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Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter
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South Africa—What Is To Be Done
Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter 253
Russia, America and Détente ..... *Helmut Sonnenfeldt* 275
The Myths of Eurocommunism ..... *Jean-François Revel* 295
The Soviet Quandary in Asia ..... *Donald S. Zagoria* 306
Thinking Through the China Problem ..... *Richard H. Solomon* 324
Begin's Strategy and Dayan's Tactics: The Conduct of Israeli Foreign Policy ..... *Amos Perlmutter* 357
The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests
Richard G. Darman 373
Scarcity and Strategy ..... *Geoffrey Kemp* 396
Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico ..... *Ansley J. Coale* 415
RECONSIDERATIONS
The Question of Containment .. *Eduard Mark/John Lewis Gaddis* 430
Recent Books on International Relations 442
Source Material ..... *Janet Rigney* 463

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The fall of any year tends to be a time when major international negotiations come to a head. (Why this is so might be the occasion for reflection, but need not detain us now.) And this seems to be particularly true in the fall of 1977, with a Panama Treaty concluded and proceeding to the ratification process, a SALT agreement possibly imminent, and both the Middle East and southern Africa situations at a boil.

For a quarterly magazine that seeks to cover the international waterfront with the most timely and reflective articles possible, this presents problems. If the issues have become clear, as in the case of the Panama Treaty and (largely) SALT, then the debate has entered the public arena, and there is a question whether arguments in our pages can contain that element of originality we constantly seek. It happens that *Foreign Affairs* anticipated the major issues in both these cases and has earlier covered them extensively. With this in mind, we have tended to feel that additional articles at this stage would not add enough, unless they could present some special angles or arguments.

For others of the list above, the situations are so fast-moving that any article may, at worst, be overtaken by events even by the time of publication, or at best have only a short intellectual half-life. To be on top of such cases is to risk having them move out from under. The dilemma cannot be avoided.

Foreign Affairs will never be designed to be inscribed on tablets. In aiming to inform our readers in as reasoned and sprightly a way as possible, we shall sometimes—as in the article on Israeli foreign policy in this issue—stress timeliness at the risk of rapid obsolescence. In other cases we shall decline the gambit, and save our always-scarce space (at least in terms of the worthwhile manuscripts we receive) for the longer and slower waves of history. If readers think we have our balance wrong, do let us know.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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Clyde Ferguson
William R. Cotter

SOUTH AFRICA: WHAT IS TO BE DONE

The October 19 decision of the South African government to continue a policy of total repression of internal dissent all too clearly marks the end of one era in American-South African relations and opens a new and more dangerous period. Among the most ominous attributes of the repressive measures were the arrest of Percy Qoboza, editor of the *World,* the largest "black" newspaper in South Africa; the banning of Donald Woods, editor of the "white" *Daily Dispatch*; and the closure of the *World* itself. The effect of the government's action was to silence some of the major voices of moderation in the Republic. The arrest and then death of Steve Biko under highly suspicious circumstances had already removed another spokesman for a policy of evolutionary change in South African society.

The harsh reaction of South Africa to internal black unrest and ferment should not, however, have engendered the shock and surprise that evidently marked the reaction of the international community. For more than three-quarters of a century, black South Africans have persistently attempted to establish black organizations to importune or confront the government. The consistent reaction of the government has been eventual, often brutal, suppression. Before the turn of the century the African Methodist Episcopal Church, a militant, ably led black American denomination, gave shelter to several black proto-protest groups consisting mainly of members of the tiny emerging black middle class in South Africa. After the creation of the Union of South Africa under British auspices, these nascent groups coalesced into the Native National Congress (later the African National Congress)

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in 1912. Without suggesting that the analogy is complete, the Congress operated in much the same fashion as the NAACP did in the United States for the same 35- or 40-year period—it begged the white establishment for alleviation of the black condition without suggesting that repercussions would follow a spurning of its pleas. Of course, there were several important differences between the Congress and the NACCP—the NAACP had access to judicial relief while the Congress did not, and the NAACP represented a minority whose demands could be accommodated within the American system. When the black Congresses, African National and Pan-Africanist, joined in protests and confrontational demonstrations culminating in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the governmental response was the prompt suppression of both movements and the bannings, harassment and imprisonment of activists.

By the 1970s, as repression grew ever more harsh and international condemnation ever more intense, a new black movement emerged—first among the black university students and then among urban blacks—taking as its leitmotif the raising of black consciousness. The values of black pride and self-reliance were stressed, adding a new dimension to previous politicization of blacks. The death in detention of Steve Biko, the movement's acknowledged leader, and the resulting black and white public furor evoked the expected and predictable reaction—suppression of the organizational forms of the movement, the Black Peoples' Convention and more than a dozen major associated groups, black and white alike.

A combination of factors, including the racial composition of our society, our commitment to human rights, and the evident Soviet interest in the revolutionary potential of southern Africa, preclude U.S. indifference to these internal events in South Africa. What our response should be, however, depends upon an analysis of trends within South African society and their effect on U.S. interests. An approach to our dilemmas regarding South Africa that has had particular appeal to some Americans in the past decade is a policy of "communication" with South Africa's whites to persuade them to change their ways. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon officially opted for this policy in choosing Option 2 of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 in 1970. A notable contemporary argument for this position has been enunciated in an article by former Under Secretary of State George Ball in the October *Atlantic Monthly*.[1] It is our contention,

[1] George Ball, "Asking for Trouble in South Africa," *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1977, pp. 43–51.

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however, that even an updated version of the communication policy will not foster the major U.S. objective regarding South Africa—a transition to a just power-sharing with a minimum of violence. A number of implications for U.S. policy flow from this conclusion.

II

Because Mr. Ball's essay has attracted enough attention both in this country and in South Africa to have become a counter in the debate about U. S. policy toward South Africa, his expression of certain key arguments will be used here in discussing this approach.

Mr. Ball's analysis is directed toward demonstrating that Vice President Mondale's equation of "full political participation" for Africans with "one man, one vote" is likely to increase the resistance of South African whites to any sort of a settlement and that the U.S. government ought, on the contrary, to direct its influence toward the achievement of some goal that whites do not find unacceptable. Since the Vice President's statement, U.S. officials have repeatedly declared that the United States has no timetable or formula in mind for achieving change in South Africa. Mr. Mondale himself stressed the same point in an October 17 interview with the South African newspaper, the *Rand Daily Mail,* saying that the United States has never put forward a plan for change in South Africa because we do not have one.[2]

Both South Africa's whites and Mr. Ball warn, however, that U.S. pressures will push them into a defensive fortress or *laager.*[3] "If we use our leverage toward an unachievable end," Mr. Ball writes, we will drive "the Afrikaners into fierce resistance to any change whatever."[4]

In fact, both English and Afrikaner whites have—in the absence of significant pressure—long demonstrated just such fierce resistance. The history of South Africa has been characterized throughout this century by movement in one direction—into the *laager,*

[2] The Mondale interview was reported by Bernard Gwertzman, "Mondale Eases South Africa Stance," *The New York Times,* October 18, 1977, p. 3.

[3] This term is derived from the circle of ox-drawn wagons inside which the migrating Boers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took shelter at night.

[4] The South African mining magnate, Harry Oppenheimer, enunciated a similar argument in an October 14, 1977 address to a standing-room-only audience at a Foreign Policy Association luncheon in New York: "Peaceful change is . . . not possible unless the white Afrikaners can be brought to believe their identity would not be threatened should they cease to hold their present monopoly of political power." But, he continued, "Any foreign opposition to the policy [of South Africa] is resented and denounced as an unwarranted interference by outsiders in South Africa's internal affairs." Stephen Rosenfeld made a similar point when he declared, in *The Washington Post* of October 21, 1977, that to air the concepts of one man, one vote or majority rule "is to subordinate the existing equipment for change in South Africa to American foreign policy goals in black Africa and perhaps to domestic political considerations as well."

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into a defensive structure founded on the progressive consolidation of white power through the legal separation and subjugation of blacks. From 1912 to 1948 the English-speaking community presided over the passage of legislation enforcing racial separation. Skilled work by blacks in extractive industries was prohibited by the 1911 Colour Bar Act, and the Natives Land Act of 1913 set the pattern for restricting freehold ownership of land to whites. After the electoral victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948, the Afrikaner government significantly quickened the pace of repression, arming itself with varied "legal" instruments. Particularly notable was the Group Areas Act—enacted with dispatch in 1950—which established the separate areas in which each racial group could live and earn wages. Following this came a bewildering army of mixed-marriage and immorality acts, jobs reservation laws, and separation-of-residence requirements.

It is significant that the rigid structure of separation and repression was solidified during years in which South Africa was comparatively free of external pressures. Following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and until the end of the Portuguese empire in 1974–75, South Africa enjoyed unprecedented growth, as Western capital flowed in; seeming internal stability with virtually no visible black resistance; and relative protection from international harassment (with the United States, Britain, and France applying their U.N. vetoes reliably in South Africa's behalf).

Despite their relatively favorable circumstances, and the gentleness of Western admonitions about the South African system of racial separation, the Nationalists used this period progressively to dismantle the rule of law and enforce a new kind of separation through such laws as the General Laws Amendment Acts, which granted the Minister of Justice wide powers to arrest and detain without court approval; the Suppression of Communism Act, further restricting members of banned or suspect organizations; and the Terrorism Act, which established a very broad definition of terrorism and allowed indefinite detention without trial.

A main bulwark of apartheid, the institution of separate tribal lands for each ethnic group, was elaborated during these years. According to South Africa's Bantustan or homelands policy, the deprivation of black political rights and economic freedom is compensated by citizenship in black tribal areas or "homelands," over which blacks will ultimately exercise full political control. Today, even after efforts at "consolidation" of the many scattered parcels of land, only 12 to 13 percent of South Africa's territory nominally belongs to its 18.6 million blacks, while 87 percent is reserved to its

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4.3 million whites.[5] Thus the argument that pressures will only drive white South Africans "into the *laager*" is demonstrably flawed. During a period of prosperity and relative peace, they were moving deeper into their defensive structure, and fortifying it energetically.

Middle-aged blacks in South Africa remark on the difference between their experience of whites and those of their children—"the only white they know now is the policeman." Yet Mr. Ball judges that trends within the Afrikaner leadership indicate that positive changes will be forthcoming: "members of the South African government are actively discussing for the first time the abrogation of some of the more repellent measures." It is difficult to understand the basis for this prediction. Despite promises of "major changes" by the South African government,[6] what is happening in that country is uninterrupted movement toward the further consolidation of apartheid.

In Durban and Cape Town today, for example, residential areas are being razed and families displaced to complete the separation of the races. African lawyers are now being ordered to move their offices out of Durban (where their clients are during office hours) and into the Zulu homeland some 15 miles out of town.

As Mr. Ball sees it, South African political reform may be characterized by "two steps forward . . . and one step backward." The reverse, however, is more likely. In a recurring pattern of taking away much and giving back a little, the South African government after its November 30 election will probably put forward some sort of reform—perhaps further technical changes in the Pass Laws or the restrictions on the owning of freehold property by blacks in urban areas. At the same time, however, the government threatens to add to its arsenal of restrictive legislation laws that would effectively curb nongovernmental organizations (and therefore much of the private voluntary activity which has provided an outlet for black and white efforts to ameliorate, reform, or develop alternatives to the existing system) by requiring that: only organizations registered with the government may offer social welfare services; no one may practice social work but a registered social worker; and no one may collect money for charity

[5] Eventually destined by the South African government's plan to become 9 independent nations, the homelands (including the Transkei, which has been declared independent by the South African government) remain scattered fragments throughout the landscape of white South Africa.

[6] The most famous of these was the pledge by South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, on November 10, 1974, that there would be "startling" developments in South Africa's racial policies provided they were given six months to implement them.

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without government permission. Although Mr. Ball notes approvingly the government's proposed constitutional reorganization, which, he says, "would give Asians and so-called Coloureds—but not the black majority—some degree of political participation," the proposed parliaments for Coloureds and Indians are likely to mask further entrenchment of white authoritarian rule. The details of the changes will not be fully revealed until after the election, but their outlines promise the creation of three parliaments—for whites, Coloureds and Indians (but not blacks)—of which varying percentages will be appointed by the government. The appointment of members to the white Parliament represents a further move away from democratic government, and a further emasculation of an already weak opposition. In the Cabinet Council to be elected by an electoral college of the three groups, whites would exercise numerical control (even, according to Prime Minister Vorster, if the Coloureds and Indians eventually exceeded the whites in population).[7] In addition, the government would no longer be headed by a Prime Minister, elected by Parliament, but by an Executive President elected by the electoral college effectively controlled by the Nationalist Party. Finally, the fact that both the Coloured and Indian councils have rejected the plan does not seem to have daunted the government's constitutional planners.

In sum, available evidence, from history and contemporary events, would indicate that significant movement toward power-sharing in South Africa is unlikely in the absence of felt external pressure.

III

International efforts to affect South Africa's internal situation—and international concern with the distribution of power within that country—do not, of course, originate with the Carter Administration. Beginning almost literally with the birth of the United Nations, the racial policies and practices of South Africa have engaged the attention of the international community. The notion that South Africa's internal situation was of international concern was voiced as early as 1946 when the Indian delegation to the General Assembly charged that Indian settlers in South Africa had suffered progressively worse discrimination since 1885. In September 1952, 13 countries requested the inclusion of an item on the agenda of the General Assembly entitled: ". . . the question

[7] "MP Answers Queries on Constitution Plan," by Patrick Laurence, *The Rand Daily Mail*, October 6, 1977.

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of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa." The group of 13 alleged that policies and practices of the government were "creating a dangerous and explosive situation, which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

In 1954, the U.N. Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa concluded: "Although the Commission appreciates the importance of securing equal economic opportunities for all, regardless of differences of race, colour or belief, it feels bound to state its conviction that *steps to achieve political equality among ethnic groups are of prime importance and cannot be continually deferred without serious danger*...." (Commission's emphasis). The reaction of South Africa to the request was to insist that the United Nations was incompetent to consider the matter. In the U.N. General Assembly debate South Africa's representative, relying on statements made by John Foster Dulles in the course of drafting Article 2, asserted that under international law the relationship between a state and its nationals, "including the treatment of these nationals," is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, "which allows no interference either by another state or by any organization."

During the 1950s South Africa was supported by the United States and the United Kingdom in this position. The issue of whether South Africa's treatment of its nonwhite population is a matter of "international concern" or is solely within "domestic jurisdiction" has been a divisive issue for the world community throughout the intervening period.

IV

With the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November 4, 1977, terming the export of arms to South Africa a threat to the peace and invoking a mandatory arms embargo, the domestic jurisdiction argument has been significantly eroded. But the argument has now reappeared in discussions of the situation in South Africa in the more subtle formulation put forward by Mr. Ball in his *Atlantic* article. In effect, the thesis of nonintervention in domestic affairs has shifted from legal argument to political strategy.

In its implications for U.S. policy, the crux of this argument is that the international community in general and the United States in particular must limit themselves to what would not be unaccept-

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able to South Africa's whites (equated with the diplomatically "do-able"). The creation of a South African regime of separate but equal—perhaps starting with the upgrading of black educational opportunity and a gradual dismantling of petty apartheid—is seen by Mr. Ball as possibly do-able.

A major semantic difficulty with this argument is that Mr. Ball's definition of "petty apartheid" seems to differ widely from that of South Africans. Whereas they use the term for signifying racial separation on the level of park benches, as well perhaps as in railroads and in restaurants, for Mr. Ball "petty apartheid" means "pay discrimination and the regulations that reserve skilled jobs to white workers and deny blacks the right to positions involving authority over whites. It means bringing to an end the harsh decree that denies South African citizenship to blacks who live in white urban communities." White South Africans do talk frequently of ending "petty apartheid," but most of Mr. Ball's definition would constitute for them the central core of apartheid and is therefore not negotiable. If urban blacks were accorded full citizenship, they would outnumber South African whites by two to one and the Afrikaners by more than three to one. Thus, common citizenship with urban blacks would mean the end of all apartheid and not a mere refurbishing of its "petty" face.

The underlying problem with Mr. Ball's proposal, however, lies precisely in the fact that three-quarters of a century of history has demonstrated that equality is unacceptable to white South Africans. Even now, the Bantustan policy, the "acceptable" embodiment of "separate but equal" in South African terms, demonstrates the reality of what "equal" means to the ruling South African establishment.

V

Central to the crisis in South Africa is the sharing of political power, whether the sharing formula is "one man, one vote" or some other. The formula for sharing political power must represent the expression of *all* South Africans as to their future, not simply that which white South Africa is prepared to yield voluntarily. It is now too late in the day to suggest that the South African solution can be anything other than the beginning of a process in which all South Africans have a voice—the aim of which is to determine the distribution of political power. For, while whites have evidently not altered their commitment to racial separation and subordination, black politicization has been greatly spurred by the fall of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique as well as

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the disruptive power of the liberation fighters in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the prospect of black governments in both Zimbabwe and Namibia.

In general, black moral awe of whites is largely diminished. Thus, South Africa's blacks become increasingly impatient for significant change. The impotence of the government in the face of a student boycott of the schools in Soweto and other urban townships, which has virtually ended African secondary school education in Soweto and severely curtailed it in other places, has demonstrated the efficacy of a new use of black power. The related resignations of close to 400 teachers and high school principals in Soweto may constitute an equally significant turning point toward the radicalization of the black middle class. (The action of the government in seizing about 200 schoolchildren among the more than 600 blacks arrested on November 10 in a black township outside Pretoria may have represented a first attempt to force these students back to school.)

But as we have seen, there is no sign that white South Africa is prepared to consider an effective sharing of political (and hence economic) power. Pretoria has not even been prepared to admit blacks to the process of devising the acceptable. Thus a violent and protracted collision seems inevitable unless a combination of internal pressures and resources in the international community can be used to enlarge the ambit of what is "acceptable" to the minority ruling establishment.

The events of October 1977 in South Africa painfully demonstrate that Western rhetorical condemnation and abjuration have been most ineffective in inducing movement toward the goal of shared political power. But it is asserted that international business and the business community in South Africa contain as yet untapped reservoirs of reforming potential and that the exercise of this community's economic power can bring about a political evolution satisfactory to blacks and whites alike. The proponents of this view make an appealing analogy to the civil rights movement of the 1960s in the United States.

The parallel is particularly appealing because it permits Americans to advise South Africa on the basis of our experience. Framed in the metaphor of Birmingham, demands upon South Africa are shorn of the appearance of moralizing. And the metaphoric analogue carries the comforting message that the consequences of racist ideology can be ameliorated without the elimination of the ideology itself. But South Africa is not the American South a decade and a half ago. Nor is South African business the U.S.

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Steel of Birmingham in the early 1960s.

Until the onset of the current South African recession two to three years ago, the primary characteristic of South African business was its enormous profitability. For the past 25 years, U.S. returns on investments in South Africa ranged between 15 and 20 percent (although in 1975 they fell to 8.6 percent because of the recession). The wellspring of that profitability is not difficult to identify: its source is cheap black labor.

The exploitation of the vast black South African labor pool is illustrated by looking at the wages of blacks relative to those of whites. Figures for the mining and manufacturing industries in 1975, for example, show a broad gap: in manufacturing the average monthly wage for whites ($714) was almost five times that of blacks ($148.40); in mining the average monthly wage for whites ($868) was eight times that for blacks ($103.60). To expect business in South Africa to exert its influence to redistribute political power in a fashion which threatens its very raison d'être is to ascribe to that community an unwonted altruism. The real costs to business of a white majority sharing political power with a black minority do not threaten the structure of profitability remotely to the degree that it would be threatened by a black nonbusiness majority exercising political power *over* a white business minority. As George Ball points out, the demographic structure of the South in the 1960s, where blacks did not constitute more than 37 percent of any state's population, did not present the risks to profitability and stability that the demographic structure in South Africa presents to South African business. Profit-making enterprises have shown little propensity to commit economic suicide by misconceiving the political structures that best serve their interests. Certainly there is motivation on the part of the economic sector to initiate changes that may abate possible disruption of the status quo. It is too much, however, to expect business to push for significant change of conditions that make profitable operations possible.

Left to itself, South African society appears to possess neither the will nor the resources to effect fundamental alterations in its political structure through a nonviolent process. Indeed, violence is already present in South Africa. The maintenance of the status quo ultimately rests on violence—the monopoly of violence by the state against blacks has already been exercised from Sharpeville to Soweto. The real issue is whether substantial change can be induced without violence by blacks against whites. But here too, low-level black violence is already present in South Africa. The

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unthinkable must be thought—what should be the position of the United States and the international community in response to a possible race war in South Africa?

VI

In discussing U.S. policy options toward South Africa, we should first look at real or perceived U.S. interests and the related question of domestic interest groups' shaping or constraining policy.

U.S. international and regional political goals in southern Africa can only be sketched briefly here. African policy and almost certainly southern African policy became a priority concern to American policymakers only after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. The factual premise of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of "tilting" toward the white regimes—namely the durability of Portuguese colonialism—was in error. With the belatedly perceived threat of a communist presence in southern Africa after Angola, the memorandum's conclusion, that U.S. interests were best furthered by a continuance of the status quo, also appeared faulty. For the Soviet Union had since the early 1960s been betting on the end of white minority rule by aiding the liberation movements of southern Africa. (George Ball seems puzzlingly to misconstrue this situation when he advances the complicated argument that if the United States, "having encouraged insurrection by talk of 'one man, one vote,' then refused assistance to blacks," not only would the communists jeer at us, but "they would probably provide the aid we are withholding.")

An essential element in U.S. policy since Angola has been active involvement in securing peaceful transitions in both Zimbabwe and Namibia. In this effort, the cooperation of South Africa has been sought. In the fall of 1976, the State Department vigorously denied that either an express or tacit understanding had been reached with South Africa that, in exchange for Pretoria's efforts to reach an agreement with Ian Smith, the United States would give South Africa breathing space in regard to its own racial policies. In the fall of 1977, faced with three African-sponsored resolutions in the U.N. Security Council calling for imposition of punitive sanctions against South Africa, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, admitted that a major constraint on U.S. policy lay precisely in the fact that the United States looked to South Africa to assist in procuring a Rhodesian settlement. The assertion that South Africa must undertake major changes in its racial policy for reasons of South

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Africa's own best national interests was lost in yet another reformulation of U.S. interests. However, South Africa is indeed the central problem of southern Africa and no resolution in southern Africa is possible without a substantial change in South Africa's racial policy. In the long run, U.S. interests in the area are best protected by a peaceful settlement in South Africa itself. Furthermore, it should be obvious that the South African government will advance such settlements *only* when it believes they are in its own interest. If South Africa doubts the long-term U.S. resolve, it may prefer to keep the pots boiling—to keep guerrilla warfare away from the South African heartland; to preoccupy international attention with these issues; to concentrate Soviet interest on the buffer areas; and to buy time until new elections are held in the United States and United Kingdom, in the hope that friendlier administrations will be installed.

Economic interests may also exercise a determining—and perhaps constraining—influence on U.S. policy. U.S. investments in South Africa amount to little more than one percent of our total overseas investment. Because U.S. investors include the top 50 U.S. corporations, however, they may wield a disproportionate amount of influence with the U.S. Congress. The other main Western economic interest—in South Africa's gold, chrome, diamonds and iron ore—is considerable. But, arguably, long-term access to these can best be safeguarded by dissociation from the present regime.

More substantial constraints on the scope of U.S. policy toward South Africa can be identified in the domestic imperatives of U.S. society. U.S. policy toward South Africa is now and always has been shaped by domestic concerns and interests. Mr. Ball apparently fears that powerful domestic constituencies may "engage us too deeply in that area's agonies." If he has in mind pressures from American blacks, however, history does not hold grounds for his fear. Although there are now signs of change, until this time the least relevant and least potent domestic dynamic has been the opinion of the black constituency. To assert that an activist U.S. policy of pressuring South Africa to reform its internal racial policies is (or would be) solely a product of domestic black political forces is to give far too much credit to the power of the black community in the United States and to underestimate American idealism. The domestic constraints on American policy toward South Africa are much more fundamentally emanations of the nature of American society.

Of course the fact that more than 10 percent of the American

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population has roots in Africa has indeed affected American policy toward South Africa. Until now, however, the effect has been on the whole negative. Too often, indeed, South African-American relations have been viewed as analogous to American black-white relations. On the one hand, the American experience has taught the political impotence of blacks on issues in which the decisive factor is race; on the other hand, the same experience has instructed that there is always a nonviolent accommodation to essentially racial conflicts. The result has been a kind of American myth—that there is always a solution to racial problems which will not unduly upset present arrangements and expectations. Thus, a constraining force in African policy has always been our own national experience.

A related constraining force on policy options is that imposed by racism. It is sometimes useful to remind ourselves that there are Americans who sympathetically identify with the architects of apartheid in South Africa. Many more would vigorously deny such an identification but nonetheless assert that the outside world has no right to judge the exigencies of a system developed by the whites for their own survival.

VII

Given U.S. interests, the domestic constraints upon policy options, and the nature of contemporary South African society, what is possible as a U.S. policy in South Africa? The United States both for itself and as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council does have an interest in avoiding an escalating race war. It is obvious, however, that this country cannot dictate or impose a solution to the South African problem, and an imposed solution has never been a serious element of U.S.—South African policy. Even if there were an American will to do so, such a course of action would not be politically in the interest of the United States. But to recognize the limits of American power and policy is not the equivalent of supporting only resolutions that would now be acceptable to the white South African community.

Mr. Ball's proposal, that the United States indicate to the South African government "what, short of majority rule, we might be prepared to support," would be asking for trouble in both South and black Africa. In addition to embroiling us rather deeply in the processes of change in that country, it would also deprive us of flexibility as mediators by identifying us with the position of a particular faction or factions.

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Instead, we should reiterate our goal as formulated by Vice President Mondale and other Administration spokesmen: to foster a process in which all South Africans play a part in determining the future of their country. To alleviate unnecessary fears, we should make it clear, from the outset, that we sympathize with the expressed need for firm and enforceable constitutional guarantees protecting the human rights of all citizens in South Africa.

Mr. Ball advises that we not try to isolate further the Afrikaners but rather "bring them into harmony with the 20th Century and the prevailing social values and concepts that are espoused by other noncommunist democratic nations." We doubt that the Administration would quarrel with that reformulation of our policy goal. But the question is, how do you accomplish this? Clearly a system which was in harmony with the "values and concepts" of the West would require, at a minimum, the evolution of a process of joint decision-making in South Africa which would give participation, for the first time, to the 83 percent of the population who have thus far been excluded.

The basic demand of a wide range of black South African leaders has been to convene a national conference where freely chosen representatives of all groups would have an opportunity both to help shape their future society and to decide on transitional steps necessary to reach that final goal. Similar demands have been made by a wide variety of white opposition members of the South African Parliament. While Mr. Ball is silent on this issue, we assume he would favor such a convention as the last, best chance for achieving a negotiated, relatively moderate political system of power-sharing in South Africa. The alternative is, indeed, ghastly: hardening positions on both sides, growing racial hatred, escalating violence and superpower intervention.

Our difference with Mr. Ball, then, lies not in defining the proper American goal but rather in spelling out the tactics to be employed. Mr. Ball would, apparently, have us *increase* our contacts with the South African government so that we can expose Afrikaner thinking to "the liberalizing currents of the 18th and 19th Centuries." He would have the United States "quietly urge" the Afrikaner government to change its ways. But he does not say what action the United States should take if increased contact and "quiet urging" do not succeed in bringing the Afrikaners into the twentieth century.

Many Africans and Americans who have studied South Africa over the past 30 years feel there is no evidence to support the view

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that increased contact and "exposure" to "liberalizing ideas" have had any positive impact on the Afrikaner government. The very opposite seems true. Far from moving toward internal, multiracial dialogue about South Africa's future—a path involving little risk to Vorster, since he could break off talks, with little cost, at any time he found them unproductive—the South African government has now embarked upon its most ambitious program to annihilate all organized opposition. How much longer does Mr. Ball want the United States to follow our past policy of "quiet urging" when it is obvious that we have pursued this for 30 years with only negative results?

Because U.S. leverage in South Africa is mainly with the white community, our best hope of minimizing violence is to convince whites of the extremity of their position. No people throughout history has relinquished power without being required to do so. Only a combination of serious international and domestic pressures will bring home to white South Africans the necessity of moving *now* rather than waiting until it is too late for any form of peaceful settlement.

It is clear that the Carter Administration (supported by a vote of 347 to 54 in the U.S. House of Representatives) is now determined to take "effective measures" aimed at encouraging Vorster to try internal dialogue and to stop repressing black leaders who must, inevitably, participate in any future national convention.

The first step in a policy designed to encourage a transformation in South Africa's political process has already been taken in the recent U.N. Security Council action, when the United States led its Western allies to a unanimous vote mandating an international arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. That same week, although the Western powers made it clear by their Security Council vetoes that they were not now prepared to adopt *full* economic, political and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, Ambassador Andrew Young affirmed that the United States is considering other (unspecified) steps. He said, following the mandatory arms embargo vote: "We have just sent a very clear message to the government of South Africa . . . that continuation on the course on which it is embarked can only lead to further strains on ties between South Africa and other members of the international community." While threatening additional "sticks" Ambassador Young also held out the "carrot" that the Security Council must "make clear our desire for reconciliation provided South Africa is willing to begin progress toward the end of apartheid."

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The next move in the United Nations should be to declare that South Africa's internal situation—not merely the supply of arms to South Africa—constitutes a threat to peace under Chapter VII. The rising tide of militant nationalism within South Africa, combined with the reactions of black African nations, the Soviet Union and others to the Vorster government's use of force to suppress all black attempts at political organization, have created a tinderbox similar to Rhodesia. Increasing violence by the Vorster government against black consciousness groups is bound to generate increased counter-violence. Transborder guerrilla movements are already occurring, and this threat to international peace will certainly grow unless the Vorster government changes its policies.

Such a finding would not require the United States or any other Western power to support the immediate applications of sanctions. There is no legal requirement that recognition of a "threat to peace" requires coterminous economic or military sanctions. The two issues are entirely separable. Indeed, it might well be more effective first to recognize that the situation is a threat to the peace, leaving to the future the imposition of appropriate sanctions.

Various other measures are available to tighten the screws on a graduated, sequential basis over, say, a two-year period. The shopping list of possible U.S. actions *short* of mandatory economic sanctions is enormous. The Administration's flexibility in employing these various tools is correspondingly wide.

The United States should try, wherever possible, to encourage multilateral action—through the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and other appropriate world bodies. Multilateral initiatives are likely to be both more effective and politically more palatable to the Carter Administration, which does not want to get too far ahead of its Western allies on this or other sensitive foreign policy issues. On the other hand, we must frankly recognize that the United States has a smaller economic stake in South Africa than some of our allies (particularly the British) and is, correspondingly, more free to act. Although we must weigh the impact of unilateral steps on our allies, we must also be careful not to let our actions be dictated completely by their interests; otherwise, multilateral actions could become as weak as those which are acceptable to the most timid of our allies.

Listed below are 41 distinct steps which the United States, acting alone or in concert with its Western allies through the United Nations, might employ. This list does *not* contain such highly controversial items as cessation of trade, withdrawal of current investment, military support to the liberation forces or

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other "drastic" measures which were embodied in the recently vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions. We realize that general mandatory sanctions would require far more active mobilization of U.S. political will as well as a possible naval blockade of South Africa to ensure implementation. Such steps are not likely to be adopted in the present U.S. political context, although their imposition should be clearly held out as a *future* possibility if all intermediate steps fail.

The following more moderate steps have been widely discussed in the United States and are, we understand, under active consideration by the Carter Administration.[8] These options have been divided into five categories: diplomatic; military; support for refugees, liberation movements and African states; "mild" economic steps; and, finally "tough" economic steps. Space limitations do not allow a full argument of the pros and cons of each step, but possible actions are, generally, listed in ascending order from the easiest to implement through the most difficult to implement:

Diplomatic Options:

1. Issue a presidential condemnation of the bannings, detentions and other police actions in South Africa.
2. Give presidential attention to detained black dissidents in South Africa (as has been done in the case of Russian dissidents).
3. Reiterate that under no circumstances would the United States intervene militarily to assist the white South African government in suppressing a black revolution.
4. State that under no circumstances would the United States recognize the Transkei, BophuthaTswana, or any other so-called independent homeland.
5. Eliminate U.S. commercial, defense and agricultural attachés to South Africa and end all U.S.-South Africa cooperative agency agreements, such as those with the Treasury and the Defense Departments.
6. Institute an expanded educational and cultural exchange program with South African blacks, Coloureds, Asians and institutions and individuals working for meaningful change.
7. Increase the number of black American staff members in the

[8] See, in this connection, the list of 22 "options" gathered by the Congressional Reference Service for Congressman Don Bonker of Washington in the *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., February 2, 1977, Washington: GPO, 1977; the 12 Congressional Black Caucus recommendations presented to President Carter and reprinted in *South Africa/Namibia Update*, November 2, 1977, p. 2; and the Nine-point program suggested by Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa at the 1976 African-American Conference, *Toward a New Africa Policy*, Report of the 1976 African-American Conference, Maseru, Lesotho at pp. 19–20.

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U.S. Embassy in South Africa (including, possibly, the appointment, for the first time, of a black American ambassador).

8. Instruct the U.S. Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission to attend all political trials, inquests and other judicial proceedings in South Africa to show solidarity with the accused and the oppressed.

9. Arrange for the President to meet with liberation movement leaders from South Africa and Namibia when they visit this country. (He has met Chief Gatsha Buthelezi but he should also talk with such recognized liberation leaders as Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress; P. K. Leballo, Acting President, Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania; and Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia.)

10. Cease condemnation of the efforts of blacks in South Africa to achieve their freedom by forceful means and, in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, acknowledge their right to use whatever means are necessary to achieve self-determination when moderate paths fail.

11. Encourage U.S. sports figures to participate in the growing sports boycott of South Africa.

12. Cease all intelligence cooperation with the South African government.

13. Downgrade our representation from ambassadorial to chargé level in South Africa and close our outlying consulates. (This obviously would only come *after* earlier U.S. Embassy changes fail to bring about change.)

14. Join the U.N. Council on Namibia, the Apartheid Committee and other bodies of the United Nations engaged in increasing international pressures on South Africa.

15. Put U.S. visa policy toward South Africa on a reciprocal quid pro quo basis (unlike the current situation where white South Africans are free to travel to the United States while U.S. Congressmen, journalists, academics, black American leaders and others are regularly denied visas to visit South Africa).

16. Finally, as argued previously, make it clear that South Africa's internal situation itself—not merely the supply of arms to South Africa—constitutes a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. (The arms embargo is ambiguous on this point.)

Military Options:

17. Tighten further the definition of what constitutes "military" equipment.

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18. Terminate the sale of weapons-grade uranium to South Africa and end all other nuclear collaboration.

19. Encourage our allies, particularly the Israelis, French and Italians, to abide by the U.N. mandatory arms embargo and to give the broadest possible interpretation to such "gray areas" as the provision of spare parts, components and repairs, light aircraft, (including civilian aircraft), the training of South African military personnel (including correspondence courses and participation at conferences), and cooperation in research and development of military know-how (including the testing of military equipment).

20. Make certain that NATO does not collaborate with South African military personnel in any fashion and make it explicit that the NATO umbrella does not extend to protect South Africa from internal or external military pressure.

Options with Respect to Refugees, Non-military Support of Liberation Movements and African States:

21. Offer political asylum in the United States to South African refugees and facilitate the issuance of travel documents and visas for such individuals.

22. Increase scholarship assistance for such refugees to enable them to attend both technical and higher education institutions in Africa and in the United States.

23. Contribute substantially to the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa, a voluntary fund used for legal assistance, education and refugee relief.

24. Support multilateral (via the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations) or bilateral programs of humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements, including the provision of educational and medical supplies.

25. Increase support to the front-line African states affected by their proximity to South Africa. These states include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia. These nations have been shouldering huge economic losses resulting from the liberation struggle in southern Africa and, unless there is a change of course in South Africa, are likely to suffer even more in the future. Botswana and Lesotho are particularly vulnerable to "counter-pressures" by the South African government, and the international community should be making contingency plans *now* for supplying needed resources to these countries (including oil) in the event of South African cutoffs.

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Mild Economic Steps:

26. Discourage foreign business expansion in South Africa and vote for the Swedish resolution in the United Nations which calls for no new international investment. This should not cause excessive domestic political problems for the Administration since some 30 American companies in South Africa have already decided to freeze their current level of investment for the next five years, and another seven are actually planning to pull out. Among those that have adopted a policy of non-expansion of their subsidiaries in South Africa are Control Data, Ford and General Motors. Polaroid has just pulled out.

27. Advise U.S. businesses that if they decide to stay in South Africa, they do so at their own risk and that, in the event of difficulties with liberation movements, the U.S. government would not protect them.

28. Encourage U.S. firms in South Africa to establish fair employment practices *including* a new program to recognize and deal with black labor unions. This latter point is significantly absent from the so-called Sullivan Principles (named for Rev. Leon Sullivan, a black American board member of General Motors) which have now been adopted by 54 U.S. firms, but *is* included in the Common Market code adopted by the EEC.

29. Amend Executive Order No. 10925 so that, with respect to U.S. businesses in South Africa, fair employment practices in their South African enterprises would be made a condition for their eligibility for U.S. government contracts.

30. Eliminate Export-Import Bank facilities still available to South Africa. (Current policy permits insurance and guaranteed coverage in commercial sales. It normally limits the terms of such coverage to two to five years but the limit can be extended if necessary.)

31. End U.S. Department of Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits to South Africa.

32. Warn U.S. traders with South Africa that they should be seeking alternative suppliers since the security of supply, given the unsettled internal conditions, cannot be guaranteed.

33. Discourage the travel of U.S. tourists to South Africa—now totaling more than 50,000 a year. American tourism constitutes an important source of foreign exchange for the South African government as well as a major propaganda asset.

Tough Economic Steps:

34. Prohibit U.S. banks and other financial institutions from

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providing financing to the South African government or its parastatal corporations.

35. Deny foreign tax credits to U.S. firms operating in Namibia. (This merely requires a reinterpretation by the Treasury Department of current law rather than new legislation.)

36. Embargo the transfer of new technology that might assist the South African government in enforcing repression.

37. Enforce Decree No. 1 of the U.N. Council on Namibia calling on all states to seize any exports from Namibia which reach their shores and to hold them in trust for the Namibian people.

38. Reduce or terminate landing rights for South African Airways in the United States.

39. Prohibit the importation of South African goods into the United States on the grounds that they violate U.S. laws banning importation of goods produced by "slave" labor.

40. Use U.S. influence in the International Monetary Fund and in other ways to depress the world gold price. This could severely reduce South African foreign exchange earnings, which now help cover its enormous trade deficit.

41. Use our influence with Iran (South Africa's principal oil supplier) and with U. S. oil companies (the principal refiners) to get them to abide by the international oil boycott of South Africa.

VIII

We are not suggesting that the use of any or even all of these "sticks" would topple the South African government. The United States acting alone cannot bring South Africa to its knees, nor is it likely to try. However, we *can,* by using selected pressures, increase the cost of Afrikaner intransigence, support the internal efforts of blacks and, perhaps, cause moderate whites in the society to take to the streets in civil disobedience against what will surely be increasingly harsh restrictions on their *own* freedoms. With the white editor of the East London *Daily Dispatch* now banned, how much longer can white press freedom survive? How long will able white lawyers be permitted to challenge the government through the judicial system and to embarrass the police responsible for internal security, as Sydney Kentridge did in the Biko inquest?

In undertaking a long-range, carefully moderated but rigorous policy to deal with South Africa, the United States must be prepared for tough countermeasures by the Vorster government. For example, South Africa, in retaliation against an oil embargo, would almost certainly cut off oil supplies to Botswana and Lesotho. In retaliation for a policy that discourages or prohibits new

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loans or investments, it might freeze repayments of old loans or the repatriation of profits and proceeds from sales of capital assets in South Africa.

On the other hand, the United States must also stand ready to "loosen the screws" and offer "carrots" when there are signs of real change on the part of South Africa's whites.

If we pursue a two-year path of graduated actions, we may frequently have to act alone: our British allies have a much greater economic stake in South Africa than the United States and are not likely to join us in exercising many (if any) of the options we are now considering. We should also be aware of South Africa's growing propaganda attempts to convince Americans that "important changes" are taking place when, in fact, they are only desegregating the deck chairs on the *Titanic*.

Finally, we must be careful of the oft-repeated argument that Western pressures on South Africa will hurt the country's blacks most. Yes, increased pressures will hurt blacks in South Africa, but they will affect the still-complacent white community most fundamentally. Blacks have little to lose—and they know it.

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Helmut Sonnenfeldt

RUSSIA, AMERICA AND DÉTENTE

During the past year, spokesmen in the Carter Administration have on various occasions urged us to be less preoccupied with the Soviet problem. Because of the rise of Soviet military power, it has been said, there was a tendency in recent administrations to see Soviet-American relations as the center of the universe and to pay inadequate attention to other forms of power and trends extant in international affairs, including some of the less than successful ventures of Soviet foreign policy in the past few years. President Carter, in a major address at Notre Dame University last May, suggested that we had been given to an "inordinate fear" of the Soviet Union and that it was time to approach our relations with Moscow with greater confidence.

Nevertheless, the problem of Soviet power remains a central concern for the United States. As Marshall Shulman, formerly of Columbia University and now the principal Soviet affairs advisor to Secretary of State Vance, stated in congressional testimony last October: "there is scarcely an aspect of international life that is not affected by this relationship, and that would not be made more difficult and more dangerous by a high level of Soviet-American tension and unregulated competition."

Some of our debates about Soviet policy have tended to turn more on the definition of the labels that have been attached to it than on substance. "Containment," "cold war," "an era of negotiation," "détente," and a host of other phrases have paraded through the headlines over the years. They all caught elements of the complex realities and challenges confronting American statecraft in dealing with the U.S.S.R., but over time they came to obscure rather than illuminate them. Some of them, like "containment" in its day, and "détente" most recently, have acquired pejorative meanings. It is instructive to go back to the debates over Soviet purposes and American policies 30 years ago to find that invidious definitions of "détente"—like "one-way street" and "giveaway"—

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had their almost precise antecedents at that time.

President Carter, at Notre Dame, sought to take the curse off "détente" and to return it to respectability by defining it as "progress toward peace," involving cooperation which also implies obligations. This seemed a sensible way to describe the issues in a relationship which, Administration officials have once again wisely reminded us, will long be marked by a mixture of cooperation and competition. Policy, of course, should try to shape this mixture and the contents of each element in ways that protect and advance American interests and values. Put another way, given the weight of the Soviet Union in international affairs as it now exists and evolves, we must be concerned with the role it plays; and our policies must be concerned with how we can help to affect that role. That does not necessarily make the Soviet Union the center of the universe but, for better or worse, a major actor whose future and conduct is of vital importance to us. That broad problem, rather than how to encapsulate the tasks before us in a phrase, is what should engage our concerns.

II

While recognizing the existence of a multiplicity of trends in the international arena—even if we wished it were not so we must begin any consideration of the choices before us with the fact that the Soviet Union is the principal military opponent of the United States in the world and will remain so for the indefinite future. It is not likely that any other single power, or combination of powers, will assume this position for the rest of the century.

America and Russia have been military antagonists since the end of World War II, but the character of this relationship has changed substantially over this period as the U.S.S.R. has become a power of global rather than essentially continental dimensions.

It will remain a matter of speculation whether the Soviet Union or, for that matter, the United States, intended at the end of World War II to become global military competitors. Much argues for the view that the Soviets set out to maintain military forces sufficient, in their estimation, to prevent the recurrence of the near disaster of World War II; in short, their military programs were designed to protect the Soviet periphery on the Eurasian landmass, including territories acquired outright in the course of the war or subjected to Soviet control in its aftermath.

But, as Stalin made clear in early 1946, the commitment to this task was not finite. It involved an open-ended determination to

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build up the physical strength of the Soviet state. The economic priorities and efforts of the society were single-mindedly geared to this objective, which, moreover, never seemed to be quite within reach. As the outside world reacted by building or rebuilding its own defenses, the Soviets, in turn, saw in them a renewed threat to themselves.

In any case, the advance of military technology and the increasing domination of postwar international politics by Soviet rivalry with the United States, already a strategic power with global concerns, virtually ensured that the U.S.S.R. would gradually acquire forces that could be brought to bear beyond the confines of the Eurasian land mass. It began to do so in earnest in the mid-1950s. This period coincided with accelerated decolonization in the less-developed world, and, under Khrushchev's leadership, produced a renewal of the revolutionary optimism that had waned soon after the Bolshevik Revolution. That optimism was almost certainly nourished by a growing sense of power. And Soviet ambitions to support the "national liberation" struggle, in turn, fed the impulse to acquire the instruments of power.

As the process of building large and diverse military forces went forward, a powerful military-industrial interest group evolved within the Soviet political structure. It gradually achieved a major, if not always fully united, voice in Soviet economic decision-making. Soviet political leaders, from the Khrushchev to the Brezhnev eras, never lost the basic propensity to amass power but their ambitions to provide also for a measure of improvement in the lives of the Soviet people and to further the modernization of the Soviet economy involved increasingly complex choices concerning the allocation of resources. It has clearly been the purpose of the military-industrial elite to ensure that in this process the power sector of the economy should always be allotted a large proportion of Soviet economic wealth, skilled manpower and technological resources.

Given the centrality of economic decisions, it was hardly surprising that this broad interest group should seek a significant say in the makeup of the post-Stalin political leadership. It seems fair to say that none of Stalin's successors could consolidate or even attain power against the sustained opposition of the military-industrial elite. In retrospect, it is suggestive that some major Soviet military decisions during the 25 years since Stalin's death seem to have coincided with periods of political maneuver among the top leadership. With the lead times involved, it can thus be noted that the impressive advances in Soviet strategic and naval

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power in the early and mid-1960s must have stemmed from decisions taken a decade earlier, the period, that is, in which Khrushchev was consolidating his power. Similarly, the wave of Soviet strategic deployments that gathered momentum in the early 1970s, and the impressive modernization of Soviet theater forces in Europe, which began to show its cumulative effects in the same period, must have derived from decisions in the mid-1960s—the period when Brezhnev was consolidating his own authority following the removal of Khrushchev.

Without pressing the suggestion too far, any assessment of the goals of the Soviet military buildup must at least give some weight to such indigenous factors. If there is any validity to this supposition, we may again be entering, if we are not already in, a period in which the bargaining surrounding the emergence of a new leadership will produce military decisions whose effects will become evident probably in the early to mid-1980s.

But apart from speculation concerning the domestic political origins of particular decisions, a steady growth of Soviet military power has been assured by the long-term growth trend of some three to four percent a year in military outlays. The result of this persistent effort has been that in the strategic area the U.S.S.R. has been deploying forces needed, by any reasonable set of criteria, not only to deter attack, but capable of threatening the effectiveness and survival of substantial portions of U.S. strategic strength. Thus, the Soviet land-based missile force now being deployed, though somewhat inhibited by the first SALT agreement, is on the way to placing in jeopardy the fixed land-based ICBM forces of the United States that have long constituted a reliable part of the U.S. deterrent. Further, while under the 1972 ABM treaty both sides agreed to curtail antimissile defenses, major Soviet research-and-development programs continue in this field while a major air defense program is degrading the effectiveness of the present U.S. bomber force.

In addition, the Soviets, after relying for an extended period on a relatively modest and steadily aging heavy bomber force, are now adding to it some of their Backfire bombers and, according to reports, are also developing a new heavy bomber. These forces do not, at present, have to contend with any significant American air defenses.

The Soviets have also steadily increased the size and capabilities of their sea-based strategic forces, whose numbers (over 60 nuclear-powered submarines and over 800 launchers) are substantially larger than those maintained or planned by the United

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States. In this category, the United States will, however, retain larger numbers of re-entry vehices for the foreseeable future.

In the roughly quarter of a century since both sides began to deploy strategic nuclear delivery systems, there have been times when the forces of each were vulnerable to disabling attack from the other. In the face of such dangers, various measures could be and were taken by both sides: dispersal of bomber bases, the placing of bombers on airborne alerts, the deployment of missiles in dispersed silos or on mobile launching platforms such as submarines at sea. Moreover, bombers and missiles were equipped with penetration devices to maintain their ability to reach targets despite defensive weapons deployed against them. The purpose of these measures, as far as the United States was concerned, was not only to ensure the effectiveness of its strategic forces if a decision to launch them were to be made; the intent was also to reduce pressures to launch weapons in haste, should there be ambiguous evidence of a possible attack, or, in some other crisis conditions, lest they risk being destroyed before they could be used.

The United States, in this context, developed certain doctrines concerning "stablity" in strategic relations and generally deployed forces in numbers and with characteristics consistent with them. The Soviet Union never enunciated such doctrines authoritatively—though there is much evidence that Soviet strategic analysts understand them. The Soviets did, of course, act to protect their own forces by means not unlike some of those used by the United States. But for some time now they have gone beyond this in a manner inconsistent with what Americans regard as compatible with stability. It is this trend, perhaps more than the purely numerical advances in Soviet force levels, that has given rise to concern that the Soviet Union seeks substantial military advantages over the United States.

This American perception is reinforced by the fact that the changes in the strategic relationship have a profound impact on regional military balances, notably in Europe. The Soviets have, of course, long enjoyed regional military advantages on their periphery; that, indeed, has been an outgrowth of the military policies initiated in the Stalinist period. In Europe, where this problem affects American interests most directly and, contrary to our historical tradition, gave rise to treaty commitments, the United States for many years offset Soviet advantages by augmenting NATO's conventional forces with the deployment of nuclear weapons in the theater and the potential use of strategic nuclear

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forces. Similar conditions prevailed at other points around the Soviet periphery where the United States entered into defense commitments.

But in Europe particularly, the elements in the balance have been steadily shifting as the Soviet Union's own theater nuclear forces and strategic power have grown. And, added to these developments has been the dramatically growing strength of Warsaw Pact conventional forces in recent years, as well as the deployment of large Soviet naval forces on NATO's flanks, to the point where there must now be concern that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring an ability to launch an attack without NATO being able to count on adequate warning and mobilization.

Along with the increase in Soviet strategic and regional power, there has also emerged a substantial and still growing capability for military intervention at large distances from the U.S.S.R. The principal elements in this capability are the large and diversified Soviet navy; a growing merchant fleet that can be used to sustain naval units operating at great distances from home; and a growing number of various types of transport aircraft as well as ships, capable of moving men and equipment to virtually any location in the world (though for more distant places the ability to do so rapidly will be affected by overflight and intermediate landing rights). These forces have never been used for overt military attack. But they have several times been brought into play to supply and support the military preparations, and, in some instances, the military actions of others, usually with the justification that the U.S.S.R. was aiding a "national liberation" struggle. In Angola, for the first time overseas, the Soviets actually transported and equipped a proxy expeditionary force to intervene in a conflict.

The trends briefly reviewed here have convinced many in the West that the Soviet leaders have been pursuing a deliberate policy of achieving military "superiority" over the United States. Soviet spokesmen, including Brezhnev, have vigorously denied any such intent and have solemnly repudiated any notion of a "first strike" against U.S. strategic or any other forces. Especially in private meetings with official and private American representatives, Soviet spokesmen, like some Americans, have argued that even if the Soviet Union were to acquire a theoretical ability to destroy a high proportion of American ICBMs and to intercept large numbers of American aircraft, the remaining American strategic capacity would make the risks of any Soviet strategic

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attack prohibitive. Some Soviet spokesmen, pointing to the American overseas base structure, naval aircraft, and still sizable advantages in numbers of deliverable nuclear warheads, contend that far from seeking superiority the U.S.S.R. is still in the position of catching up. They stress, moreover, that Soviet force planning must also take account of British, French and Chinese nuclear forces, all of which are being, or may be, modernized. One also occasionally encounters claims to a form of "historical justice" according to which the United States, which for so long enjoyed advantages in strategic posture over the Soviet Union, should now get accustomed to having this situation equalized, if not reversed.

The question of whether Soviet military growth has the specific purpose of securing "superiority" in accordance with some systematic schedule and with specified criteria cannot, in fact, be definitively answered. For, as the Soviets undoubtedly realize, the answer does not depend on their desires or plans alone; it depends on American actions as well as those of other military powers.

Despite some hesitations and controversy, the United States has indeed begun to take measures that would, over time, reduce the dangers to the effectiveness of our strategic forces. Thus, the capacity of our bombers to penetrate to their targets can be improved, if not restored to earlier levels, by equipping them with various types of cruise missiles and other devices; our land-based missile force can be reinforced by the projected MX missile, which, in its proposed mobile deployment mode, would be substantially less vulnerable to a highly damaging attack than the Minuteman force; cruise missiles launched from submarines or surface vessels could in time likewise augment our retaliatory capability, something of considerable interest also to our European allies. There are several other technical possibilities open to the United States, which, while not necessarily removing Soviet advantages in certain areas of strategic power—such as the total payload that can be delivered by the Soviet missile force, the size and payload of individual missiles in that force, or the number of missile launchers—could nevertheless substantially reduce the threat of an effective attack on portions of our strategic force.

Furthermore, some of the technical options open to the United States have the potential of posing increasing threats to the Soviet Union's own land-based strategic forces. For the Soviets, this may be a possibility that is even more troubling than the vulnerability of our Minuteman force is to us, because Soviet land-based missile

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forces represent a far larger proportion of Soviet strategic power than our land-based forces do for us. This is but one example of the uncertainties the Soviets face in seeking a meaningful advantage over our strategic forces.

There are other vulnerabilities, actual and potential, in the Soviet military position, which, depending on the extent to which the United States and others exploit them, complicate a Soviet quest for superiority. For example, Soviet naval forces of all types, including those carrying strategic missile launchers, must pass through relatively constricted waters on their way to and from home ports. There is little Russia can do about this awkward fact of geography. It may account, in part, for the fact that thus far the Soviets have reportedly maintained on station at sea only a relatively small portion of their 62 nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines with their 800-plus launchers.[1]

More generally, the Soviet Navy, while growing impressively in the number and variety of its vessels and in the skills and experience necessary to operate at great distances from home, does have vulnerable lines of communication. It has few secure ports and anchorages outside the U.S.S.R. in case of war. (The recent expulsion of Soviet military personnel and facilities from Somalia is but the latest instance of the fluctuating success of the Soviet Union in maintaining a far-flung support structure for its long-range military capabilities.) The Soviet navy is also approaching a period when large numbers of ships become obsolescent at about the same time.

The fact that the Soviet Union has not succeeded in surrounding itself with friendly states will continue to impose major military expenditures on it. And the forces that it will find necessary to deploy, particularly vis-à-vis China, play little direct role in the balance with the United States and the West.

Further afield, while Soviet long-range intervention forces have grown, no one can assume that Soviet military interventions will always go unopposed locally or by possible counterinterventions by the United States or other military forces. The Soviet capacity for sustained or intensive operations overseas remains modest.

In sum, though its military growth has been unremitting and impressive, this has still left the U.S.S.R. with substantial actual and potential limitations on the effectiveness and utility of its armed forces. If the Soviet Union does seek a dominant military position, the United States and other nations retain the ability to

[1] Data on Soviet force levels are in *The Military Balance, 1977–78*, London: IISS, 1977, p. 8.

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impose on the U.S.S.R. continuing heavy requirements for additional and diversified forces. But the United States and others must communicate a readiness to do so not only in words but also through actual defense efforts. Indeed, that is the principal means by which the United States can not only protect its security interests but also stimulate Soviet desires, present in an ambivalent way since the days of Khrushchev, to seek negotiated agreements that limit the growth of international military programs.

Plainly, the Soviets are interested in inhibiting the military programs of potential adversaries, and, equally, they would prefer to do so by cutting down their own programs as little as possible. So far, experience does not bear out the hope that acts of American self-restraint induce reciprocal acts by the Soviets; on the contrary, they tend to make negotiations more difficult. This is not a "bargaining chip" argument, for it is unwise to develop and buy expensive forces simply for the sake of trading them away again on the bargaining table. Forces should be bought to serve requirements, and they should be maintained as long as they are needed. If negotiations or unilateral actions remove or reduce a requirement, then the forces designed to meet it can be adjusted accordingly.

In the current state of negotiations it is rates of changes in forces, upward or downward, that will be the most likely subject of agreement. For example, as has been pointed out by the Administration, no foreseeable SALT agreement is likely to remove or even greatly reduce the vulnerability of our fixed, land-based missile force. If, therefore, the United States wishes to retain an effective and secure land-based component in its strategic force, it will need to take action to proceed with an MX, or similar type of missile. How rapidly it actually does so can be adjusted, by negotiation or otherwise, to the development of the threat to the Minuteman force. If, beyond that, the United States wishes to persuade the U.S.S.R. to consider reducing the counterforce capacity of the Soviet land-based missile force, it may be able to do so by signaling an intention to increase the vulnerabilities of this force by increasing the projected MX force. Whether such an increase actually goes forward can be negotiated or decided in the light of how the U.S.S.R. disposes of the threatening portions of its own land-based missile force. If a SALT agreement is to have the effect of reducing actual or emerging instabilities in strategic relations, it should not foreclose U.S. programs that safeguard the effectiveness of U.S. forces, though it can also provide an incentive for the Soviets to moderate the most threatening aspects

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of their strategic dispositions.

In short, the propensity of the Soviet political system to amass power, whether to attain superiority or simply to have it as a tool to implement policy, can probably be affected only marginally by current negotiations. The latter are not likely, in the foreseeable future, to relieve us (and others) of the need to offset some of the gains the Soviet Union has achieved in recent years, particularly in the area of strategic forces and in the European theater. The margin of what may be negotiable will widen as the Soviets become persuaded that negotiation is the most effective way to inhibit the worrisome military programs of their adversaries, in return for inhibitions on their own.

But neither negotiations nor the military programs of the outside world seem likely to divert the Soviet Union from its determination to be the other military superpower in the world. The impulse to amass military power seems pervasive among the Soviet ruling elite regardless of generation. Soviet political dynamics seem to favor it, and the Soviet economic system seems unalterably geared to it.

III

Possession of military power does not necessarily determine how, and how effectively, that power is used. External powers, notably the United States, have had little ability to influence the growth of Soviet military power. Nor are they likely to have anything but a modest direct influence in this respect in the future. But they must and can be concerned with the uses to which that power is put. For the United States, broadly speaking, the purposes of policy toward the Soviet Union must be, on the one hand, to prevent injury to American interests and, on the other, to avoid open warfare. Policy must operate within these limits.

The question with which American statecraft must cope is how to maximize the restraints upon the uses of Soviet power. Part of the answer, as already indicated, is to seek to maintain a military balance, where possible in direct or indirect association with others who share our interest in restraining the uses of Soviet power and the potentially detrimental effects of its existence. This raises complex problems in addition to those alluded to earlier about the size and types of forces we must maintain and acquire over the rest of the century and beyond. Without addressing details here, the general point should be made that military deterrence requires forces that are generally thought to be usable for defined ends

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should fighting break out with the U.S.S.R. or its clients. To the extent this can be done, it is likely to place restraints on direct and indirect Soviet use of force, because it serves to impose upon Soviet decision-makers substantial uncertainties regarding the outcome.

But the problem does not end or begin with military measures alone. The Soviet Union, both as a polity and as an actor on the world stage, has developed unevenly. The international environment in which its power has developed and can be used is itself in a state of dynamic evolution. Military power does not translate automatically into influence and even less into control. Even in regions where Soviet military power goes essentially unchallenged, such as in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has not been able to control or prevent developments which sap Soviet hegemony or, at any rate, undermine the kind of uniformity which Soviet rulers used to consider essential to their own well-being and security.

Elsewhere, in more distant areas, where the projection of Soviet power at one time appeared to confer upon Russia a potentially dominant influence, indigenous and external factors have diluted it or, in some instances, even reduced it to the vanishing point. This is not a law of nature and cannot be relied on to work automatically, especially if the United States itself is uncertain about the Soviet role it prefers to see in these regions. But the history of the last 20 years or so of Soviet "imperial" penetration into distant regions does provide a useful corrective to earlier fears—and Soviet expectations—that Soviet influence once established will become dominant and can only rise.

Among the reasons for the spotty Soviet record is that the Soviet mentality does not adapt easily to the nationalism and peculiarities of other peoples; Soviet ideology and institutions have not proved to be readily applicable or even appealing in other places and societies; Soviet political support is equivocal and frequently self-serving; and Soviet contributions to social and economic development are often inept, inappropriate and irrational, reflecting, as they do, Soviet society itself. For all the Soviet efforts during the last 20 or more years, it is the Western industrialized nations, and the international institutions they have been instrumental in erecting, which have played the greater external role in the development of the new nations around the world. All these factors have limited or even counteracted the effects of Soviet military power in advancing Soviet influence.

One is tempted to conclude from the history of the postwar period, which includes also the increasing diversity within the

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international communist movement itself, that socialism—Soviet-style—in one country, once a temporary expedient, has in fact become a hallmark of our era. Whether it will remain so will depend, in part, on the evolution of Soviet society itself, on the people who run it after the present generation leaves the scene, and on whether Soviet military power will continue to be balanced so that it cannot become so overwhelming in some place or region as to enable the U.S.S.R. to determine the course of events there for a substantial period of time.

IV

Meanwhile, the steady though uneven expansion of Soviet external influence has been accompanied by, and has indeed contributed to, the gradual emergence of the U.S.S.R. from its isolation. This is most notably the case in the area of economics. Burdened as it is with enormous and constantly rising military expenditures as well as by ponderous and over-centralized bureaucratic controls and a rigid social structure, the Soviet economy has been unable with its own resources to provide for the broad modernization of Soviet life. While impressive by the indices of the 1950s, the Soviet economy lags well behind other industrial countries in technical sophistication and productivity. Trade with the outside world has long been used to fill gaps that the Soviet economy itself could not fill. But the volume and diversity of this trade have steadily increased in recent years; the methods have evolved from barter or straight cash deals to more complex commercial arrangements, including considerable reliance on foreign credits. These latter have now risen to some $40 billion for the Soviet block COMECON countries as a whole; Soviet hard-currency indebtedness is in the neighborhood of ten billion dollars. A substantial volume of economic activity in the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern countries must now be devoted to earning hard currency to finance imports and to service mounting indebtedness.

Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders have affirmed Soviet interest in an international division of labor, though they certainly have not meant by this any total Soviet reliance on certain external sources of supply. Indeed, in their foreign economic policies the Soviets have sought to minimize extended foreign reliance by trying to get foreigners to build up within the U.S.S.R. economic and technical capabilities which the Soviet Union is unable or unwilling to create with its own resources and skills. The Soviets no doubt continue to hanker for some form of autarky even if, for a time, they are prepared to accept something called a division of

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labor. But there is no reason why the external world needs to accept this Soviet preference. It is true that a systematic long-term policy by the industrialized nations to maximize Soviet economic reliance on the outside world would encounter formidable difficulties. In particular, Western political and economic systems do not readily lend themselves to long-term economic policymaking of any sort, but this is especially so since the long-term management of economic relations with the U.S.S.R. would require large-scale and sustained government involvement. The difficulties in coordinating the policies of several of the principal industrial countries are even greater, despite the fact that these nations should have the incentive to do so since they are linked to each other by security alliances and numerous other institutional arrangements as well as common interests and broad values.

Despite the difficulties, there is scope for an economic strategy that uses Soviet needs to draw the U.S.S.R. into the disciplines of international economic life. The United States, for example, although unable to use periodic Soviet need for grain for specific political purposes, e.g., to affect Soviet conduct in a crisis, did prove able to negotiate an agreement that imposes more orderly practices on Soviet behavior in this field. The 1975 grain agreement requires the Soviets to consult the U.S. government before it can purchase agricultural products above eight million tons a year[2]; it requires the Soviets to purchase a minimum quantity of six million tons of certain specified products from the United States each year even when they would not otherwise do so because of a satisfactory harvest; and it places upon the U.S.S.R. obligations to permit U.S. vessels to ship the products Russia buys.

In the future, it should not be impossible to reinstitute Soviet eligibility for U.S. government export-financing facilities and thereby to influence the flow of credits and the degree to which the Soviet Union balances the reliance on credits with the use of exports to finance its imports. In general, it would be desirable to encourage the U.S.S.R. to pay for more of its imports with exports and to reduce the share of credits in financing imports. If the issue of tariff discrimination were at some point separated by the United States from issues of Soviet emigration policy, to which it is now linked, the Soviet Union might have incentives to devote more high quality resources to exports. Soviet economic planning and priorities could thus become somewhat more susceptible to

[2] According to press reports, the Soviets may have found a way to circumvent this consulting requirement in signing contracts to buy grain to make up shortfalls in the 1977 harvest. While the purchases involved will apparently be from American sources and thus benefit American farmers in a surplus period, it would be desirable to correct any loophole in the 1975 agreement.

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external demands. Moreover, it would be both desirable and feasible for Western nations to evolve harmonized concepts in these respects, with the goal of reducing the autarkic nature of Soviet economic decision-making and complicating Soviet resource choices.

Soviet economic connections with the outside world seem, in any case, destined to become more extensive and complex. Already, the Soviets are not immune to currency fluctuations and inflationary trends beyond their own borders. Their planners and hard-currency managers must take account of them, and Soviet economic officials have an obvious stake in operating in foreign markets to minimize injury to Soviet financial interests. Western governments should consult and work with one another to ensure that the U.S.S.R. operates responsibly in the international financial community and that individual Western lending institutions do not become excessively exposed vis-à-vis the East.

Over the somewhat longer run, the Soviets may get caught up in international energy shortages and price rises. Russia's own resources, while large, will evidently become increasingly expensive to recover, and international dealings in the energy field on a growing scale may well become part of Soviet economic life. Planning should be undertaken sooner rather than later for the time when the Soviets may become large-scale petroleum buyers in international markets. There may be similar needs and opportunities with respect to other commodities. The needs of Moscow's East European allies in these areas may provide useful leverage to help induce Soviet interest in more orderly international arrangements.

Many other fields of actual or potential Soviet involvement in the international system can be cited.

For some years now, the Soviets have sensed the need to participate in international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapon manufacturing capacities around the world. Indeed, because most potential nuclear weapons states are not friends of the U.S.S.R., Moscow seems to have sensed the need for restrictive actions even before some Western nations. So far, the Soviets seem to have imposed fewer limitations on their domestic nuclear power development than the United States. The future of the breeder reactor and the "plutonium economy" is uncertain as the United States debates its merits, and other Western nations experience domestic opposition toward these and other kinds of nuclear power facilities which may make the pursuit of coherent nuclear energy policies difficult if not impossible for some years to come. It remains to be seen to what extent these problems, including that of waste disposal, spill over into the U.S.S.R. At any rate, however, Soviet export policies are becoming part of an international regime in this area, and the utility of Soviet nuclear exports for political purposes, by "underselling" Western sup-

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pliers, is now probably minimal.

The regime of the world's oceans is another area where the Soviet Union is compelled to participate in international discipline if it does not wish to deny itself the benefits of the available resources. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. should not expect to be able to operate in outer space without submitting to legal and other constraints developed by the international community. Incentives also exist for Soviet participation in international arrangements to curb environmental pollution. The international civil aviation regime is still another example.

V

In these and other ways, the Soviet Union has slowly and often grudgingly accepted foreign constraints on its freedom of action. Will these constraints also affect the way in which the U.S.S.R. pursues its geopolitical interests and ideological ambitions through the use of its military power? The answer depends in part on the extent to which external powers see international politics as composed of interrelated parts. But there can be no definitive answer because the processes whereby the U.S.S.R. is becoming more involved in the international system are frequently only in an early stage and far from fully understood. And even when adequately appreciated, it is not always simple to utilize them for broader political purposes; nor is it obvious how to do so. Moreover, the cost of depriving the Soviet Union of some of the benefits of international interaction may fall not only upon the Soviets. We have, for example, seen how American farmers were opposed to our own government's using possible embargoes on grain exports in order to exert political pressures on the U.S.S.R. Western bankers may well fear the effects of massive defaults by their Eastern clients if economic relationships become hostage to political vicissitudes.

Yet these are issues that have to be faced. The growing needs of the Soviet Union for access to the assets and products of the West should be satisfied to the extent that Moscow conducts itself with restraint internationally. It is probably not workable to deny a particular benefit or break a specific contract in an effort to affect Soviet conduct in a crisis. But given the interactions that have already evolved, a strategy should be possible whereby these evolving mutual reliances can over time moderate any disposition to let competition drift into crises of such intensity that they will inevitably tear the fabric of interconnections. But, to repeat, such a strategy can work only if the military risks for particular Soviet geopolitical excursions continue to be kept high.

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VI

There is a further and perhaps even more controversial and contingent set of factors that needs to be put in the balance. Inflation, environmental pollution and the other issues alluded to above are not the only external forces that fail to respect national or ideological boundaries. Soviet society, in part because of the broadening and intensification of Soviet external relations in the 1970s, is no longer hermetically sealed off from the outside. Blue jeans, rock music, literature and pop art are but a few, and probably the least significant, of the foreign habits and activities that have begun to affect Soviet life. More significant, there probably would never have been major Jewish emigration pressures in 1971–72 if there had been no leap forward in the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States. There probably never would have been any Soviet response—however reluctant and sporadic—to the demands of foreign constituencies of some sections of Soviet society if Soviet leaders had not begun—however hesitatingly—to calculate their interests in terms of their reputation abroad. It is worth noting that even after the Jackson Amendment was enacted and the Soviets angrily rejected their trade agreement with the United States, Jewish emigration continued at over 12,000 a year and individual "hard-core" cases continued to be acted on favorably. As we have learned this past year, Soviet toleration of these kinds of external intrusion is not unlimited, and foreign powers, to be effective in influencing Soviet practices, must calibrate their strategies and tactics with some care. But the principle has been clearly established that the state of human rights within a country is now a matter of legitimate international concern.

The Jewish population is not the only minority in a state composed of minorities. Thus, in the case of ethnic Germans wishing to leave, the Soviets have also been prepared to respond to outside pressures and inducements. Who is to say how foreign constituencies may someday manifest their interest in the condition of the Soviet Union's large and growing Muslim population? And who is to say how the long-suffering Soviet consumer may some day find his frustrations adopted as a cause abroad? Will Soviet youth be forever kept on an intellectual starvation diet compared to their counterparts in other industrial societies?

These lines of speculation should not be pushed too far. The Soviet system is traditionally repressive. Its aristocracy has a vigorous sense of survival in the face of real or imagined threats to its monopolistic hold on power. It possesses a vast panoply of instruments of power to contain unwanted intrusions.

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Yet, the Soviet Union can never return to the isolation cell to which Stalin condemned it to make his brand of socialism in one country a reality at home and a virtual impossibility abroad. That isolation is now past history, though there is probably little the Soviets can do for years to come to make themselves "beautiful Russians" around the world. By the same token, the costs and risks of using power for political ends, and the impediments to doing so, are amply present in the world at large. And the world at large, in all its variety, increasingly stretches its influences into domains hitherto controlled by the Soviet rulers.

VII

We have thus entered an era in which the United States and the external world generally can seek increasingly to draw the Soviet Union into the constraints and disciplines but also the advantages of the international system. To do so requires conscious strategies and policies. Passive reliance on historical trends will not suffice. Much progress was made during the 1970s, building on some progress before that, to devise "rules of conduct" for the restrained uses of power. The American-Soviet understandings arrived at during the three summit conferences of the early 1970s, the Helsinki Final Act, and numerous similar understandings between the U.S.S.R. and various Western nations such as France and Germany, have probably gone as far as negotiated documents can go in laying down ground rules for competition. None of these understandings are, however, self-enforcing in the sense that they will be adhered to simply because they have been put on paper. Nor can they be instantly or systematically implemented except where very precise obligations are involved, as in arms control agreements. Many of the understandings, such as the Joint Statement of Principles of 1972, the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973 and the Helsinki Final Act provide standards and goals rather than enforceable commitments to specific, unambiguous modes of behavior.

The Soviets have undoubtedly contravened some of the principles, and they probably consider that we and others have also contravened them. Notions about eschewing efforts at obtaining "unilateral advantage," in particular, are difficult to nail down in the shifting sands of international alignments and in circumstances where the successor states of the old colonial empires continue to be embroiled in territorial and other conflicts and seek external support for their causes. The effects of Soviet, or American, efforts to gain "unilateral advantage" are often unpredictable.

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The United States has not resisted, and sometimes has sought, opportunities to diminish Soviet influence in places where it had previously flourished—for example, in the Middle East—though this has not always resulted in corresponding American gains.

The Soviets for their part were quite prepared to seek a new role for themselves in southern Africa when the decisions of the U.S. Congress made the risks of doing so seem manageable while the benefits of not doing so were not evident. Their use of Cuban proxy troops—though in fact the Cubans probably pursued objectives of their own as well—opened disturbing vistas of new forms of Soviet expansion. But it also drew the United States and other Western powers more actively into the affairs of southern Africa. The Soviets were not uninvolved in the outbreak of the 1973 October War and the oil embargo, though their role was less active and direct than critics of the policies of the last Administration would have had us believe. But whatever the precise Soviet role, the outcome did nothing to impede, and actually speeded up, the decline of Soviet influence in parts of the Middle East.

Rules of conduct and other formal arrangements to limit the intensity and dangers of competition must thus be buttressed by other policies, furthering the trends discussed above, to reduce over time incentives to adventurism and to strengthen the incentives for restraint and greater interrelatedness.

This necessarily involves arrangements from which the U.S.S.R. can draw benefits, be it in the form of economic relationships or in its ambition to be accepted as a power with global interests. For Americans, this side of the equation has been a difficult one to accept and has given rise to the notion of détente as being a "one-way street." But it is almost certain that disappointments about expected benefits from détente have also led the Soviet Union to question whether or not the costs—in terms of external intrusion, limitations on Soviet freedom of action, reductions in hard-won foreign influence, restiveness in Eastern Europe, diversity among communist parties, continued high levels of American military preparedness, the unpredictability of American conduct and many other equivocal trends from the Soviet standpoint—are worth paying.

Many observers have stressed that U.S.-Soviet relations can no longer be seen as operating independently of other major trends in international politics, even if in military terms the relationship remains largely bipolar. As noted at the outset, it is often suggested that we should rid ourselves of our fixation with the Soviet Union. The time has come, says one commentator, when "at least for a

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while, the best way to conduct U.S.-Soviet relations may be to reduce the intensity of the relationship, to cool it."[3] The new Administration, like virtually all its predecessors, entered office with the hope that it could reduce the preoccupation with the Soviet relationship in order to concentrate on "world order politics" and global "architecture."

Yet Soviet military power continues to grow and Soviet involvements in world affairs, whatever the fluctuations, remain on the rise. World order politics which fail to envisage the inclusion of the U.S.S.R. in the disciplines, constraints, and advantages of the international system would hardly be consonant with the facts of the age. Despite its hopes, the new Administration has found itself heavily engaged with the U.S.S.R. and seems to devote as much energy to that relationship as to any other, if not more. It may be that, as President Carter said at Notre Dame, " . . . the threat of conflict with the U.S.S.R. has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive." But the distinctions are not always obvious. And there can be no assurance that an intensification of conflict could not rapidly return.

Thus, given the pervasiveness of U.S.-Soviet interactions, geographically and functionally, our policies toward the U.S.S.R. are likely to remain the most active and far-flung among our external policies. Certainly, because of the military aspect, they will continue to place the largest single external demand upon our resources and the federal budget. And however much we may seek to "de-link" issues in given instances, we will not be able to avoid the essential interrelationship between them. Nor should we. Efforts to regulate military competition by negotiation and agreement will not stand alone as an island in a sea of crises or virulent antagonisms. On the contrary, though it is likely to be limited in impact on military programs, the effectiveness of SALT and other negotiations will depend heavily on the rest of the relationship. Similar points can be made about virtually every major facet of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Above all, it is unlikely that the incidence and intensity of crises, whatever our diplomatic skill and other restraints, can long be held to moderate levels unless there is in operation a whole range of constraints and incentives that give each side a stake in restraint.

What is involved is, of course, a long-term evolution which requires constant attention and effort and which will see many occasions that will defy clear characterization as to whether they

[3] Seyom Brown, "A Cooling-Off Period for U.S.-Soviet Relations," *Foreign Policy*, Fall, 1977, p. 21.

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represent progress, retrogression, success, failure or "irreversibility." There is no joy in ambiguity, especially for Americans. But that is precisely what will mark our relations with the Soviet Union for a long time to come. We will probably never stop arguing over whether we actually have a détente that, in the President's words, constitutes "progress toward peace." That will have to be a judgment of history.

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Jean-François Revel

THE MYTHS OF EUROCOMMUNISM

The paradox of the concept of Eurocommunism is undoubtedly the combination of its extraordinary success in the United States and the skeptical treatment it has met since its birth in Europe in the countries concerned.[1] European political commentators, including this author, noted in 1975 how difficult it was to apply the same concept to situations so different as the Italian one, where a powerful Communist Party was allied to a powerful conservative party in order for the two of them to monopolize political life; the French one, where, in contrast, an important, though not dominant, Communist Party allied itself to the Socialists and cut the political world into two irreconcilable halves; or the Spanish or Portuguese situations, where two minor Communist Parties (about 10 percent of the vote) had more coverage than their actual weight justified (the Spanish, because it presented the most liberal image in the Western world and risked nothing by doing so, and, on the other hand, the Portuguese, by trying with the help of the army to establish a dictatorship in the purest Leninist style).

The point at which Europeans had little confidence in the solidity of Eurocommunism was evident from the moment that the first cracks appeared in the Union of the French Left, in September 1977. The explanation that immediately came to the minds of the Socialist analysts, when they perceived the incomprehensible hardening of the French Communist Party, was the influence of Moscow. These are the same people who for five years had been maintaining that French communism had completely detached itself from Russian communism, and then decided from one day to the next to perceive the hand of the Kremlin in the crisis of the French Left. The noted Paris daily, *Le*

[1] One of the favorite amusements of "political scientists" is to search for the author of the term "Eurocommunism," which was not devised by the communists. Some attribute it to Zbigniew Brzezinski, others to the director of Turin's *La Stampa,* Arrigo Levi. The latter, actually, used the word "neo-communism" (*Newsweek,* European edition, July 14, 1975). It took German erudition, in its own special way, to resolve the enigma. The word Eurocommunism was devised, during the summer of 1975, by the Yugoslav journalist, Frane Barbieri, former editor-in-chief of the most important Belgrade weekly, *N.I.N.*, fired during the purges of 1972 and today a contributor to *Il Giornale* of Milan. ("Ursprung und Konzept des Eurocommunismus," *Deutschland-Archiv,* April 1977.)

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Monde, which for years had been the most ardent defender of the thesis of the independence of the French Communist Party from the U.S.S.R., published in rapid succession two articles, "The French Communist Party and Proletarian Internationalism"[2] and "The Hand of Moscow",[3] both of which attributed the change of course of the French Communists to Leonid Brezhnev. While it is true that they left question marks, until quite recently *Le Monde* would have considered the mere question itself to be sacriligious. Nowadays, articles and declarations proliferate in Italy, in France and in Spain, proclaiming "the death of Eurocommunism" and adding "if it ever existed." François Mitterrand, Alvaro Cunhal, Felipe Gonzalez and Giorgio Amendola all agree on this point.

On the other hand, during my visits to the United States in 1975, 1976 and 1977, I saw to what degree one is suspect by the academic and the liberal press Establishment if one retains a critical attitude in regard to Eurocommunism or, indeed, to communism in general. According to the current cliché, it means "a return to the cold war." American liberals do not understand the existence in Europe, and in France and Italy in particular, of a violent anti-communist Left among people who were only 20 in 1970 or even 1975 and who have not lived through the cold war and do not even know what it is. The explosion of the "new philosophers" in France, the mass demonstrations of the extra-parliamentary extreme Left in Italy fall into this category (together with many members of the preceding generation, who have not been conditioned by the cold war). The communist phenomenon, including what I have called in *The Totalitarian Temptation,* "unofficial Stalinism," should be examined independently and not in relation to other concepts, such as the "cold war" or "McCarthyism," which are today without any semantic content.

For instance, to ask oneself whether the West European communist parties have remained Stalinist is not a matter to be resolved by a vague evaluation or by impressions gathered through personal contacts with French or Italian Communists or by a subjective confidence in their writings, promises or declarations. On the contrary, it is a technical problem: as long as the Western communist parties remain organized according to the so-called schema of "democratic centralism," meaning a Politburo, recruited by co-optation, which nominates and controls from top to bottom the members of the Central Committee and the federation secretaries, the sections and lastly the cells, and consequently all the delegates

[2] *Le Monde,* September 16, 1977.
[3] *Ibid.,* September 25–26, 1977.

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to the congresses, it is ridiculous to speak of de-Stalinization. Actually, this structure adheres strictly—and has always done so—to the Stalinist-Leninist organization of the communist party. It transforms the deliberations of the rank and file into phony discussions, completely prefabricated by the Politburo. This results in a ritual "unanimous" vote of the Central Committees of the parties. Indeed, the French and the Italian Parties have never ceased to function in accordance with this schema. And this leads one to ask the following question: if, tomorrow, in France, coalition governments were to include Communist ministers, whose orders would these Communist ministers obey? The Prime Minister's? The President of the Republic's? or those of the Politburo of their Party? In the current state of things, the answer is: the Politburo's. This is incompatible with the practice of a representative democracy, and with the Constitution, precisely because the Communist Party works in an undemocratic and oligarchic way. This technical angle is the only one that makes it possible to see things clearly: all the rest is literature and impressionistic gossip.

To take another example: independence from Moscow. It is impossible to know absolutely the degree and method used by Moscow to control the Western communist parties. But one thing can be measured with precision because it consists of public and published declarations, i.e., the extent of the support of the Italian and the French Communist Parties for Russia's foreign policy. Has there been, since 1975, one or several aspects of Soviet foreign policy toward which a Western communist party has adopted a reserved or critical attitude? The answer is simple: none. Whether it be Angola, Mozambique, the Polisario liberation front, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Helsinki agreements, Israel, the civil war in Lebanon, communist newspapers and communist leaders in the West have approved wholly and unconditionally Soviet theories and behavior. It is not a question of mysterious secret ties between Moscow and the Western communist parties but of historical fact.

II

Certainly there are other elements to be taken into account: the condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia by the Italian Communist Party or the pledge by both the Italian and French Parties to remain within the Atlantic Alliance. In these two cases, however, one must examine not the propaganda value but the substance of their declarations. The Western communist parties claim that they condemn the excesses of Soviet repression

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but simultaneously have launched a fantastic campaign of intimidation and calumny against Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Amalrik and Vladimir Bukovsky. They say they want to stay in the Atlantic Alliance (the Italians even in NATO) but French Communist Jean Kanapa's report on the defense policy of the French Communist Party results in the isolation of France within the Atlantic system and, thus, in the dismantling of the Alliance. This serves "objectively" Soviet interests, the principal designated enemy being West Germany! It is not surprising that François Mitterrand has described the new Communist doctrine in defense matters as ludicrous and that it has been one of the main points of the conflict in the crisis between Socialists and Communists in France.

Here are some examples of diagnosis and of concrete questions, which are really the only way of dealing with Eurocommunism. By contrast, to deal with it, as is frequently done, by generalizing leads to utter confusion. And, above all, the evolution of the communist phenomenon in the world should not be confused with the evolution of the psychological attitude of Americans toward communism.

In the 1950s, communism was much less powerful and widespread than it is today. The Soviet regime was isolated in its geographical sphere and the inferiority of its economy, its military forces and its technology. The riots and the staged trials in the satellite countries and the revelations on Stalinism by Khrushchev in 1956 had discredited it. Cuba was not communist. Southeast Asia was not communist. That vast portions of Africa could, one day, become subject to the direct or indirect influence of the Soviet Union was unthinkable. It was also inconceivable that West European communist parties might accede to power either by electoral means or by revolution.

At that time, however, Americans saw the communist danger everywhere. Any European who tried to explain to them the existence in Europe of a long tradition of non-communist, non-totalitarian socialism and stressed the necessity of understanding this would himself be accused of being a communist. Even worse, if he explained that the large number of communist voters in Italy or in France was not entirely due to the machinations of the KGB but had, instead, national roots that one had to analyze, he was considered an active propagandist of communism.

Today, even though communism exists on all the continents and the influence of unofficial Stalinism overlaps the actual communist sphere and penetrates even Britain's Labour Party, we witness the opposite phenomenon. Americans no longer see total-

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itarian danger anywhere when it is present everywhere. Only détente and Eurocommunism are respectable and accepted at their face value.[4] American liberals, and even non-liberals, have retained from the 1950s the idea, or rather the conditioned reflex, that the rejection of communism is always a conservative stance. This is completely wrong. In Europe, the most uncompromising anti-communists have always been the socialists, the large social-democratic parties of Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Austria and Great Britain (before the current "Marxization" of its Left wing). To this very traditional anti-communist Left have recently been added the young anti-totalitarian radicals I have mentioned above. In this context, the experiment of an alliance between the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party of François Mitterrand is not the rule but the exception, and (as the mishaps of the alliance seem to indicate) an unfortunate exception. In general, it has contributed more to the Finlandization of the Socialist Party than to the democratization of the Communist Party. Hence, it is profoundly unfair and wrong to consider all the skeptical reactions to Eurocommunism as coming solely from the Right.

The fundamental controversy about Eurocommunism in Europe is thus not a debate between the Right and the Left but between two Lefts. The question is which trend of European socialism—the Leninist or the social-democratic—will prevail.

III

Let us now return to what is, in theory, the substance of Eurocommunism, so that we can then ask ourselves if it is viable or even if it exists. Eurocommunism defines itself, in the first instance, as a demand by the communist parties for independence from Moscow and hence the right to define, at home, "their national road toward socialism." Further, it defines itself by a desire for democratization on the part of the Western communist parties and for respect for the law, both in the struggle for and in the exercise of power. Communists promise, in particular, to give up power if they lose the elections (provided there are any).

[4] One could go back even further to observe this curious Anglo-American swing: sometimes everyone is suspected of communist sympathies, sometimes no communist is considered dangerous. On May 23, 1943, *The New York Times* published an article stating that the Russians were changing the structures of their economy and progressively abandoning communism. *Fortune* (April 1943) believed that, after the war, the U.S.S.R. would be too weak to expand in Europe, even ideologically. Finally, the dissolution of the Comintern was hailed by *The Times* of London (May 24, 1943) as one of the most important events of the war and proof that the Russians would not try to influence Central Europe after peace. The monumental naiveté of these assertions need hardly be stressed today.

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These two points—de-Russification and pluralistic democracy—must be examined in turn according to two criteria.

First, are the themes of Eurocommunism new? It is important to know if this is so because Eurocommunism has been presented as a decisive, indeed an irreversible innovation, of Western communism. Second, to what extent do the words and deeds of the Western communist parties coincide? It is important to measure this, because, curiously, although communist leaders in every country have lied far more than anybody since the beginning of politics (even more than Hitler who, after all, announced his intentions quite clearly in *Mein Kampf*), it is virtually sacrilegious today to doubt their promises. Skepticism in regard to electoral promises of any political party is considered in democracies as a prudent and an elementary right of the citizen; however, the exercise of this right, when it comes to Eurocommunists, is considered (and, at the risk of repeating myself, especially in the United States) as the irrefutable sign of a conservative mentality.

To test whether or not the Eurocommunist communist parties are truly independent in relation to the U.S.S.R. and if this is a new phenomenon, one must keep in mind the following principles.

1. The relations between non-Soviet communist parties, in or out of power, and Moscow have never been without problems. The history of the communist movement is full of cases of leaders who did not think the policy that Moscow wanted to impose was suitable for local conditions. Between 1956 and 1964, for instance, the French Communist Party was constantly hostile to Khrushchev and plotted with the "Molotov group" of old-line Stalinists. On the other hand, the Italians, who had previously been in veiled disagreement with Moscow, supported Khrushchev ardently. It is difficult to interpret the real relationship because secrecy reigns over the communist world. For instance, the Italian Communist Party is now by far the Western Party that enjoys the best relations with Moscow. *Pravda* does not miss an occasion to praise Enrico Berlinguer, although logically he should be the most detested leader, since he presumably launched the Eurocommunist wave. At the Eurocommunist summit in Madrid, in March 1977, Enrico Berlinguer was the man who insisted that the final statement contain no mention of human rights in the U.S.S.R. And let us not forget that before the 1948 breach, the Yugoslav Party was the most pro-Soviet of European parties.

2. The programs of "national democratic unions" and of popular fronts demanding "original paths toward socialism" reappear periodically in the history of communist parties, especially of

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those that are not, or not yet, completely in power. In 1946, Klement Gottwald declared before the Czechoslovak Central Committee: "There is not just one road to socialism, there is not just the path that passes through the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviets. Another road to socialism can be envisaged."[5] Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, in an interview given to *The Times* of London on November 18, 1946, declared: "The progress of democracy throughout the world, despite those rare exceptions that prove the rule, permits other roads to socialism than the one followed by Russian Communists." In the same year, Mathias Rakosi for Hungary and Georgi Dimitrov for Bulgaria offered numerous reassurances in the same style: different ways toward communism exist and "there will be no dictatorship of the proletariat." These were the periods of the great alliances: Communist ministers were members of the French and of the Italian governments, with Christian-Democrats, Socialists and Gaullists. These alliances were also broken overnight. As for the countries of Central Europe, one knows the nature of the regimes they were rapidly subjected to (including Czechoslovakia, from 1948 on, *without any intervention by the Soviet army*).

3. Until now, communist strategies have always been reversible. A communist party "line" does not mean a profound change in policy as long as it can be changed at any time. We have seen in France this past September how a sudden hardening of the Communist Party can, with one stroke, reverse a policy followed for years, thus giving lie to the predictions of those who judged the change in the French Communist Party as being "final."

4. Even when the "Marchais line" and the "Berlinguer line" give formal endorsement to a certain autonomy, the governing bodies of the French and Italian Parties always include members close to the Soviet leadership, ready to take over if necessary. The same is true of the communist unions, like the CGT in France.

5. The financial relations between Moscow and the non-Soviet communist parties no longer consist of direct payments, as in former times, except in the case of the small parties (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, etc.). But in Italy and in France financial relations do exist by way of commissions on commerce between East and West received by import-export companies independent in legal form from any political party but actually owned by straw men of the Communist Parties. The most famous one in France is

[5] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 26, 1946. An even stronger declaration appeared in *Rude Pravo* on October 5, 1946.

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a company by the name of Interagra, headed by the "Communist billionaire," Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, which has the monopoly on French commerce with the East in wine, meat, cereals and butter. There are other companies of the same sort for manufactured goods. No French or Italian producer, who wants to sell to the East, can ever obtain a contract without going through one of these middlemen. This largely explains the wealth of the French and of the Italian Communist Parties, which paradoxically are the two richest political parties in their countries, although the contributions of the registered members (500,000 in France, 1,500,000 in Italy, not to be confused with voters) are very far from explaining this wealth. Consequently it is quite obvious that if the U.S.S.R. ever considered Eurocommunists as its enemies, it would put a stop to this considerable source of profits. By the same token, the Western communist parties can hardly afford the luxury of breaking completely with the Russians, even when they find them difficult to put up with. One can sometimes be on very bad terms with Moscow without breaking with Moscow, as one can sometimes be on very bad terms with one's wife or husband without divorcing.

6. Eurocommunists have never stopped totally supporting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (as has already been mentioned above).

To conclude: there have always been periods of affirmation of "national roads" followed by periods of avowed obedience to Moscow. For example, in France, the national road and the popular front from 1935 to 1939; return to Moscow with the Russo-German Pact; and, during national or Eurocommunist periods, relations with the Soviet Party are never broken. Thus, between 1935 and 1939, Maurice Thorez had his independent policy dictated to him by an agent of the Comintern who stayed at his side and whose name and activity is now known: Eugen Fried.[6]

IV

What about democratization and participation by Western communist parties in the political life and the public debates in their respective countries? Notwithstanding all the reservations that I have made above, *the right to criticize* the present regime in the U.S.S.R. and the other East European states has certainly been clearly established since 1968 and particularly since the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*. The Western communist parties had to separate their image from that of the U.S.S.R., which had become

[6] See the biography of Thorez by Philippe Robrieux, recognized today as authoritative: *Maurice Thorez, Vie secrète et vie publique*, Paris: Fayard, 1975.

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simply too repulsive. Whenever the question "Where would you want to live if you had to leave France?" was asked in polls, hardly two percent of Communist voters would answer "in the U.S.S.R." In October 1977, the French Communist Party condemned unequivocally the parody-like trial in Prague of certain dissidents.[7] But, at the same time, the French Communist Party never ceased approving as authentically socialist the foundations of the Soviet system, particularly its economic base. Proving themselves to be bad Marxists, French Communists do not ask themselves how an economic system can be fundamentally good and liberating if 60 years of police-state terror has been necessary in order to enforce it.

Above all, the essential point that I want to make here is the following: even if the Western communist parties were to go to the point of breaking openly with Moscow, which *is* possible, it would not mean that they had become, in a domestic context, democratic parties. *De-Russification is not democratization.* The Communist Parties of Yugoslavia, China and Albania have broken with the Soviet Communist Party, but they have maintained and even aggravated the totalitarian system. The most totalitarian of all the popular democracies of Eastern Europe is Romania, which as a nation-state is the one that least follows Soviet foreign policy. Nonalignment is a concept that has to do with the will of the leadership to be all-powerful and not with the will of the people to be free. The present Cambodian leaders are nonaligned, despite the recent courtesy visit of Pol Pot to Peking.

Moreover, when studying the evolution of the French Communist Party since April 1977, it is clear that its unquestionable firmness in relation to Moscow's admonitions has been accompanied by a tougher stand on domestic policy and a return to the most intransigent Leninist principles. The purpose of the campaign to "update the Common Program" was to extend nationalizations to such a degree that the better part of the French economy would have passed under the control of a state bureaucracy. In addition, the French Communist Party demanded that in all such nationalized companies the chief executive officers be "elected by the rank and file," that is to say, in practice, designated by the Communist union, the CGT, and by the Communist cells within the company. These two decisions would, as a practical matter, let the Communist Party gain control over about half of the French industrial apparatus, especially through the nationali-

[7] *L'Humanité,* October 19, 1977.

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zation of all the subsidiaries of the large companies that would come under state control.

At this point in the negotiations, the Socialists realized that their Communist allies were laying the foundations for an East European-style economy. Hence the rupture. But it is erroneous to give it a headline as *The Washington Post* did (September 27, 1977): "French Reds Risk Electoral Hopes for Ideology." Ideology had nothing to do with it. It was a question of power. Ideological concessions such as "the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat" do not bother Communists one bit. But they never yield when it comes to real power: controlling the economy, securing for the state the monopoly of economic initiative, and therefore eliminating the autonomy of the economy. This has always been the essential instrument of power of Leninism and consequently of Stalinism. This is the reason why Eurocommunists still consider social democracy as their main enemy. For the past few weeks, the French Communist Party's campaign against social democracy and the Socialist International has been revived with increased violence. If one adds to this program the maintenance of the authoritarian, even military, structure of the internal organization of the Communist Party, I really fail to see how it can be said that they have changed on truly important points.

These observations apply less to the Italian Communist Party, which is not eager to increase the public sector, already overgrown, poorly managed and operating at a loss. But what I have said remains true of its internal organization and its takeover of the mechanics of society. While representing only a third of the voters, the Italian Communist Party has managed to carry two-thirds of the cities and the regions in elections. It heads the most powerful union. And, above all, most recently it has succeeded in gaining control, directly or indirectly, over the press, the media, the publishing houses and the educational system. The ideological control of society has always been since Gramsci the essential objective for the Italian Communist Party. Neither in France nor in Italy does the Communist press show any tolerance toward adversaries or even political partners or for that matter toward Communist dissidents. Everything is always voted unanimously. How can one believe that the communist parties in power would grant freedom of expression to non-communists when they do not even acknowledge this right in the case of communists?

Eurocommunism may be defined, then, as the result of two phenomena that have occurred over the last 20 years. First, the realization in Western Europe of the economic and human failure

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of Soviet socialism. This realization is not quite clear yet but it is no longer possible to suggest the "Soviet paradise" as a goal and a model for Western voters. Second, the adaptation of the communist parties to advanced industrial societies—or rather, their clumsy efforts to "direct" these societies without renouncing their principles. Even Spain has enjoyed an economic boom during the 1960s. Portugal is the only country that missed it, and it is no coincidence that its Communist Party has been the most archaic of all.

The first phenomenon enabled the communist parties to have a much freer hand in dealing with their particular situations. If we take the Spanish Party, for instance, we must keep in mind that its extraordinary good will comes from the atrocious image it had given the Left as a result of its behavior during the Civil War. It fought the Civil War for itself and for the Soviet Union within the Republican camp, against the Anarchists and the Socialists far more than against Franco. It had to purify its image at any price.

The second phenomenon—the increasing complication of the social structure of societies enriched by industrial and post-industrial development—forces the communist parties to confront a dilemma: remain revolutionary parties and take power illegally or take power legally and blend into social democracy. Eurocommunism can be logical and coherent only if it results in the disappearance of communism. This is the reason why its short history is already filled with illogicalities, contradictions and reversals. Nothing, however, makes it possible to believe that communists do not have as their goal, today as yesterday, the monopoly of power.

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Donald S. Zagoria

THE SOVIET QUANDARY IN ASIA

There is an anecdote going the rounds in Moscow these days. It seems that Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev were all riding together on a train. Suddenly the train lurched to a stop and remained immobile for an hour. What to do? Stalin ordered some soldiers on the train to shoot the conductor. They obeyed. But still the train did not move. Khrushchev ordered the rehabilitation of the conductor. This being done, the train still did not move. Everyone turned to Brezhnev for a solution. Brezhnev ordered all the passengers on the train to hold up their hands to their mouths and to whistle. Then, at least, they would *think* that the train was moving!

The point of the story, of course, is that the aging Soviet oligarchy is not quite up to the massive problems it faces. One perceptive Western scholar of Soviet politics says the Brezhnev regime is "muddling down" rather than "muddling through." And although this tendency toward inertia in the face of serious challenges is most notable in Soviet domestic policies, it is equally apparent in Soviet foreign policy, particularly in Soviet policy in Asia.

For ten years the Soviet Union has pursued a Dulles-like strategy of containing China in Asia by building up its ground forces on the Chinese border and its naval power in the Pacific, while seeking through a variety of political and economic means to check the expansion of Chinese influence. Yet the result of that strategy has been to leave the Soviet Union in virtual political isolation in Asia. China, Japan and the United States remain Moscow's adversaries and the Kremlin's heavy-handed policies are running the risk of driving those three adversaries closer together. None of the Asian powers has shown even the slightest interest in Moscow's plan for Asian collective security, an ill-conceived idea whose major goal was to facilitate Soviet efforts to contain China.

This essay examines some of the reasons why Moscow has failed in its efforts to expand its influence in Asia, and assesses the

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prospects for an improvement in the Soviet position in Asia.

Certainly since the late 1960s, when the Russians quadrupled their military forces on the Chinese border, the Soviet Union's major preoccupation in Asia has been with China. Indeed, Moscow's Asian policy has been Moscow's China policy. Chief among Moscow's long-range goals in Asia has been the desire to establish nothing more nor less than a *cordon sanitaire* around the periphery of China, to weaken it internally, and, in one way or another, to pressure China into an accommodation with the Soviet Union. A derivative Soviet goal in Asia has to do with the effort to win the two smaller communist nations, North Korea and Vietnam, to the Soviet rather than to the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moscow seeks also to pry Japan loose from its alliance with the United States, to prevent Japan from moving closer to China, and to get as much Japanese help as possible in developing Siberia. In Southeast Asia, Moscow wants to improve its relations with all of the ASEAN countries in an effort to take advantage of the withdrawal of American power and to block what it regards as the inevitable expansion of Chinese influence into that area.[1] A fifth Soviet goal in Asia is to use its relatively new relationship with India in order to expand Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean, the gateway to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and to use India as a countervailing force against both China and the United States. Finally, in the region as a whole, Moscow seeks to project its military, particularly its naval power, and to insert itself into the various security arrangements in the region, thereby assuring for itself a leading role in Asian politics.

Before turning to consider Soviet successes and failures in achieving each of these objectives, let me stress what these objectives do *not* include. There is little evidence of any strong Soviet interest in promoting communist revolutions in Asia. One reason for this, no doubt, is the absence of many good prospects for such revolutions. But an equally compelling fact is that the Russians need to improve their relations with existing Asian governments if they are to compete for influence with both China and the United States, and any significant support to Asian revolutionaries would simply be counterproductive.

II

The most spectacular Soviet failure in Asia has been its inability to come to terms with China. China has become the most active,

[1] The current members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

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and the most uncompromising, adversary of the Soviet Union not only in Asia but in the world at large. In Africa, the Chinese feel themselves to be in a de facto alliance with the United States against the spread of Russian influence; they reportedly urged U.S. intervention against the Russians and Cubans in Angola and they continually warn the African powers against the desires of the "new Czars" to become the "new colonial power in Africa." In the Middle East, although the Chinese are not in a position to do much, they quickly moved in to provide military assistance to Egypt once Sadat broke with Moscow and they are encouraging other Russian clients to be wary. At the same time, in an effort to build up countervailing power against Moscow, Peking is strengthening its ties with the most conservative regimes in the region, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, China would like nothing better than to revive the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).[2]

In Western Europe, China has greatly expanded its diplomatic presence and activity. Peking invites an increasing stream of the most anti-Soviet European politicians to visit China, and China has become one of the most enthusiastic promoters of both NATO and the Common Market. In Eastern Europe, Peking has promoted with equal fervor any kind of "national communism," whether of the Yugoslav or Romanian variety, which could be used to weaken Soviet power over its imperial domain. Meanwhile, at the United Nations and in Third World forums, Peking maintains a steady level of vituperation designed to convince whoever will listen that the Russians are the gravest danger to world peace and are intent on world domination.

In Asia, China has become a quasi-ally of the United States, lobbying actively for a strengthening of the American military presence throughout the region, for ASEAN military collaboration, for the ANZUS Pact, which joins Australia and New Zealand to the United States, for maintenance of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and, recently, even for Japanese rearmament.

Whatever prospects may have existed for a limited Sino-Soviet accommodation after the death of Mao have greatly diminished during the past year. The new Chinese leaders seem to have considered and to have rejected the possible advantages of such a rapprochement. Probably the most important factor is that the

[2] The members of CENTO are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States, while not technically a member, has participated fully in the work of the alliance. It has been for some years in a caretaker status, though the Carter Administration showed continuing interest by sending Secretary Vance to the annual meeting in Iran last May.

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new Peking leadership is still divided and would require a united leadership to undertake such a substantial change in foreign policy as a limited accommodation with Russia. Moreover, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's legitimacy derives from the fact that he was Mao's candidate for the top job in China; if Hua were now to agree to what looked like a radical change in Maoist foreign policy, he would weaken his own position. Finally, the new Chinese leaders may have decided that they have, at least for the time being, more to gain from the West than from the Soviet Union. They will want increased trade, technology and credits from the West in order to develop China; the Soviet Union cannot supply these in the amounts needed. And, so long as China genuinely fears Soviet expansion in Asia and the possibility of Soviet military action against China, Peking will need the cooperation of the West to maintain an effective balance of power against Moscow. In any case, throughout the period since Mao's death in October 1976, Chinese anti-Soviet polemics have remained constant. Huang Hua's address to the U. N. General Assembly on September 29, 1977, was typical in striking most of the major themes: the Soviet Union is on the offensive. It wants to "grab" all of Europe, Asia and Africa. It is accelerating its "plunder" of strategic resources and areas in Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Its ambitions far exceed those of the "old Czars." It is more aggressive and more adventurous than any other imperialist power. It has to rely on threats of war and military strength to pursue its expansion because it has inadequate economic strength. Finally, its highly concentrated state-monopoly, "capitalist" economy and its "fascist dictatorship" make it easier for Moscow to militarize its economy. Therefore beware of growing Soviet military power.

The Russians, for their part, after suspending polemics for a few months after Mao's death, resumed them again in the spring of 1977. In May, "Alexandrov," a pseudonym for the highest ranking Soviet authorities, launched a broad indictment of "Maoism without Mao," accused the Chinese of preparing for war, and bluntly warned the West against appeasing Chinese "expansionism" by providing military assistance to the People's Republic. Since then, Moscow has increasingly emphasized the dangers of growing Chinese military strength and war preparations.

The events since Mao's death suggest that the Sino-Soviet conflict has now reached a new and higher level. Moscow must now bury whatever hopes it may have had for reducing tensions with China after Mao's death; it must confront the likelihood that

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China will be a long-range adversary, an adversary who may become more dangerous than the United States at the height of the cold war; finally, Moscow can no longer take comfort from the fact that Mao's ideological campaigns in his last years led to instability and weakness in China. Now that Mao is dead, the new, more pragmatic Chinese leaders are already concentrating their efforts on economic and military development. And, although the Russians are likely to remain much stronger than China for years, if not decades to come, they know from their own experience what a determined, stable, totalitarian leadership can accomplish. In sum, the Kremlin must now begin to ponder seriously the long-range implications of permanent hostility with a determined and increasingly powerful neighbor.

It is, of course, possible, as some Western analysts have consistently speculated, that Moscow may consider a military "solution" to its China problem. But it would be difficult to envisage any military action for Moscow that makes much sense. An effort to deal China a "punishing blow," to detach a portion of its territory, or to knock out its nuclear capacity—options that are cavalierly discussed by Western "strategists"—would almost certainly lead to a long, protracted and debilitating war that would have the gravest consequences for the very stability of the Soviet system. For Russia to undertake such a war at a time when it is already preoccupied with a developing internal economic crisis caused by declining rates of productivity, with growing problems of empire, and with a faltering relationship with the United States, is difficult to conceive. Even a limited military action would almost certainly drive Japan, Europe, China and the United States into a military alliance against Russia. And it would deprive the Soviets of any of the considerable advantages they now gain from détente.

But if war remains unlikely, an accommodation will now be even more difficult. Those Western observers, including this writer, and those Soviet "optimists" who foresaw the possibility of such a reduction of tension after the death of Mao seem to have underestimated the degree of suspicion and inflexibility on both sides. Although Moscow suspended polemics with China for a few months after Mao's death, it was unwilling to make any more substantial gestures such as a thinning out of its forces on the Chinese border. Such a gesture to the new Chinese leaders would have been particularly important as an indication that the Kremlin was now prepared to deal with Peking on a more equitable basis rather than from a position of strength. As Arnold Horelick has recently pointed out, it was the Soviet military buildup, including

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airfields, fixed missile sites, depots, supply stations, and permanent garrisons that completely transformed the military geography of the border. Nor was Moscow willing to offer the Chinese any concessions on the disputed territories. At least that is the impression one has from the abrupt suspension last February of the border talks that were resumed after Mao's death. This does not mean that a border settlement is no longer possible. But it does serve to reinforce the view that even if such a settlement does come about, any far-reaching resolution of the conflict sufficient to relieve the deepest fears of either side is extremely improbable and could take decades to occur, if it occurs at all.

The most likely development in Sino-Soviet relations over the next few years, then, is the institutionalization of a "neither peace nor war" relationship. This new adversary relationship will be characterized by a continuing, if not an intensified, military-strategic competition. That competition will become most acute in the thousands of miles of poorly defended borderlands between the two countries. These borderlands lie in regions that have been traditional invasion routes; they are inhabited by minority nationalities of doubtful political loyalties; and they are geographically remote from both European Russia and the center of Han Chinese power, a fact that increases fears on both sides about their defensibility.

The strategic competition will also lead to a continuing buildup of military forces more generally. The Chinese held four national conferences on defense in January 1977, and there is much evidence of a higher priority being assigned to military modernization. The Russians, for their part, will probably continue to expand and to modernize their Pacific Fleet and to upgrade their forces in Siberia.[3]

Finally, it is likely that the worldwide competition for influence between Russia and China will intensify, particularly in those areas where the United States is weak, such as Southeast Asia and southern Africa.

In sum, the Soviet Union has not only not succeeded in resolving its China problem; it has probably run out of options for dealing with China, unless it is prepared to make some fundamental concessions of the kind it has so far rejected, e.g., a substantial thinning out of its forces on the border, or a willingness to consider at least some of the Chinese territorial claims. Otherwise,

[3] The great danger of a spiraling arms race between Russia and China, apart from the obvious danger of such a race getting out of control, is that it would accelerate Soviet-American arms competition. Some Soviet spokesmen are already saying that Russia requires a larger strategic force than the United States in order to deal with enemies on two fronts.

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all that Moscow can realistically do now is to be patient, to hope that the opportunity for a more civilized relationship will develop later on, and to discourage the West from adding to its long-range fears by providing China with arms.

Of course, not all of Moscow's current difficulties with China can be blamed on the Kremlin leaders. The Chinese leaders, and particularly Mao Tse-tung, must share a considerable part of the blame for the deterioration of the relationship. But the characteristic Soviet overreaction to the Chinese "threat," particularly the massive military buildup in Siberia, is an example of the kind of Soviet inflexibility that has proved to be so counterproductive in its foreign relations generally.

III

Soviet efforts to line up North Vietnam and North Korea against Peking have also failed. The simple facts of geography dictate to Hanoi and to Pyongyang that they cannot afford to alienate Peking. Both countries have long borders with China. In the North Korean case, it was the Chinese who preserved Pyongyang's very existence by coming to its defense against the Americans in 1950. Moreover, both Communist Parties have independent bases of power. The Vietnamese Communists came to power in the course of an indigenous revolution which lasted for more than three decades. It would be foolish to imagine that after such an experience they would become willing satellites of the Kremlin. In the North Korean case, despite the fact that Kim Il Sung was installed in power by Soviet troops at the end of World War II, he used the Korean War to emancipate himself from the Russians and by 1958, Kim had created an independent power base and, like the Vietnamese, was adroitly playing off Moscow against Peking.

A third factor behind Moscow's inability to line up the two smaller communist states against China is Moscow's lack of economic leverage. Both the Vietnamese and the Korean Communists are in desperate need of foreign aid, credits and technology which they cannot hope to get from Moscow; this drives both of them toward the non-communist world. Hanoi has recently accepted both credits and outright aid from the French, negotiated an aid agreement with the Japanese, and made clear overtures to private American capital, all in the interest of rebuilding a war-ravaged economy. North Korea, for its part, increasingly turned to the non-communist world, particularly to the Japanese, during

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the mid-1970s, when it had hopes of importing large quantities of machinery to accelerate its industrialization. These plans ran into difficulty when, as a result of the international oil recession and a drop in the prices of North Korea's major exports, Pyongyang was forced to default on its outstanding loans from the Japanese and Europeans. But if North Korea succeeds in rescheduling its debts, it will almost certainly turn once again to Japan and to Europe for the machinery, technology and credits it needs to develop its industry.

Then too, Soviet interests and the interests of the two smaller communist powers in Asia do not coincide. Kim Il Sung has an interest in reunifying all of Korea by any means, but the Soviet Union has little interest in risking a war with the United States, endangering détente, and alienating Japan in order to help him achieve that goal. In the case of Vietnam, Moscow's interest is to exclude American and Chinese influence from Indochina, but Hanoi's immediate aims are to rebuild its economy and to balance Russia against China, goals that are causing it to look for help from the West, and to improve its relations with Peking. There are, however, potentially serious conflicts of interest between Peking and Hanoi over territorial issues and over Vietnam's continuing fighting with Cambodia, but both sides have an interest in avoiding increased tension which would provide an opening for Moscow. Hanoi, after all, does not want to choose sides between Peking and Moscow and China does not want to force Hanoi into increased dependence on the Russians.

But apart from such objective factors that limit Soviet influence over the smaller Asian communist powers, the Russians have been their own worst enemies. They have characteristically used the crudest kinds of pressure in unsuccessful efforts to force North Korea and Vietnam off the fence. Between 1962 and 1964, in an effort to force North Korea to the Soviet side of the conflict with China, Khrushchev cut economic assistance to Pyongyang; this virtually drove the North Koreans into the arms of the Chinese. Although Brezhnev has been somewhat more subtle, there is evidence that, in the early 1970s, once Moscow became Pyongyang's largest trading partner, it sought to use this trade as a political weapon to turn North Korea away from China. Once again, the effort backfired and Pyongyang this time turned to the non-communist world, particularly to Japan, in order to try to lessen its economic dependence on the Russians.

As to the two smaller communist countries in Indochina, Laos, like Vietnam, has begun to seek Western economic aid, while

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Cambodia, beset by isolation and border clashes with its neighbors, has recently moved even closer to the Chinese orbit. Indeed, in the area of Indochina as a whole—that is, the three communist states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, plus Thailand—it is Peking, not Moscow, that is playing a growing and pivotal role in the new diplomatic balance that is emerging. Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand are all trying to improve their relations with Peking in order to gain leverage on their more immediate and historic enemies.

Moscow's basic difficulty in relating successfully to the smaller communist powers of Asia stems from its unwillingness or inability to treat them as anything other than pawns in a great-power rivalry with China. In this chess game, the Russians have used the crudest kinds of pressures in an effort to line up both North Korea and Vietnam against China. Such a policy was foredoomed to failure from the start. It represents yet another example of Soviet rigidity in its dealings with Asian countries.

IV

Soviet hopes of prying Japan loose from its American alliance, preventing Japan from moving closer to China, and getting a great deal of Japanese help in the development of Siberia have also not been realized. Although the Japanese-American alliance has run into troubles in recent years, it is difficult to conceive of any substitute relationship or posture that would fit Japanese interests. An alliance with China against Russia would make little sense; it would be an alliance of two military weaklings against a military superpower and would be more likely to provoke than to deter Moscow. Whatever economic gains might be achieved from an alliance with China are already being realized by the Japanese without such an alliance. Trade between Japan and China has been rising steadily since normalization and can be expected to grow even more in the years ahead once China sets its course on steady development.

A Japanese alliance with the Soviet Union against China is inconceivable. There is deep popular resentment against the Russians at all levels of Japanese society, a resentment fed by a territorial dispute, worsening fishing disputes, and continuing suspicions of such Russian actions as seizures of Japanese fishing boats, overflights of Japanese territory, and violations of Japanese territorial waters. In Japanese public opinion polls, it is the Soviet Union that consistently ranks highest as the country that most threatens Japan. More recently, Tokyo is increasingly uneasy

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about the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

If another bilateral alliance is unlikely, a Japanese rejection of the American alliance in favor of a policy of neutralism is equally unlikely. Such a policy would leave Japan with much reduced leverage on Russia and China, as well as on the increasingly powerful minor states in the region such as North and South Korea and Taiwan. It would also foster growing protectionist sentiment in the United States and thus pose grave consequences for Japanese economic interests.

In short, there do not seem to be any realistic Japanese alternatives to an alliance with the United States. Moreover, now that China enthusiastically endorses that alliance, out of its fear of Soviet expansion, the alliance comes under much less domestic pressure within Japan, particularly on the Left.

Soviet efforts to prevent Japan from moving closer to China also seem doomed to failure. There has never been a strong feeling in Japan that China is a serious threat. Insofar as such a feeling once existed before the 1972 normalization of relations, it has declined remarkably in the past few years. The Chinese, unlike the Russians, are extremely adept at cultivating Japanese politicians. While Moscow's influence is limited to one faction of the Japanese Socialist Party, Chinese influence extends across the entire Japanese political spectrum. When the Japanese do show doubts about their relations with the United States, they show a proclivity toward closer ties with China, the nation that has most profoundly influenced Japanese culture in the past. Moreover, China and Japan are natural trading partners, and now that the new Chinese leaders have embarked on an effort to modernize their industry and agriculture, economic ties between the two countries should mushroom. Whether or not the Japanese leaders decide to go ahead and sign the controversial peace treaty with China that contains the famous "anti-hegemony" clause to which Russia objects—and there is a good possibility they will do so—Japanese-Chinese relations are likely to grow closer in the years ahead.

Finally, the Soviet Union is not likely to involve Japan in the development of Siberia on any large scale unless the United States also agrees to help develop Siberia. Japan wants American co-participation in Siberian development both as a guarantee on its economic returns and as a guarantee against Soviet political pressure. Yet substantial American involvement in Siberia is almost out of the question unless there is a radical improvement in Soviet-American relations. To be sure, Soviet trade with Japan

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has been growing steadily since the 1960s, and Japan has provided more than a billion dollars in credits to several Siberian development projects. But the volume of these credits still falls far short of Soviet expectations and needs.

Soviet disappointment in its relations with Japan can to some extent be credited to factors beyond Moscow's control. But Moscow's inflexibility on the issue of the northern territories has been decisive in preventing any real warming up of Soviet-Japanese relations. In a period when Japanese policymakers were shocked by Nixon's approach to China without prior consultation and might have been receptive to Soviet concessions on the controversial island issue, Moscow remained adamant.[4] For the Soviet Union, which has so much to gain from Japan, to sacrifice its relations with that country over a few small islands is an example of the nineteenth-century mentality that the current Soviet leadership often demonstrates.

V

Soviet efforts to contain Chinese influence in Southeast Asia have also met with little success. Despite the fact that Moscow itself has established diplomatic relations with all of the Southeast Asian countries, it has not been able to prevent those countries from warming up their relations with China. In 1974, Malaysia established diplomatic relations with Peking; in 1975, Thailand and the Philippines followed suit; and in late 1976 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew journeyed to Peking amid signs that normalization of relations is imminent. China has also established its close pre-Cultural Revolution ties with Burma. Only with Indonesia are Chinese relations still frozen, and even this may soon change.

More fundamentally, competition with Moscow has forced China into substantial overtures to the governments in Southeast Asia. China has, for example, welcomed ASEAN and the idea of Southeast Asian neutrality; it has sought to calm the fears of countries such as Singapore and Malaysia about the loyalties of their own sizable Chinese populations; and in some instances Peking has even gone out of its way to reassure ASEAN governments that it would not give support to their internal communist opponents.

On the economic front, although Soviet economic relations with

[4] See Elizabeth Pond, "Japan and Russia: The View from Tokyo," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 141–152.

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the ASEAN countries are increasing, the growth rate is miniscule because the Russians are finding it difficult to develop markets for their goods. China, on the other hand, exports large quantities of rice to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Finally, in the economic realm, Moscow cannot hope to compete for influence in Southeast Asia with either Japan or the United States. At the recent ASEAN summit last August, it was Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda who stole the show by promising substantial economic involvement in the region's future. Thus, Moscow's principal weakness in this region is its lack of economic instruments to influence the course of events.

VI

Although the Soviet Union's best publicized "success" in Asia has been its growing ties with India, Soviet prospects for expanding its influence in India, or in the South Asian region as a whole, are severely constrained. The new Janata government in India has demonstrated a clear interest in improving its relations with both China and the United States. Similarly, the new Bangladesh government that came to power after the assassination of President Mujib in 1975 is also more pro-Western and pro-Chinese than its predecessor; it established diplomatic relations with China in 1975. Pakistan is continuing to hold Moscow at arm's length, mindful of the fact that it was Russian arms that enabled India to assist in the breakup of Pakistan.

Perhaps an even more fundamental factor at work in the region is the growing effort of the Shah of Iran to use his money and influence to resolve traditional South Asian regional differences, and thereby to reduce the dependence of regional powers on outsiders such as the Soviet Union. The prospects for regional cooperation in South Asia are, as a result, brighter than they have been at any time during the last three decades.

Already there has been a rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan in which the Shah has been instrumental; the development of a close relationship between Iran and India in which Iran has offered India a large amount of credits, an uninterrupted flow of oil, and jobs in Iran for Indian educators, technicians, engineers, etc.; and movement toward closer ties between Iran and Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and Iran and Pakistan. Both of the latter two countries are extremely wary of Moscow's capacity to destabilize the region.

Ultimately, the Shah's goal is to loosen Indian ties to Moscow and to the Arab states, to increase the economic ties between the

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riparian states of the Indian Ocean and Australia, and to transform the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region into a "zone of peace," which would limit the intrusion of outside powers. This concept of a "zone of peace" has been endorsed by Peking, which undoubtedly also shares the Shah's strategic vision.

Until the intrusion of all outside powers in the region is removed, the Shah and many of the indigenous powers such as Pakistan vigorously support the continued military presence of the U.S. Navy. Finally, Iran itself has begun to finance a mammoth defense buildup that includes a naval force scheduled to grow by four times between 1975 and 1978.

In sum, in South Asia, as in Northeast and Southeast Asia, there are good prospects for a durable power equilibrium that will minimize the opportunities for adventurous outside powers to increase their influence in the region.

VII

The Soviets probably consider that the most important avenue for an expansion of their influence in Asia and the Pacific is the well-publicized Soviet Pacific Fleet. Before World War II, the Pacific waters were divided between the American and Japanese navies. In the immediate postwar period, the U.S. Navy had unchallenged dominance of the Pacific. Now there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union is intent on challenging that American naval dominance and is casting its shadow on the countries bordering the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet submarine fleet is already the largest in the world. The role of the Soviet naval air force seems to be growing. In just the past few years, the Soviets have extended their naval presence to the East China Sea and to the Yellow Sea.

Although one of the purposes of this growing naval power in the Pacific is undoubtedly defensive—to cope with American strategic submarines and with American naval forces generally—there can be no question that another purpose is to project Russian political influence throughout Asia. Indeed, Moscow's renowned Admiral Gorshkov talks like Admiral Mahan. And, in addition to Gorshkov, several Soviet strategic writers have argued that it is necessary to use Soviet naval forces not merely to protect but actively to promote Soviet interests in the Third World. Thus, in a recent Soviet volume on the suggestive subject of "Military Force and International Relations," we can read the following:

> In connection with the task of preventing local wars and also in those cases wherein military support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their

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freedom and independence against the forces of internal reaction and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. In some situations the very knowledge of a Soviet military presence in an area in which a conflict situation is developing may serve to restrain the imperialists and local reaction, prevent them from dealing out violence to the local populace and eliminate a threat to overall peace and international security. It is precisely this type of role that ships of the Soviet Navy are playing in the Mediterranean Sea. . . .

The actual situation may require the Soviet Union to carry out measures aimed at restraining the aggressive acts of imperialism. Practical steps towards resolving the problem of regional military opposition to imperialist expansion by expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military assistance are being viewed today as a very important factor in international relations.[5]

Moreover, this is not merely talk. To a far greater degree than is generally realized, the Soviet Union has employed its naval forces for political purposes. A list of such actions (compiled by Robert Weinland) includes the following examples:[6]

October 1967	Maintenance of continuous combatant presence in Port Said to deter Israeli strikes against Egypt
February/March 1969	Deployment of task group into Gulf of Guinea to effect release of Soviet fishing vessels impounded by Ghana
September/October 1970	Concentration of countervailing forces in Eastern Mediterranean to deter potential U.S. intervention in Jordanian crisis
December 1971/January 1972	Deployment of countervailing forces in Indian Ocean to deter possible U.S. intervention in Indo-Pakistani war
April 1973	Visit of Admiral Gorshkov and naval task group to Iraq during border conflict with Kuwait

[5] V. M. Kulish, ed., *Voyennaya Sila i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (Military Force and International Relations)*, Moscow, September 1972, translated in JPRS, 588947, May 8, 1973, and cited by Robert G. Weinland in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds. *Soviet Naval Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1975, pp. 385–386. There are three extremely useful collections of papers on Soviet naval policy edited by MccGwire and his colleagues and published by Praeger: *Soviet Naval Developments*, 1973; *Soviet Naval Policy*, 1975; and *Soviet Naval Influence*, 1977.

[6] Robert G. Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations: 10 Years of Change" in MccGwire *et al.*, *op. cit.*, *Soviet Naval Policy*, pp. 382–383. For other examples of what the authors call Moscow's "coercive naval diplomacy," see James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis," and James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," in MccGwire, *op. cit.*, *Soviet Naval Developments*.

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April/July 1973	Sealift of Moroccan expeditionary forces to Syria
October/November 1973	Concentration of countervailing forces in Eastern Mediterranean to deter potential U.S. intervention (or support potential Soviet intervention) in Fourth Arab-Israeli war

The extent to which the Soviet Union intends to try in the future to spread its influence in the Pacific through naval power is not clear. There are, however, some very real constraints on such a course of action. Massive naval expenditures will divert economic resources at a time when Soviet economic productivity is declining. The rate of growth of Soviet military expenditures has exceeded the overall rate of growth of the economy for a half dozen or so years. Moscow may soon have to make some fundamental decisions about its future investment priorities. Can a convincing case be made to the Kremlin leaders for Russia to rule the waves when there are so many other competing priorities for scarce resources?

Moreover, the relationship between enhanced naval power and political influence is not so clear. Unchallenged American naval supremacy in the Caribbean did not prevent the rise of Fidel Castro or Salvador Allende. The American Seventh Fleet could not prevent communist victory in South Vietnam or earlier in China. Finally, Moscow may find that its increasing naval activities in the Pacific are counterproductive. The United States, China, Japan and Australia, as well as other powers, may be forced into cooperative counteraction. China has already taken the initiative to invite "retired" Japanese naval officers to Peking to discuss coastal defense and Japanese-Australian cooperation is developing in the political and economic realms. Thus, it may well turn out that the Soviets are relying on a nineteenth or early twentieth century strategy to gain influence in the late twentieth century.

Still, the Pacific Fleet can be used as a tool of political opportunity and it would be foolish to rule out the possibility that opportunities *may* arise for its use. Thus, much will depend on whether the present tenuous equilibrium of forces in various regions of Asia is durable.

VIII

This brief review suggests that there are four major factors that account for the failure of Soviet policy in Asia. The first is

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Moscow's historic conflict with China, which has now turned China into one of the Kremlin's mortal enemies. As the United States found to its great discomfort in the 1950s and 1960s, an Asian policy whose central focus is the containment of Chinese influence is bound to fail. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can hope to achieve its goals in Asia without taking into consideration the legitimate interests and concerns of China. If this was true during the early years of the cold war when China was relatively weak, it is even more true today when China is already one of the dominant powers in Asia.

The second major element accounting for the Kremlin's poor performance in Asia is the relatively stable situation that exists throughout the region. Despite widespread predictions that the communist victory in Vietnam would have profound domino effects on the rest of Asia, the post-Vietnam realignment of political forces has not produced any substantial change in the balance of power in the region. In Northeast Asia, there remains a four-power standoff. In Southeast Asia, the new communist states are preoccupied with their internal problems, and they do not in any case represent a coherent force because of their historic rivalries. At the same time, there is growing cooperation among the non-communist states in the region. In South Asia, there are better opportunities for regional cooperation than have existed at any time in the recent past.

It is in large part because of this relative stability in Asia that the Soviet Union, despite a massive increase of its military power in the region, has not been able to translate that military power into increasing political influence. Indeed, in no other region of the world is there such a major disproportion between Soviet military power and Soviet political influence as there is in Asia. Nor does the Soviet Union seem to be in a particularly promising position to improve its position.

Another substantial constraint on Soviet policy in Asia is its lack of instruments to influence events in that region. Neither any Asian state nor any group of Asian revolutionaries any longer considers the Soviet Union to be a model for its own development. And the Soviet Union cannot provide either a market for Asian products or development assistance and technology on the scale required. This is probably why the Soviets continue to rely so single-mindedly on military power as the principal vehicle for expanding their influence. But such a policy runs the real danger of provoking their adversaries into joint action and increasing the already great suspicions in the region of Soviet intentions. Such

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suspicion is deepest in Japan, Korea and China, but it exists everywhere.

Finally, Moscow's heavy-handed approach to the Asians, and its obsessive concern with frontier security, has caused it to miss major opportunities to improve its relations with Japan and, probably, with China as well. To be sure, Moscow has some very legitimate security concerns. But one cannot avoid the impression that an inflexible approach to those concerns, influenced to a considerable extent by narrow military, rather than political, considerations, has greatly contributed to Soviet difficulties. For all of these reasons, it would seem that the time is at hand for a serious reappraisal in Moscow of its Asian policies. But such a reappraisal will probably have to wait for a new Kremlin leadership, if it is to occur at all.

As for the United States in Asia, the present moment is certainly not a time for self-congratulation. American preoccupation with the Vietnam War focused our own and world attention on Asia for more than a decade. During the last 35 years, the United States has fought three large wars in Asia and lost 200,000 American lives. If the focal points of world attention are now elsewhere, on the Middle East, southern Africa, Europe, and the future of the Soviet-American détente, this does not mean that the tenuous stability in Asia will last indefinitely.

There are a variety of events that could undermine the Asian equilibrium. A further decline of American power and interest in Asia, a new Korean war, a worsening of Chinese-American relations, a communist victory in the Philippines, Thailand or Malaysia, an increase in instability in India, the coming to power in Japan of an anti-conservative coalition with a more neutralist foreign policy—any of these developments, or some combination of them, could contribute to new fears, pressures and instability.

Moreover, it would be extremely unwise for the United States to become complacent about the region. There are growing fears among our friends and allies in Asia about American staying power and the extent of the American commitment. The Administration's plans for withdrawal of American combat forces from Korea have contributed to these fears. Those plans need to be reappraised. But in a larger sense, the United States should use this welcome period of quiescence and stability in Asia to construct new and more solid arrangements and to reenforce old ones that will contribute to a long-range pattern of stability in the area.

Nothing is more important in this respect than to construct a more solid and stable foundation for American relations with

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China. Leslie H. Brown has stated the matter succinctly:

> The issue boils down to a very simple proposition: is the threat of a breakdown of U.S.-China relations over Taiwan, with all the consequences that would flow from it, sufficiently real to justify accepting the consequences of trying to remove it? In my opinion, the threat is real, and the costs of indefinitely deferring a Taiwan settlement are unacceptable.[7]

There are several other matters of pressing importance in Asia. Now that there is a new government in India more inclined to friendship with the United States, the opportunity to forge new and more stable ties with India should not be lost. Also, the rising tide of protectionism both in Western Europe and the United States, unless it is checked, could engulf our relations with Japan. Since India and Japan are not only two powerful countries in Asia, but also two of Asia's most impressive democracies, we need to devote special efforts to our relations with each. Finally, in the wake of our national trauma in Vietnam, we should resist the temptation to forget about Southeast Asia. The United States and Japan, together with other interested powers in the region such as Australia, can play a constructive role in forging new ties among the ASEAN countries and in contributing to more equitable growth within those countries.

In sum, the prospects for building a stable framework for peace in Asia are much more promising than even the most bold analyst might have imagined just a few years ago. Whether or not we have the wisdom and the vision to cash in on these opportunities remains to be seen.

[7] Leslie H. Brown, "American Security Policy in Asia," *Adelphi Papers*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1977, No. 132. For an extremely powerful argument for seeking to establish full diplomatic relations with Peking, see A. Doak Barnett, "On the Road to Peking," *The Asia Mail*, October 1977.

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Richard H. Solomon

THINKING THROUGH THE CHINA PROBLEM

The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have reached a fork in the road to normalizing relations. The high-level discussions between Chinese and American officials initiated during Presidential Assistant Henry Kissinger's July 1971 trip to Peking have been sustained now for six and a half years. Senior U.S. officials, including two Presidents, have made eleven visits to the Chinese capital. There have been less formal contacts at the United Nations, ongoing exchanges through the liaison offices in Washington and Peking, and visits to China and the United States by congressional and semi-official PRC groups promoted under the cultural exchange program. The most recent official discussions, conducted by Secretary of State Vance and Chinese officials in Peking in August 1977 and followed up in New York this past September, explored thinking in Washington and Peking on the basis of the Carter Administration's reaffirmation of the China policy of the two previous Administrations: a commitment to normalize the U.S.-PRC relationship within the framework of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, and to develop ties with China as a central element of American foreign policy.

The current period represents a major point of decision not because there is an artificially established deadline, but because the present discussions put to the test the Carter Administration's commitment to the Shanghai Communiqué, and the willingness of the new Chinese leadership to show flexibility within the policy framework laid down by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Failure to move forward is unlikely to result in an immediate crisis, for both Washington and Peking will see it in their respective interests to maintain the present quasi-normal relationship. Rather, the problem is that the domestic political momentum toward normalization has just about played itself out in both the United States and the PRC.

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The present period in U.S.-PRC relations is significant not only for the long-term consequences of decisions to be made in Washington and Peking, but also because if the Chinese and American leaderships are to make further progress in their relations a transition will have to be made from the years of closely held official discussions to a time of public debate. A major consideration that must give pause to the Carter Administration is whether an officially negotiated normalization agreement will elicit sufficient popular support to sustain normal U.S.-PRC relations, or whether compromises reached at the official level will only generate domestic political feuding and loss of public support—even conceivably some form of congressional action that will undercut an agreement. And Americans are too little aware that Hua Kuo-feng and his colleagues face an almost equally difficult problem in sustaining support for the policy from Party and government leaders, and from the Chinese people as a whole.

The political choices associated with normalization are onerous and potentially divisive for both China and the United States. The compromises required to defuse the Taiwan issue touch highly emotional questions in both countries. At stake for the Chinese is a basic issue of sovereignty, and for the Americans the integrity of defense commitments and the welfare of a long-time ally. Part of the challenge facing each government is to justify to its people the risks and compromises necessary to reach an agreement in terms of global interests and gains to national security that are indirect and may not be evident for years to come.

For the United States, a normalization agreement will involve complex and uncertain arrangements for Taiwan. By contrast, Peking's position is unambiguous: "Taiwan Province is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's internal affair, which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."[1] As the price for normalizing relations with the PRC, the United States is likely to have to make an irreversible political decision regarding its formal ties to the Republic of China on Taiwan. For the Chinese there will be problems of drawing on the immediate symbolic gains of recognition by the United States and acknowledgment of the unity of China to justify a long period of deferred efforts to "liberate" the island.

[1] Quoted from the political report by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977, as reproduced in *People's Republic of China*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), August 22, 1977, p. D-30.

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The advantages associated with such decisions will appear uncertain and thus difficult to rationalize in public debate. But if agreement under present circumstances is unattainable, it is unclear whether, or when, some future common threat (such as the one that resulted from the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) will impart a new sense of urgency to the idea of normalization, or whether a renewed crisis in bilateral relations (as with the Taiwan Strait confrontation of 1958) will carry the United States and China back into a state of confrontation or even a military conflict.

The following pages explore the mood of the American public and Congress on China policy as revealed in public opinion surveys, editorial opinion and press commentary, and the *Congressional Record*. These sources provide the context within which normalization will be evaluated. Then, in order to build a more explicit sense of how the policy will be debated, I have set down a series of responses to the ten most common arguments put forward in opposition to normalization. This "dialogue" may establish some sense of how the remaining differences between Washington and Peking might be reconciled, and how the range of objections to normalization might be narrowed in our public debate.

II

Over the past century American attitudes toward China have been characterized by recurrent swings of mood. Periods of public fascination and respect for a country of great cultural achievements, and friendship for China's hard-working people, have given way to times of disdain for chaotic political conditions or fear of Chinese aggressiveness.[2] We are now in the midst of one of these periodic swings in the "pendulum" of public mood. The enthusiasm that greeted the Nixon Administration's opening to China is giving way to frustration with the inaccessibility of Chinese society, concern about the lack of respect in Peking for human rights and other "Western" values, and indignation at the political inflexibility of PRC leaders.

The Nixon Administration's 1971–72 initiative to normalize relations with Peking drew broad public acceptance as one of the creative departures in America's post-World War II foreign policy. After two decades of confrontation with "Red China" and costly

[2] The classic statement of this instability in American attitudes toward China is Harold R. Isaacs, *Images of Asia: American Views of China and India*, New York: Capricorn Books, 1962, especially pp. 71–72.

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bloodshed in Korea and Vietnam designed to contain communist expansion in Asia, the American people welcomed efforts to ameliorate tensions with the Chinese—even if they were somewhat skeptical about how much progress might be made.[3]

It has often been noted that Mr. Nixon's public image of the 1950s and early 1960s as a forceful anti-communist enabled him to hold the support of the American "Right" in the China initiative of 1971. It has been less frequently observed that Mr. Nixon's first public intimation of a major departure in China policy—expressed in the pages of this journal in the fall of 1967 as a call for the United States to "come urgently to grips with the reality of China," so as to build a post-Vietnam Asia policy for the United States—occurred in a year when American anxieties about Chinese aggressiveness were at an all-time high.[4]

Despite such fears, the Vietnam War had prepared informed American opinion for a change in China policy. The widely publicized hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966 and 1968 vividly demonstrated that the U.S. involvement in Indochina had grown from a strategy of "containing" a supposedly expansionist China from strong points in Korea, Taiwan and Indochina. With the passage of time, however, Peking's intervention in Korea and the 1962 border conflict with India no longer appeared to be a replay of the post-World War II military expansionism of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe. The Chinese had withdrawn their troops from Korea after the Armistice, and had not attempted to overrun India after their victory on the Tibetan border and on the Northeast Frontier. And, despite Peking's aggressive encouragement of "people's wars" against the United States, Vietnam seemed a unique and indigenous example of guerrilla warfare that had gained little for the Chinese in other countries of the Third World.

Thus, the July 15, 1971 announcement that an American President would visit Peking met with broad public acceptance, and Mr. Nixon was successful in muting the congressional and public criticism that had undercut efforts in the early 1960s by the Kennedy Administration to formulate a new China policy. Indeed, the Nixon initiative proceeded with more support than Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai appeared to have in China for their opening to the United States. Evidence has gradually accumulated that the Chinese people were quite unprepared for the

[3] See Louis Harris, "Public Approves China Trip of President by 68% to 19%," *The Washington Post*, September 20, 1971.

[4] See "Public Rates Other Nations," *The Gallup Opinion Index*, November 1976, p. 3.

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dramatic shift in Peking's policy toward "U.S. imperialism," and that there has been significant opposition to the normalization policy from Chinese military leaders and the political "Left."[5]

In America, however, the years 1971 and 1972 were a time of "China fever." The excitement of renewed contact with a distant and esoteric adversary was conveyed to millions of Americans through Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China and the subsequent satellite television coverage of President Nixon's visit in February 1972. The public mood shifted rapidly from fear of a threatening communist state to fascination with a country of unique cultural achievements and the urbane diplomacy of Chou En-lai.

The enthusiasm of this breakthrough period has long since dissipated. Shirley MacLaine's view of contemporary China as a harmonious society transforming individuals and establishing standards for America's future has given way to popularization of Simon Leys' preoccupation with the manipulative and Orwellian qualities of life in the People's Republic.[6] For America's China specialists, initial hopes for normalization have been replaced by realization of the difficulties of completing the process and of the constraints that will limit the development of a constructive U.S.-PRC relationship. Four or five years ago a positive public mood gave the Administration considerable flexibility in promoting a new China policy. Today, further progress toward normalization—if it occurs—will rest on a more secure base of realistic public expectations, thus minimizing the prospect of future swings in public support for a China initiative through excessive hopes which might not be fulfilled. The question, however, is whether this more sober public mood will sustain further diplomatic progress.

What is the American public's attitude toward China? A number of national public opinion polls conducted during the past two decades, while sporadic and incomplete, suggest the following qualities:

[5] Shortly after the 1971 announcement of the forthcoming Nixon visit, PRC public media began an active campaign of study to rationalize what apparently was a controversial and unanticipated development. See, for example, the Writing Group of the Hupeh Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Unite the People, Defeat the Enemy: A Study of 'On Policy,'" *Red Flag*, August 1971; text reproduced in *Peking Review*, August 27, 1971, pp. 10–13. PRC Defense Minister Lin Piao, according to several accounts, led the opposition to the Mao-Chou policy. See Han Suyin, *Wind in the Tower: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1949–1975*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, p. 346. In 1973 and 1974 there were indirect indications in the Chinese press that military and other officials were disturbed about American intentions toward the PRC because of the U.S. policy of détente with the Soviet Union. And during China's "anti-Lin Piao-anti-Confucius" campaign of the years 1973–1975, radical leaders now purged as the "Gang of Four" opposed the development of scientific, cultural, and trade contacts between the United States and the PRC.

[6] Shirley MacLaine, *You Can Get There From Here*, New York: Norton, 1975, and Simon Leys, *Chinese Shadows*, New York: Viking, 1977.

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—*A legacy of distrust.* The enthusiasm with which Americans greeted the Nixon Administration's China initiative in 1971 reduced but did not eradicate the cold war legacy of fear of an aggressive, expansionist China. A 1976 national Gallup survey of American opinion found that only 20 percent of the public had a favorable view of what was still termed "Communist China."[7] In April 1977, a poll conducted by Potomac Associates revealed that 58 percent of a national sample felt it would *not* be in the best interests of the United States for "Mainland China" to become a great power by the end of this century. Most Americans still hold much more favorable views of Taiwan than of the People's Republic of China.[8]

—*An ability to adjust to changing realities.* Despite this unpromising basis for U.S.-PRC normalization, there have been significant shifts in public opinion toward China over the past decade as a result of presidential leadership, moderation in Chinese attitudes toward the United States, and the Sino-Soviet conflict. In 1967, a Gallup poll found that 71 percent of the American public saw China as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union (20 percent saw Russia as the greater threat; nine percent were undecided). In the fall of 1971, following the announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking, 56 percent saw China as the greatest threat, while 27 percent now saw Russia as the greater menace (with 17 percent undecided). By the fall of 1976, however, the U.S.S.R. and the PRC were just about equal in public distrust as suggested by a Gallup poll that found "favorable" ratings of 21 percent and 20 percent for China and the Soviet Union, respectively.[9]

These trends indicate that while doubts about PRC intentions persist, such attitudes are not immutable. The American people are able to adjust over time to changing realities, however unpleasant, as was evident in the gradual trend during the 1960s toward accepting Peking's admission to the United Nations.[10]

[7] *Gallup Index, op. cit.*, p. 11.

[8] William Watts, Ralph N. Clough, and Robert B. Oxnam, *The United States and China: American Perceptions and Future Alternatives,* Washington: Potomac Associates, 1977, pp. 29–30. The 1976 Gallup poll, cited in footnote 4, found 55 percent of the public favorably disposed toward the island versus 20 percent toward the PRC, a ratio of nearly 3 to 1 in Taiwan's favor. The Potomac Associates' survey of 1977 found 56 percent of Americans holding positive views of "the Republic of China on Taiwan," with only 26 percent favorably inclined toward "Mainland China."

[9] George Gallup, "Impending Talks Lessen Fear of China as a Threat to Peace," *The Washington Post,* October 10, 1971, p. F5; *Gallup Index, op. cit.*

[10] See George Gallup, "Peking U.N. Seat Favored by 45%," *The Washington Post,* May 30, 1971; *Gallup Index, op. cit.;* also A. T. Steele, *The American People and China,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

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—*Support for improved dealings with Peking, for normal relations with the People's Republic.* If one judges by the high level of public approval of President Nixon's first trip to Peking and the lack of opposition to the numerous subsequent visits to the Chinese capital by President Ford and Secretaries of State Kissinger and Vance, there is a wellspring of popular support for the concept of "negotiation rather than confrontation" in America's approach to China. More recent opinion polls indicate that, as long as the consequences for Taiwan are not considered, a majority of Americans favor establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC. This pattern shifts markedly against support for normalization, however, when the cost of a break in formal ties with Taiwan is placed in the balance.[11]

—*Ambivalence about America's relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.* The generally favorable view held by most Americans toward the Republic of China on Taiwan finds expression in opposition to breaking diplomatic relations with the island as a price for normalization with the PRC.[12] At the same time, a series of polls indicate that while the American public wishes to sustain its dealings with the island, there is considerable reluctance to become directly involved in Taiwan's defense.[13] Survey data thus suggest ambivalence in American attitudes toward the Republic of China on Taiwan: a desire to maintain relationships as at present, but reluctance to pay the military price of continuing to secure the island.

—*Reluctance to play the "great power game" of balancing China against Russia.* If the American public, under present circumstances, is reluctant to see the United States directly involved in the defense of Taiwan, there is even stronger opposition to helping Peking resist the expansion of Soviet power through military assistance. Seventy percent of the public in 1977 was opposed to helping China build up its military capabilities for this purpose, with only 11 percent favorably disposed.[14] As with many national security issues, public opinion can change dramatically as circumstances change; but under present conditions Americans

[11] See Watts, *et. al., op. cit.*, p. 32.

[12] In the Potomac Associates poll of 1977, 47 percent of a national opinion sample expressed opposition to severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the basis for granting Peking de jure recognition and exchanging ambassadors, even if this were accompanied by a presidential expression of United States interest in Taiwan's future security. Twenty-two percent of the sample is "very strongly" opposed to normalization on Peking's terms of a complete break in all official U.S. ties with Taiwan. See Watts, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 31–32.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 33–34.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

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are not inclined to support a highly manipulative foreign policy in dealings with the great powers.

—*Limited concern about the China issue, with a substantial measure of misinformed or unformed opinion.* Finally, we should note that in the full range of foreign policy issues that concern most Americans, China policy is of relatively limited salience. Moreover, as the opinion surveys cited in this analysis indicate, there is a substantial element of unformed opinion on China questions. As much as a quarter of the American public has no fixed view on such issues as whether or not to break relations with Taiwan as the price for normalization with Peking, whether or not to lend direct American support to the defense of the island, or even whether to supply military assistance to Taiwan without direct U.S. involvement. Recent polls also reveal a high level of misinformation in American views on China. Fully one-third of a recent national sample was uncertain whether "Mainland China" had a communist government, and 56 percent either believed Taiwan's government was communist or did not know its ideological orientation.[15]

These patterns suggest that there is a significant measure of flexibility in public attitudes toward the China issue: that misinformed or unformed opinion can be shaped through public debate; and that the President has some leeway in the amount of public support he can enlist in behalf of normalization. As the Potomac Associates study concludes, "Looking back over the past century, it seems clear that the single most important influence in determining American outlooks on China and Asia generally has been the President himself."

Our public mood on China, as revealed by these opinion surveys, holds other policy implications. Most Americans would prefer to let the China issue lie rather than face the choices that Peking seeks to impose as terms for a normalization agreement. It will not be easy to justify normalization to the public strictly in terms of America's national security interests.

It is difficult to predict the sum effect of these aspects of our national China mood on a public debate over normalization. The President, Congress, and the press can shape the terms of argument; and the Chinese, by the conditions they agree to in formal negotiations, or the way they seek to influence American opinion, can complicate or facilitate the building of a public consensus on the value of completing the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. Further progress must be based on determined leadership in

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28; see also A. T. Steele, *op. cit.*, p. 95, for similar findings in a 1964 poll.

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Washington and Peking, and it will proceed within constraints set by public attitudes and political opposition.

III

What would a national debate on normalization be like given current indications of the terms of argumentation?The Chinese are masters of symbolic politics, and over the past six years they have applied their skills to shaping the terms of our public debate on normalization and moving the official discussions in a direction consonant with their interests. In unofficial statements they have refined their terms for establishing diplomatic relations with the United States as first expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 into three conditions: that the United States sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan; that the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 be terminated; and that all U.S. forces and military installations be withdrawn from Taiwan. Since 1973 Chinese officials have asserted and reasserted to American visitors these three conditions, or what they somewhat incongruously term the "Japanese model" of normalization.[16]

In contrast, America's public discussion of normalization has been anything but well defined. It has proceeded largely without coherence at the initiative of individual Congressmen, editorial writers, and academic specialists on China. Policy guidance has been limited to occasional speeches by the Secretary of State or statements by the President at news conferences. The basic U.S. position remains embodied in the Shanghai Communiqué. In this basic policy document the United States, together with the Chinese, asserted that normalization would contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Asia and the world, and expressed a common opposition to "hegemony." Regarding the Taiwan question, the United States agreed not to challenge the view of "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait" that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The Communiqué states that America's interest is in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, and that as tensions in the area diminish the United States will progressively reduce its

[16] The incongruity, of course, is derived from the fact that Japan, since World War II, has had no responsibility for Taiwan's security, while the United States does. Peking's use of the term "Japanese model" seems intended to convey the idea of Chinese acceptance of unofficial economic and social ties between Taiwan and a country that recognizes the PRC. As good negotiators, PRC leaders have left important aspects of the security issue undefined, although insistent questioning by American visitors on some dimensions of Taiwan's future security has drawn a number of unofficial public statements from Chinese leaders.

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military forces and installations on the island. The "ultimate objective" of a complete American military withdrawal from Taiwan is linked to the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the island.

The current public debate on normalization has welled up quite spontaneously from our body politic, and largely since Watergate and the Nixon resignation removed the most determined source of presidential direction from the China issue. In the months preceding President Ford's late 1975 trip to Peking, a congressional resolution was put forward (but never passed) demanding that the U.S. government, "while engaged in a lessening of tensions with the People's Republic of China, do nothing to compromise the freedom of our friend and ally, the Republic of China and its people."[17] And in anticipation of Secretary of State Vance's August 1977 trip to Peking, a welter of editorial or "op-ed" page commentary in the American press further heightened public awareness of all the putative reasons for *not* completing normalization.

Very little of the public discussion on this issue has directly challenged Peking's three conditions for normalization. There seems to be an intuitive recognition that, because of the relationship of the Taiwan question to Chinese sovereignty, Peking is likely to show little flexibility on the matter of American de jure recognition of the Republic of China and the defense treaty with the government in Taipei. Rather, most of the arguments put forward question the importance for American interests of normalization with Peking, or assert reasons for delaying consummation of the policy established in the Shanghai Communiqué.

The objections to normalization cover a broad range of issues. The following "dialogue" begins with the strategic and security implications of a normalization policy and runs through nine other arguments, the most contentious of which concerns Taiwan's future security. With the recognition that this form of presentation does not make for the systematic development of a counterargument, its objective is to respond to the issues as they have been raised, and to demonstrate either the costs of inaction or ways in which American concerns might be resolved through negotiations with Peking. Under each heading, the opening paragraph summarizes an objection in its usual form.

1. *Strategic and National Security Perspectives:* There are no strategic gains for the United States in normalizing relations with the PRC. It is an illusion to think that Peking will cooperate with us

[17] See House Concurrent Resolution 20, 94th Cong., 1st sess., January 14, 1975.

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on international problems, and it is a dangerous policy to "play" China against the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders now criticize détente because they want to push the United States into a confrontation with the Soviet Union. They will try to gain influence in the Third World at America's expense, and eventually will seek to exclude U.S. influence from Asia.

For two decades the United States waged a two-front cold war against communist aggression in Europe and Asia. The hottest spots of this strategic confrontation were in the Far East, where Americans fought and died in Korea and Vietnam. The 1954 American Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan was established as part of a global strategy for containing the Russians and their Chinese allies.

The basic assumptions underlying this national defense strategy of the 1950s gradually eroded during the following decade. The Sino-Soviet alliance degenerated into political feuding and then into an outright military confrontation. What had been seen as Chinese expansionism was reassessed as an effort to secure vulnerable border areas (as in Korea or India), as being more rhetorical than real, or as an effort to prevent Moscow from establishing a "collective security" coalition from the Indian subcontinent to Korea that would contain Chinese influence. Despite Peking's efforts to foment insurgencies in Burma, Indochina, Malaysia, and Africa, Chinese-sponsored subversion in practice has proven to be either ineffective or a restrained attempt to compete with the Soviets for influence in the Third World. The Vietnam experience now seems a special case of "people's war," in which Sino-Soviet involvement in an indigenous conflict did more to exacerbate than ease tensions between Moscow and Peking.

The Nixon Administration's breakthrough to Peking was made possible by these basic transformations in global political alignments of the 1960s. In 1971–72, the United States was able to draw on a concern shared with Peking about the "hegemonic" ambitions of Soviet power to unburden itself of the political and military confrontation with China. For the first time in two decades we no longer faced a two-front strategic challenge. A basic issue that should enter into American public discussion of the pros and cons of U.S.-PRC normalization is the advantages to our national security that have come with elimination, or at least sharp reduction, of the Asian front of the great power confrontations, which grew from World War II.

For a time after the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué the United States derived tangible benefits from the political dialogue

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with Peking: the pace of détente with Moscow seemed to acquire added momentum; a favorable climate was created for our disengagement from Vietnam; the Chinese, after two decades of criticizing the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, reversed their position and began to lobby for strong ties between Tokyo and Washington; PRC leaders actively encouraged the strengthening of the NATO alliance; and Washington drew quiet but meaningful Chinese backing for its diplomacy on issues ranging from the Middle East to Northeast Asia.

Other fruits of the breakthrough period in U.S.-PRC relations have been less direct but no less advantageous to American foreign relations. At the United Nations and in other international forums the United States is no longer the primary target of Peking's hostility (although we are hardly immune from Chinese polemical attacks, which most Americans find unjust and offensive). And the Chinese have refrained from criticizing American security ties and base arrangements in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and Southeast Asia (Thailand and the Philippines).

These gains derived from the process of normalizing U.S.-PRC relations have dissipated somewhat in the past four years, in circumstances where America has appeared to play a less resolute role in world affairs. In 1974, Peking began to criticize détente as representing appeasement of the Soviet Union. More recently, Chinese leaders have complained publicly to visiting Americans that the United States is only "using" China against the Soviet Union—standing on Chinese shoulders to gain leverage in the continuing strategic joust with Moscow. The charge rings hollow in the ears of Americans who remember that in the early years of the U.S. confrontation with Soviet "hegemony" Peking had allied itself to Moscow. They also recall strategic confrontations with the Russians over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East, which demonstrated U.S. ability and willingness to meet strategic responsibilities. Chinese fears of those "in the West" who they say are trying to "divert the peril of the new Tsars toward the East in order to preserve themselves at the expense of others"[18] are paralleled by American concerns that the Chinese are only seeking to ease Soviet pressures against them by pushing the United States into renewed conflict with Moscow. Such suspicions bespeak the complexity of "triangular" global politics and the lack of mutual trust that is the legacy of the years of cold war.

Despite such concerns, the United States and China have both

[18] Hua Kuo-feng, *op. cit.*, p. D–29.

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gained substantial benefits to their respective security interests by setting aside the confrontation of the past two decades. Americans who doubt the advantages of even the presently modest state of U.S.-PRC relations should consider a world in which we had returned to an active political-military confrontation with China. By the 1980s this will be a China possessing strategic weaponry capable of directly threatening the United States, and building the economic resources to be a more effective force in the Third World. Fully normalized U.S.-PRC relations will not mean the elimination of all American differences with Peking. But to defuse at our own initiative and by political means the most intense source of conflict with the PRC, and thus to minimize the possibility of a return to a two-front confrontation with the nuclear powers, would constitute a major advantage to American security.

Active cooperation with Peking on international security issues is a less certain matter. There will continue to be limited U.S.-PRC common interest in at least parallel foreign policy actions for some time to come. Explicit Sino-American political cooperation on international issues is less likely. And those who advocate the sale of American arms to the PRC overreach the present level of mutual trust in the relationship, and probably heighten Chinese concerns about being used by the United States in a game that has more propaganda than practical value. The heightening of security cooperation between Washington and Peking, even under conditions of normalized relations, will not come about without reason, but as a result of an enhanced sense of shared threat created by the "hegemonic" actions of other powers. The *possibility* of such cooperation, however, made credible through a stable U.S.-PRC relationship, would serve the security interests of the two countries without being gratuitously provocative to others.

A strategy of trying to pressure the Soviet Union through an active relationship with the Chinese can be justly criticized as being so contrived and manipulative as to be counterproductive. The Chinese are unlikely to be so "used" in any event. But to say that it is dangerous to "play" the Sino-Soviet dispute is not to conclude that one can remain indifferent to its effects. There are dangers in ignoring realities, as well as opportunities to be missed in spurning those with whom one shares common concerns.

In sum, U.S.-PRC normalization should not be debated as simply a choice between American relations with Peking or Taipei. The risks to the security of Taiwan inherent in normalization must be balanced against the gains to America's (and Taiwan's) security that would come with a normal relationship with the PRC.

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With respect to Taiwan's future, it is precisely because PRC leaders have come to see their own security as related to improved dealings with the United States and to our role in international affairs that they have an interest in sustaining good relations and in not making normalization appear to be a matter of the United States abandoning others to a violent fate. If Peking cannot be responsive to these concerns, it is most unlikely that normalization will be accomplished. It remains for the negotiating process to test whether these security perspectives can be reconciled.

2. *The International Impact:* We should not normalize relations with the PRC now because of the disturbing impact it will have on our relations with Japan, Korea, and other states such as Israel which look to the United States for their security. Our Asian allies will doubt the credibility of our defense commitments to them, all the more so given recent U.S. decisions to withdraw troops from Korea and move toward normal relations with Vietnam. American normalization with Peking would just compound the impression of a U.S. "pullback" from Asia.

Since 1971, the formal international position of the Republic of China has gone through a major decline. Apart from Taipei's expulsion from China's seat at the United Nations, more than 50 states have severed diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China. Today only 23 countries have official ties with Taiwan. This contrasts with Peking's strengthened international position, in which the number of states recognizing the PRC increased from 47 in 1970 to 114 today. The United States is the only major power that still accords recognition to Taipei. In Asia the only state that still exchanges ambassadors with Taiwan is the Republic of Korea.

In these circumstances it is hard to argue that the United States has rushed precipitously into a relationship with Peking at the expense of its friends and allies. If anything, we are a "holdout" going against the tide of international practice.

Nonetheless, there is latent unease in Japan, Korea, and other states in East and Southeast Asia about the prospect of a break in U.S. relations with Taiwan because of our security role in the region. The United States continues to "cover" Tokyo's interests on the island, and the Japanese and others, in Asia and elsewhere, who look to the United States to play a stabilizing role in world affairs will draw implications for their own security from the way we handle the Taiwan issue.

The actual impact of U.S.-PRC normalization on Asia and the

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world will depend on how Taiwan's security is accounted for (to be discussed under arguments 7–9 below). If the island *is* "abandoned" or exposed to military pressures it *would* have a chilling effect on the countries of East Asia. In the absence of an understanding of the terms of a normalization agreement it is hard to weigh the likely impact on our allies and friends. What can be said is that their concerns will have to carry appropriate weight with American decision-makers.

On the other hand, inasmuch as it was shared security concerns that brought Washington and Peking together nearly seven years ago, the Chinese presumably still have some interest in seeing that the credibility of America's global defense role is not undermined. Indeed, there is almost macabre humor in the spectacle of Chinese leaders baiting American visitors by telling them that the United States does not have the courage to stand up to its responsibility to resist the "hegemony" of Soviet "social-imperialism"—even as Peking's media continue to castigate the United States as an "imperialist" power. The Chinese cannot have it both ways: they can either facilitate the adjustment of America's security responsibilities in a way that does not heighten doubts about the value of our commitments; or they can see the erosion of U.S. efforts to work with them on issues of common concern.

As for the unease in Japan and elsewhere about the impact of U.S.-PRC normalization, consideration must also be given to the effects on their interests of a breakdown in the normalization process, with the possibility of a return to Sino-American hostility or confrontation. For two decades Asian international relations were riven by the cross-pressures of the American policy of "containing" China and PRC efforts to assert Chinese influence through "people's diplomacy," insurgency, and trade. As noted earlier, the improvement in Washington's relations with Peking at the beginning of this decade was accompanied by such favorable developments as Chinese support for the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, a reduction in political pressures against American bases in Asia, and a significant decline in efforts to promote "people's wars." It is hard to see how the security of America's Asian allies would be enhanced by renewed Sino-American hostility.

The recent American decisions with respect to Korea and Vietnam have indeed created an unfavorable context for an agreement with Peking. It cannot be argued that the time is particularly auspicious for normalization; there will never be a good time to break formal relations with a friendly government.

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Such a development makes sense only within the context of a global and long-term perspective on national security issues. In practice, of course, the individual elements of American foreign policy are often shaped by factors other than a global security strategy or international priorities. Moreover, Americans are probably too practical-minded and anti-authoritarian in their approach to the world to appreciate the symbolic uses of power. Thus, we discount the unsettling effect on our allies of a decision to withdraw ground troops from Korea by rationalizing the ability of the Republic of Korea to defend itself—even as American political and economic interests in Asia are rapidly developing a weight that now challenges our traditional preoccupation with Europe. This makes it all the more incumbent upon American leaders to articulate and pursue our interests and responsibilities in the region with clarity and a steady hand; and surely one central element among these responsibilities is preventing the relapse of U.S.-PRC relations into a hostility that would have a destabilizing effect throughout East Asia.

3. *Why Normalize Now?* Why should the United States be in a hurry to recognize the PRC? The Chinese aren't pressuring us now, and given their strategic vulnerabilities they have no alternative but to maintain at least their present relationship with the United States. They should understand that their interests are served by the United States *not* taking actions relative to Taiwan that might destabilize Asia. There are no adverse consequences in delaying normalization.

Since the establishment of direct, high-level contacts between Washington and Peking in 1971, Chinese leaders have displayed an attitude of patience, but not indifference, to the pacing of the normalization process. They understood that an American President would need political "running room" to build support for the policy. Except for public expressions of exasperation this last August, following President Carter's informal welcoming statement to Secretary of State Vance upon his return from Peking—in which the President said that diplomatic recognition of the PRC "is undoubtedly going to be well into the future"—the Chinese have been sensitive to the fact that public pressure will be counterproductive in the negotiating process.[19]

Aside from any concern in Peking that expressions of impatience

[19] Harsh-sounding Chinese public statements after the Vance visit may also have been intended to counter reports from Washington suggesting PRC flexibility and substantial progress associated with the visit.

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for an agreement will compromise their negotiating position, PRC leaders undoubtedly are aware of the domestic political rhythms in both China and the United States, which influence the timing of a major political development like normalization. Just as the internal tensions of the Lin Piao affair in the years 1969–1971 retarded Peking's response to early American expressions of interest in high-level discussions, so U.S. domestic politics have drawn out the Washington-Peking dialogue on normalization.

While PRC leaders can appreciate the effects of such political realities, what would be unacceptable is an attitude of indifference or a feeling of being "strung along" in the normalization process—of not being taken seriously. Thus, it would be a mistake to take expressions of patience on Peking's part as an excuse for delay or inaction on the normalization issue. Loss of interest in Washington in developing a relationship with the Chinese is likely to dissipate what little may remain of trust in Peking and public support in the United States. And without such qualities it is most unlikely that leaders in Washington and Peking will be able to reconcile their differences.

More to the point, however, further delay—while avoiding difficult decisions for a time—will work against America's long-term interests. We should not assume that the favorable position the United States has occupied in the strategic "triangle" during most of the 1970s will persist indefinitely. In the post-Mao era, Chinese leaders may very well take steps to ease tensions with the Soviet Union. The earlier phases of post-World War II great-power relations—the Sino-Soviet alliance against the United States, political feuding and bitter rivalry between Moscow and Peking, and China's "tilt" toward America—may now be giving way to a time of "equidistant" strategic relationships and more complex political competition as power diffuses in the international system.

America's ability to influence the evolution of these patterns of international power is limited. It can be argued that China will lose interest in dealing with the United States as Soviet pressures against the PRC diminish, or—conversely—if America seems incapable of playing a counterweight role in resisting the expansionist tendencies of a "hegemonic" Soviet Union. U.S.-PRC normalization might give Peking greater incentive to moderate the conflict with Moscow as well, or the political flexibility to cooperate more openly with Washington in response to threatening Soviet actions. What can be said for American interests is that any amelioration in Sino-Soviet hostilities would hold less threatening implications if we had laid aside our most serious point of dispute with the

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Chinese, and that normalization will make it easier for the Chinese leaders to work with the United States in dealing with the challenges common to security interests. Conversely, failure to make further progress in U.S.-PRC relations will dissipate an important element of flexibility in America's efforts to adjust to a changing strategic environment.

Moreover, while the delay in completing normalization has been accompanied by erosion of support for the policy in the United States, over time opposition is also likely to increase from allies and friends in Asia, thus making an eventual decision all the more difficult. Given China's long-term interests in becoming a major influence in Asia and the Third World, America's own adjustment to shifting relationships in the Pacific and other developing areas will be much easier if we are no longer burdened by a territorial dispute with Peking, which compromises the ability of both sides to collaborate on problems of common interest.

Chinese leaders, however, may see certain advantages in delay. It can be argued that a strategy of "patience" enables the PRC to avoid a difficult decision on normalization until a time when China has further developed its economy and modernized its military forces. The question for Americans is whether *they* want to face the resolution of the Taiwan issue in future circumstances where the power balance in the Taiwan Strait is likely to be less favorable to the United States and to the island. The choices associated with normalization are unlikely to get easier over time.

4. *Human Rights Objections:* Given America's commitment to human rights, we would betray our own principles by granting recognition to the Communist Chinese and withdrawing it from the people of Taiwan who support our values.

For those who feel that the promotion of human rights should occupy a primary place in the determination of American foreign policy, there is little basis for support of normalization. China, as a collectivist society, has values and a political style that are antithetical to fundamental aspects of the American tradition. Peking emphasizes what Americans find the most objectionable aspects of Marxism-Leninism to justify its revolutionary rule, and most visitors to the PRC are incredulous at China's enduring veneration of Stalin. And if Taiwan is not a model of liberal democracy, the island at least impresses Americans as aspiring to representative political institutions and evincing general acceptance of Western values. To place the island and its population in jeopardy would thus offend principles and traditions held dear by

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most Americans, if not violate an instinctive sense of loyalty, fair play, and obligation to a friendly people.

The first response to this perspective must be to examine (as is done in later sections) the degree to which normalization would actually jeopardize Taiwan's ability to pursue its own way. The second can only be recognition that most foreign policy decisions involve a range of (often conflicting) values and principles, and normalization is no exception. Among them are our enduring support for the principle of the unity of China, and the integrity of a political commitment—formally expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué—to seek the normalization of relations with the PRC. And there is no small element of morality in the quest for peaceful resolution of international differences in the nuclear age—for Taiwan's sake as well as for our own.

In the real world of conflicting cultures and national interests, there is a price to pursuing one's own way. A realistic national policy must reflect some proportion between personal values and the costs of their pursuit. A China policy that seeks abstract goals irrespective of the consequences will ultimately lose public support—as was the fate of "containment and isolation" in the 1960s. So too, of course, would be the fate of an opportunistic policy that violated basic American values.

5. *Bilateral Issues:* There are no bilateral advantages for America in normalizing relations with the PRC. Peking is unable to finance a sizable expansion of trade with the United States even if it modifies the principle of "self-reliance." The PRC is not really interested in cultural contact with the United States, and scientific exchanges will be primarily to the advantage of the Chinese.

The American public's early response to the prospect of normalization was enthusiasm for direct contact with a country that has long fascinated traders and tourists, educators and journalists. Requests for visas to travel to the PRC numbered in the hundreds of thousands; the academic community eagerly sought the development of scientific and cultural exchanges; and the business world revived the China trader's enduring vision of "400 million customers" (only now Chinese aspirin-eaters and shirt-wearers number nearly 950 million).

Since 1971 we have become more realistic about the limits of a bilateral relationship with the PRC. Scientific and cultural exchanges have grown slowly because of China's modest and controlled capacity for hosting foreigners, the political conditions Peking imposes on such contacts, and the limited areas for unfet-

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tered intellectual collaboration. The American academic community now complains about the restraints of "scholarly tourism" (that is, no real dialogue, much less cooperative research) and the limited willingness of the Chinese side to reciprocate contacts.[20] Nonetheless, a visa to the PRC remains a valued "special dispensation" for those who have yet to make a pilgrimage to Peking; and Chinese art exhibitions and foreign affairs delegations are eagerly welcomed by the American public.

Trade with the PRC, near zero in 1971, soared to over a billion dollars in value by 1974, only to fall back to the more modest levels of $462 million the following year and $336 million in 1976. While American trade with Taiwan grows steadily at a value more than ten times U.S.-PRC commerce, our economic dealings with Peking remain constrained by limited American markets for hog bristles, textiles, tung oil and Tientsin carpets. Additional limits are set by China's reluctance to make foreign purchases on credit or to finance trade with the proceeds of petroleum sales abroad (a policy that may now be changing), and the desire to avoid dependence on the United States—or any other country—as a source of food grains or technology. The American economy remains a supplier of last resort for Peking, a situation which is likely to change only modestly if normalization is accomplished.[21] Even if U.S.-PRC trade were to expand as much as tenfold from its present level, it would still represent only about three percent of America's total foreign trade.

It is thus hard to make the case that trade and cultural contacts with the PRC, in and of themselves, justify the political costs of normalization. Relative to similar dealings with Taiwan, the People's Republic will remain a limited market and less open to intellectual and social interchange with the United States. Rather, such bilateral ties should constitute the sources of human contact that might erode the misunderstandings and distrust of the past and build a sense of shared purpose. It is not clear, however, that the commercial and cultural exchanges of the last six years have always contributed to this process. Sales of adulterated American grain to China and the contrasting intellectual style of visitors from the United States have probably put off the Chinese as much as American enthusiasms have been dampened by politicized song-and-dance troupes, the commercial rituals of the semiannual

[20] For a thoughtful evaluation of the development of bilateral U.S.-PRC relations since 1971, see Lucian W. Pye, "Building a Relationship on the Sands of Cultural Exchanges," in William J. Barnds, ed., *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship*, New York: New York University Press, 1977, pp. 109–148.

[21] See Alexander Eckstein, "Sino-American Economic Relations," in Barnds, *ibid.*, pp. 53–108.

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Canton Trade Fair, and the intellectual unresponsiveness and inflexibility of PRC foreign affairs delegations.

Ultimately, the rationale for normalization must be grounded on the national security interests of the United States: the costs of an eventual return to confrontation with a major world power, and the advantages of even a limited ability to pursue parallel international interests with Peking. But within the context of normalized relations and shared national security concerns, there can be room for the modest growth of bilateral contacts between two major societies with fundamentally different political and economic systems and contrasting social values.

6. *The Self-Determination Arguments:* We should not deprive the people of Taiwan of the alternative of proclaiming their independence. Why not at least seek a "German solution" that recognizes the reality of two Chinese states within one nation? How about a "Swiss" or "Hong Kong" solution in which Taiwan would become a neutral state or entity? Why should we accept Peking's preference for the "Japanese model" as the only way to account for Taiwan's future?

A muted but significant theme in current public reactions to the China issue is the deeply held American belief in political self-determination. Over the years this issue has not found widespread expression in the case of Taiwan, however. It has been official U.S. policy throughout this century to support the unity of China; we have not encouraged or supported sentiments of independence by the native Taiwanese against the Nationalist government; and we have now directly acknowledged the view expressed in Taipei and Peking that there is but one China. While the legalities of Taiwan's status may be ambiguous, in political terms the situation is clear enough. There are two rival Chinese governments, each claiming to be the government of all China; and the United States, by according de jure recognition to one of these governments, in effect if not intention, takes sides in the still-unresolved Chinese civil war.

Given the enduring reality of an effectively functioning government on Taiwan, however, why should the United States accept Peking's insistence that as a basis for normal relations with the PRC the legal existence of the Republic of China be repudiated? The U.S. *could* theoretically extend recognition to Peking as well as Taipei, but that recognition is most unlikely to be reciprocated by the PRC. We *can* continue to accord the Republic of China legal recognition as the only government of China, but at the

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almost inevitable cost of an eventual return to confrontation with Peking over the island.

And we could support the idea of Taiwan's independence from China. But this would put us in opposition to the policy of the present government in Taipei, as well as violating the intention expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué. Moreover, whether a treaty commitment persisted or not, U.S. encouragement for an independent Taiwan would carry with it a heavy moral obligation to defend the island as an independent state.

Apart from all the reasons why America's strategic interests would not be served by such a development, the interests of the people of the island would not be advanced by U.S. support for self-determination. Such a position would most likely erode whatever chances exist for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's future. It would be irresponsible of the United States to encourage the island's independence if it is likely to lead to violence. There is both realism and responsibility in American efforts to sustain the de facto conditions of life on Taiwan while seeking to ameliorate differences with Peking, and thus create the conditions for an eventual political rather than military resolution of the island's future.

7. *Concern for the Security of Taiwan:* We cannot abandon an old friend and ally, the government of the Republic of China, to a violent fate. The people of Taiwan cannot be treated as expendable in our search for a more secure world. We are not the kind of people who go back on solemn treaty commitments to the security of others.

Concern for the security of the people of Taiwan is *the* core issue impeding a positive U.S. response to Peking's terms for normalized relations. There is a widespread feeling that "we should not turn our backs on friends" and that the United States would betray its most basic moral values if it "abandoned" Taiwan.[22] One's sense is that the American public would feel the island had in fact been abandoned under two conditions: (1) if all American contacts with the island were terminated; or (2) if a negotiated arrangement with Peking exposed Taiwan to the prospect of a violent fate, to an involuntary political or military "takeover" by the PRC. It is most unlikely that any American President, under current circumstances, could muster sufficient political support from the public and Congress for normalization

[22] See public opinion data on this point in Watts, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

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with Peking if it meant either of these developments.

For those who feel that withdrawing legal recognition of the Republic of China and ending the security treaty amount in themselves to "abandonment," there is no basis for normalizing with Peking. But if one can accept a change in the legal formalities of America's relations with the island while the realities of Taiwan's present situation remained unchanged, an acceptable, if risk-laden, normalization agreement becomes possible.

Under Peking's own terms for normalization—the "Japanese model"—the United States would maintain trade and social ties with the island. Indeed, since Tokyo broke relations with Taipei and normalized with Peking in late 1972, Japan's total trade with the island has increased more than two and a half times. Taiwan's airline service between Tokyo and Taipei, suspended for a period in 1974 and 1975, remains active; and more than 500,000 Japanese tourists visited the island in 1976. Japan's experience thus implies that U.S. normalization with the PRC would *not* mean an end to America's economic and social contacts with Taiwan.

While Japan's normalization agreement with Peking led to the termination of all official governmental contacts with the Republic of China, unofficial ties are sustained through Taiwan's East Asian Relations Association in Tokyo, and Japan's Interchange Association in Taipei—facilities staffed by retired Foreign Ministry personnel. PRC leaders have publicly rejected the idea of the United States maintaining a liaison office in Taiwan after normalization, believing that such an arrangement would imply official relations with the Republic of China. The "Japanese model" does indicate, however, that Peking will not object to some form of unofficial representation that would enable the United States to maintain contact with the authorities and people of the island.

Taiwan's vulnerability to attack from the mainland is a more complicated issue, for common sense implies that a state controlling 950 million people and a regular military establishment of 3.5 million men should have, or can acquire, the capability to take over Taiwan by force. In practice, the Taiwan Strait, which separates the island from the mainland by almost 100 miles, constitutes a significant barrier to direct assault. All indications are that Peking at present neither possesses nor is constructing the types of landing craft suitable for an amphibious invasion. Such action would require control of the air, and while the PRC possesses more than 15 times as many aircraft as the Republic of China, Taiwan's modern air defenses would exact a considerable cost from an invading air force. Moreover, at present Peking does

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not appear to be training its pilots for such an exercise.[23]

Most basically, however, the PRC's primary concern remains the security of the Sino-Soviet frontier, along which the Russians have deployed 43 divisions, modern aircraft, missiles, and armor. So long as this is the case, the concept of a direct assault on Taiwan is, for Peking, a right of sovereignty and possibility for the future rather than a practical alternative.

Peking's air and naval forces do now have the capability to blockade Taiwan and thus to try to "liberate" the island through a combination of military pressure and negotiations. This approach would have the advantage of being a more economical and restained use of force, although such action would place Peking in confrontation with those countries—primarily Japan and the United States—that maintain an active trade with the island. PRC leaders will be reluctant to do this while their security concerns on other frontiers both divert the attention and resources of the People's Liberation Army from the Taiwan Strait and place a premium on satisfactory relations with Tokyo and Washington.

The military balance between the island and mainland, and its political context, will evolve over the coming decade. Peking is slowly constructing modern naval and air assets, and an ICBM force capable of reaching the continental United States as well as the Soviet Union. For its part, Taiwan will seek to maintain its defenses, partly through domestic arms production but primarily through purchases of military equipment from abroad—and largely from the United States.[24] While the island is small in size, its remarkable economic growth has now created an industrial base and scientific manpower capable of eventually sustaining important elements of its own defense system. In a public statement in 1975, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo implied that while Taiwan possesses the capability to build atomic bombs it would not do so because "we cannot use nuclear weapons to hurt our own countrymen."[25] The United States, consistent with its world-

[23] This is according to statements of a pilot of the People's Liberation Army Air Force of the PRC who defected to Taiwan in July 1977. See Melinda Liu, "Propaganda Boost as Fan Flies In," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 22, 1977, pp. 22–23.

[24] The issue of sales of defensive U.S. military equipment to Taiwan after normalization with the PRC is among the most delicate and crucial questions affecting the prospect of a negotiated agreement between Washington and Peking. The support of many Congressmen for normalization is likely to depend on the ability of American companies to provide the island with the weaponry to sustain its own defenses.

[25] Quoted in Fox Butterfield, "Taiwan Diplomatic Ties Weak, Is Thriving on Its "Self-Reliance,'" *The New York Times*, October 14, 1975. This point was reiterated in an official statement of January 27, 1977 released by the Central News Agency, Taipei, and reprinted in FBIS, *Asia*, January 27, 1977, p. B-1.

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wide opposition to nuclear proliferation, has discouraged the sale of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities to the island by other countries so as to diminish the prospect of proliferation. In so doing, we maintain our global concern with security in the nuclear age, but put ourselves in the position of opposing Taiwan's enhancement of its own defenses in a political context where our policy of normalization with Peking is likely to lead to termination of the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty.

The sum effect of these military factors is that whether or not there is normalization, Taiwan is unlikely to be under threat of invasion from the mainland for at least another decade; blockade rather than direct assault is likely to be the primary threat to the island's security; and, over time, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait will evolve as both Peking and Taipei modernize their defense establishments—although not necessarily in ways that will be to the PRC's advantage. Thus, U.S.-PRC normalization is unlikely to expose Taiwan to threats of invasion for some time. The immediate pressures of de-recognition will be more psychological than physical. But there is no denying the fact that in a decade or so Peking could create the military capability to take the island by force.[26]

The basic question one must ask of normalization is whether political rather than military means can be used to secure Taiwan's present circumstances, sustain the island's social and economic ties abroad, and increase the likelihood that Peking and Taipei will eventually negotiate their differences rather than fight for control of the island. This issue is all the more meaningful for the United States given the reluctance of the American public to become directly involved in Taiwan's defense—an attitude that is sure to increase with the passage of time and as Peking acquires ICBMs with the range to threaten the United States directly.

Officials of the PRC have made it clear, under repeated prodding from American visitors, that they will not make a *commitment* to the United States to renounce the use of force in achieving Taiwan's "liberation." Is there any way to reconcile Peking's claim of sovereignty on this issue and the substance of America's defense commitment to the island? The Chinese, in various public statements, have pointed toward two approaches to resolving this most delicate issue. One would be a *unilateral* and *conditional* PRC statement (not a commitment to any foreign power) of the inten-

[26] It is worth noting, however, that Peking's current economic development priorities place industrial modernization and agricultural mechanization ahead of defense spending. See the statement by PRC Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying of May 9, 1977, as translated in *Peking Review*, May 20, 1977, especially p. 18.

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tion to resolve Taiwan's future relationship with the mainland by peaceful means. As the late Premier Chou En-lai told China's National People's Congress in the summer of 1955:

> There are two possible ways for the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, namely, by war or peaceful means. Conditions permitting, the Chinese people are ready to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. . . . Provided that the United States does not interfere with China's internal affairs, the possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan will continue to increase.[27]

The United States no longer maintains regular naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and has reduced its military presence on the island from 10,000 men in 1972 to just over 1,000 today. It remains to be seen whether the negotiating process can reconcile Chou En-lai's perspective—recently reaffirmed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping[28]—and the American position expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué that the United States will achieve the ultimate goal of a complete withdrawal from Taiwan of all its military forces and installations when there is the "prospect" of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

Another opportunity for compromise could lie in the *timing* rather than the *mode* of "liberation." The Chinese are skilled in the use of timing in politics, and have shown an ability to be "patient" when their interests are served by setting aside an issue for more propitious circumstances. Perhaps the most relevant current sample of "political patience" is Peking's willingness to tolerate the continuing existence of the colonies of Hong Kong and Macao. Regarding Taiwan, senior PRC leaders have told American visitors on a number of occasions that they are prepared to wait a century to achieve direct control over the island. In the summer of 1975, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping asserted to a private American international affairs group headed by Cyrus Vance that China could wait as long as a hundred years to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.[29]

The combined effect of Peking's apparent willingness to be "patient" and to make a unilateral expression of restraint in

[27] Chou En-lai, "On the Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy," July 30, 1955, as reproduced in *Current Background*, Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General, August 3, 1955, p. 6.

[28] As recounted in Louis D. Boccardi, "Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties," *The New York Times*, September 7, 1977.

[29] Quoted in John H. Knowles, *China Diary*, New York: The Rockefeller Foundation Working Papers, October 1976, p. 81. Among other authoritative statements by Chinese leaders on this point that might be cited, see the remarks to Senator Hiram Fong by a PRC Vice Foreign Minister reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., November 25, 1974, Washington: GPO, 1974, p. S19956.

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recognition of Taiwan's "special conditions" would be to defer action on the Taiwan issue for future generations of leaders in Peking and Taipei. What political and military circumstances would then prevail no one can now foretell. As the basis for a U.S.-PRC normalization agreement, this approach would preserve China's sovereign rights, reinforce the legitimacy of the PRC, and sustain the principle of the unity of China, yet allow the United States to end de jure recognition of the Republic of China in a way that could sustain the de facto realities of life on Taiwan and unofficial American ties to the island for decades to come.

It cannot be denied, however, that such an approach to resolving the impasse between Washington and Peking is not without risks for the United States, or for Taiwan. Peking would not be formally *obligated* to use peaceful measures alone in its approach to the island, and the timing of its "liberating" efforts would remain under its sovereign control. The United States would have made an irreversible political move in withdrawing recognition from the Republic of China. We would have to assume that whatever public expressions of patience and restraint the PRC might make would be "guaranteed" by a combination of Peking's concern about its security on other frontiers, a desire to sustain good relations with the United States and Japan, and Taiwan's capabilities and determination to defend itself (and perhaps eventually to show a measure of flexibility in negotiating some form of association with the mainland).

In weighing the uncertainties about the future security of Taiwan, the American public, as it debates normalization, must consider the alternative risks and costs of inaction. If efforts to resolve differences with Peking through negotiations break down—or simply atrophy—the result is likely to be more than just a cooling of the atmosphere of the U.S.-PRC relationship. Chinese leaders will have little domestic political support for promoting even limited forms of cooperation with the United States on international issues—especially in circumstances where they feel a less immediate threat to their security from other powers. And over time, an unresolved conflict about Taiwan, with a U.S. defense commitment still in force, is likely to be the most specific cause of a return to outright hostility or even direct confrontation. A situation in which the United States continues as the military guarantor of Taiwan is surely the one in which Peking will feel its only recourse is the use of political and military pressures. This raises the prospect of the United States eventually having to make good on its defense commitment to Taiwan, but

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in future circumstances where the conventional and nuclear-military balance is likely to be much less favorable to the United States and to the island. Having now all but dismantled our defense establishment on Taiwan, an end to the normalization process would imply the need to rebuild it. Otherwise, the United States will remain in the most vulnerable position of all, of having a commitment to Taiwan's defense without the means at hand to meet its obligation.

8. *The Internal Stability of Taiwan:* Taiwan could not cope with the shock of normalization. Foreign trade and investment would decline, causing an economic crisis. The authority of the government would be undermined, producing political chaos.

Taiwan has met with considerable adversity since the onset of American efforts to normalize relations with Peking and the expulsion of the government of the Republic of China from the United Nations. The authorities on the island have skillfully coped with their difficulties, however. The diminution in formal recognition has been replaced with functioning trade and cultural missions in more than 20 countries. While foreign investment on Taiwan declined slightly for a year after the Nixon visit and Sino-Japanese normalization, it has been sustained at a level of well over $100 million per year throughout the 1970s, thus helping to accelerate the island's remarkable economic growth. The island's total foreign trade of nearly $16 billion in 1976 was almost three times greater than in the year of the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. At the same time, numerous observers of the Taiwan scene have remarked at the heightened sense of political unity on the island as both "mainlanders" and the Taiwanese majority, in the face of shared adversity, cope together with the uncertainties of the future.

This experience of the past seven years does not prove that Taiwan can accommodate to an unlimited range of pressures and changed circumstances. If anything, the island's future is increasingly vulnerable to disruption of its growing economic ties abroad, as the value of imports now approaches 50 percent of GNP. What it does reveal is an effective leadership in Taipei able to cope with changing and difficult circumstances—able to adjust if given time—and a strong popular will to sustain a pattern of life built with decades of personal effort. In this sense, the established authority and proven flexibility of the Chiang Ching-kuo government may provide a more effective context for adjusting to an American normalization agreement with Peking than some future

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administration of less tested competence.

Ultimately, of course, Taiwan's ability to cope with normalization will depend in substantial measure on the terms of an agreement. If Peking in fact will make good on its expressed interest in recognizing Taiwan's "special conditions,"[30] and if the United States meets its fundamental responsibilities by normalizing with the PRC in a way that sustains the island's economic and administrative viability, it seems likely that Taiwan can continue to adjust to changes it has dealt with effectively since 1971.

9. *The Administrative and Legal Complexities of Maintaining America's Ties with a De-recognized Taiwan:* Given the legal complexities of our presently normal relationship with the Republic of China, we could not adequately sustain commercial and social contacts with Taiwan under conditions where we have broken diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China.

American dealings with Taiwan are presently facilitated by a web of 59 treaties and executive agreements covering such diverse issues as defense and military assistance, commerce, air transport, civil uses of atomic energy, and immigration. In addition, the regulations of such governmental agencies as the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Military Assistance Program under the Foreign Assistance Act affect our official relations with the island. Many of these arrangements, which help maintain the health of Taiwan's economy (through trade with the United States, which constitutes nearly a third of the island's imports and exports) could be called into question if the United States broke diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China.

One study of the effects of normalization on American ties to Taiwan has concluded that despite the ambiguities of existing international law and domestic U.S. legislation, "it is possible to construct a legal framework for dealing with Taiwan as the 'de facto government of an entity having international personality,' which would permit continued economic and other dealings after the withdrawal of de jure recognition."[31]

To give effect to this judgment, however, the Congress will have to cooperate with the executive branch in passing enabling or amending legislation that would sustain the present web of relationships—and thus enable Taiwan to adjust to circumstances

[30] Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping recently used the phrase in discussions with American visitors. See Louis D. Boccardi, *loc. cit.*

[31] Victor H. Li, *Derecognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems,* Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977, p. 36.

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of de facto rather than de jure relations with the United States. The Senate and House are also likely to express America's continuing interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and the terms of such an expression could conflict with Peking's position on the island's future.

Will congressional action be supportive of this aspect of the normalization process? The level of cooperation is likely to reflect reactions "on the Hill" to Peking's terms for normalization. No President is likely to proceed with the policy if he is not reasonably confident of congressional backing, and this requires not only clear articulation of the value to the United States of normal relations with the PRC, but also convincing answers to the arguments against normalization. Such answers can be formulated only when the terms of a normalization agreement have been negotiated, and Peking must be aware of these constraints on presidential action.

A thus far unspoken cause for concern in Peking, as well as in Washington, about proceeding with normalization is the possibility that terms for an agreement negotiated between the Administration and PRC leaders might be blocked by actions of the Congress. The now-pending Senate action on the Panama Canal treaty will do much to either heighten or ease this concern, for it is a bellwether of America's ability to adapt treaty commitments of an earlier era to the new challenges of a changing political and strategic environment.

10. *Lack of Trust of PRC Intentions:* Even if we can negotiate an acceptable normalization agreement with Peking, we cannot count on the Communist Chinese to keep their word. They would eventually go back on any promises or understandings, if not through deviousness then as a result of political chaos in their leadership in which one faction would repudiate the policies of their rivals.

The cold war experience of unsuccessful negotiations or violated agreements with communist governments has left a difficult legacy for those who would promote reconciliation rather than confrontation with Peking. There is the argument, for example, that once normalization has been accomplished Peking might cast aside any expressions of "patience" about Taiwan and apply pressures to the island. Such a concern can only be responded to with a recital of all the reasons noted earlier why PRC leaders are unlikely to see it in their interests to do so, enumeration of possible American counteractions, and the observation that the Chinese place weight

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on their given word. The assertion, "We Chinese mean what we say," expresses a basic sense of integrity and determination, just as the words of Chairman Mao carry a particular burden of authority.

Where trust is lacking, however, the language of political agreement seems a flimsy reed; and even the Chairman's words can be quoted selectively or edited to convey varying impressions.[32] There are no sure bets in politics, only enduring values and interests, degrees of risk, and opportunities to be grasped or wasted. But apart from the constraints of reality and national interest that would help to sustain verbal understanding or a written agreement with Peking, it is at least worth considering which words of the Chairman his successors might choose to draw upon to legitimate elements of a normalization agreement. A quotation from Mao or the late Premier Chou En-lai on such matters as patience or restraint in resolving Taiwan's future would have special legitimacy for the Chinese and would provide at least some basis for building support for normalization with Americans.

As for the "chaos in the leadership" argument, one might make the self-critical observation that since Watergate this argument could as readily apply to the American political scene and the continuity of U.S. China policy as to the succession struggle in China following Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four." Yet despite our own quadrennial foreign policy revisionism, campaign rhetoric, and congressional horse-trading, which induce some uncertainty into America's conduct of international affairs, there is an underlying consistency to U.S. foreign policy reflecting the continuity of our security concerns and national interests.

The same can be said for the foreign policy of a major country like China. The words that Peking will ultimately put forward as part of a normalization agreement will reflect enduring realities that China can ignore only at its own peril. Apart from the historically unique problem of Taiwan, basic Chinese and American interests on matters of security do not clash. Geography imparts a helpful distance to contact between two great, but contrasting, nations. The challenge to our negotiators is to find the words of agreement that will express the common concerns and interests that brought Peking and Washington together in the first place, as well as language which might reconcile the differences that continue to make normalization an elusive prospect.

[32] See "China's Vice Premier Reaffirms Rigidity on Taiwan," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 1977, p.10.

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IV

Every American will have to evaluate for himself, or herself, the merits of the various arguments for and against normalization. It would be feckless to assert that there is a totally convincing case for consummation of the process initiated with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. It would be wrong to overstress the positive benefits of the policy — or to ignore the long-range cost of its dissipation. Normalization will not mean the end of all our differences with Peking. A composite judgment must weigh the terms of an agreement yet to be negotiated with Peking, the gains to American interests associated with it, and the risks and costs of either inaction or a breakdown in efforts to resolve U.S.-PRC differences by political means.

The most powerful tendency at present is to drift along in the current, quasi-normal relationship with Peking. Why normalize now; why not wait? The answer must be based on a judgment of likely developments in this country, China, and abroad; from the limited evidence available, public and leadership support for the policy is eroding in both countries. In the post-Mao era China is likely to ease tensions with the Soviet Union, and great power relations would thus evolve toward greater strategic "equidistance" (although China is unlikely to be the primary threat to American security). For the United States to enter such a period having laid aside the primary point of contention with the PRC would mean enhanced foreign policy flexibility, greater likelihood of being able to take coordinated action with Peking in response to threats affecting common interests, and a less burdened position for adapting to changing relationships in East Asia and the Third World. It would mean diminished likelihood of an eventual return to Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan.

Given our public mood on China, however, as revealed in the opinion data and arguments discussed earlier, there cannot be normalization at any price. An agreement must bridge Peking's principle of sovereignty and the credibility of American security relationships. This is most likely to come through a shift in U.S. legal recognition from Taipei to Peking and affirmation of the unity of China, accompanied by arrangements that will sustain for an indefinite period the realities of life on Taiwan, America's social and economic ties to the island, some form of nongovernmental representation, and Taiwan's ability to maintain its own defenses. Above all, normalization must preserve the prospect of an eventual peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, presumably

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based on parallel expressions of patience and restraint by the PRC and American concern for the island's future. Without this prospect, normalization is unlikely to be accomplished.

In sum, the normalization issue tests the ability of the American political process to adjust to a changing world without compromising basic principles, to promote "preventive politics" and plan for the long term and global perspective by accepting short-run uncertainties, and to "move without being kicked." It hardly needs to be said that if Peking comes to believe that the only way to move the United States on Taiwan is with a "kick" in the Strait, we will be back in a period of military confrontation with the PRC. Similarly, a PRC diplomatic "feint to the north"—some gesture on Sino-Soviet relations designed to move us on normalization—is more likely to harden attitudes than to induce flexibility.

The major risks of the present period are precisely that with continuing delay there is ever more dissipation of public support for normalization and concurrent erosion of interest in the policy as the leadership in Washington and Peking begin to explore other alternatives. We are already in a period of some public bickering and recrimination. Senior American foreign policy opinion-makers now speak out against "cravenly yielding" to Peking's terms for normalization, or threaten impeachment if the President abrogates the defense treaty with the Republic of China.[33] Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, who in late 1975 toasted President Ford's arrival in Peking with the statement that normalization "will eventually be realized through the joint efforts of our two sides," told American newspaper editors last September that the United States alone will have to make the moves necessary to normalize relations.[34] Are the Chinese telling us they no longer support the approach to the United States initiated by Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai? Inflexibility in Peking, or indifference and jingoism in Washington, could portend not a period of public debate on normalization, but an eventual return to the political and military burdens of the past, for the United States and for the People's Republic of China.

[33] George W. Ball, "Against 'Cravenly Yielding' to Peking," *The New York Times,* August 24, 1977. See also, Barry M. Goldwater, "Abrogating Treaties," *The New York Times,* October 11, 1977, p. 10.

[34] As quoted in Louis D. Boccardi, *loc. cit.*

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Amos Perlmutter

BEGIN'S STRATEGY AND DAYAN'S TACTICS: THE CONDUCT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Two new major actors are on the scene in Middle Eastern negotiations, dormant since the Sinai II troop disengagement agreement of September 1975. Jimmy Carter, a political newcomer inexperienced in international politics, is President of the United States, and the ancient militant, Menachem Begin, who never expected to become Israel's Prime Minister, is exactly that. While the President's mind is not set as yet on an American strategy for the Middle East, the Prime Minister's preconceptions were formed four decades ago. For nearly 40 years, Menachem Begin has not changed his essential position, modified his beliefs, or wavered in his commitment and dedication to the cause of *Eretz Yisrael* (land of Israel). The two leaders could not be more different in personality and style nor come from more widely differing political orientations. They do have in common a moral, principled, even puritanical stance and commitment, but there the similarity ends.

Since Jimmy Carter assumed office, he has committed his Administration to a Middle Eastern conflict resolution. Carter began his on-the-job training by inviting the leaders of Israel and the confrontation states to Washington. This process began as early as January 1977 and ended with Begin's visit at the end of July. My aim here is not to examine Carter's Middle East policy, orientation and tribulations but to analyze the Begin-Dayan style and its implications for the Carter strategy. This is important because the key to a peaceful solution lies in Israel's hands. Israel occupies Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory. Israel, and only Israel, can relinquish its rule over the West Bank and Gaza and begin the process of Palestinian self-determination. This does not mean that Israel dictates the political procedure for a Middle East peace. In fact the contrary is true. The initiative and the will

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to grant Israel its cherished peace lie solely with the Arabs. Nor is Israel in a position to dictate the nature and structure of the peace; this again is in the hands of the Arabs. But neither Israel nor the Arabs can really imagine conflict settlement without a serious, consistent and imaginative American involvement.

So, once more, we are on the negotiation track. This time, however, Kissinger's step-by-step approach is no longer considered useful or necessary by Israel or the Arabs, and the Carter Administration appears to concur. The step-by-step approach was originally an Israeli idea supported by Egypt and subsequently embraced by Kissinger, who brought an end to the 1973 war by means of troop disengagement agreements. Four years without war between Israel and the Arabs ensued. Now the Carter Administration has embraced the principle of a Geneva conference as an American strategy of mediation to produce an overall settlement. Here again, the design for the negotiating process originated with both Egypt and Israel.

The idea of Geneva is dear to the hearts of the leading Arab confrontation states and especially to Egypt's Sadat, who favors such a substantive overall conference in hopes of securing Israeli withdrawal and righting the wrongs against the Palestinians. Sadat has had considerable influence on the Carter strategy. Israel, on the other hand, actually prefers another form of Arab-Israeli mediation than Geneva, one that is mainly concerned with procedural and functional-substantive aspects, or the "nature of the peace." The Israelis do not believe the time is ripe now for an overall settlement. Thus we have seen the emergence of the Israeli-American proposal for a "two-tiered" Geneva in which negotiations would proceed on several levels and with a double purpose: (1) the achievement of overall settlement, perhaps in a "grand Geneva," involving the participation of all parties to the conflict; and (2) the construction of a sturdy, unit-oriented process for negotiations dealing with discrete issues, with the hope of eventually making everything fit together in a satisfactory pattern. The goal would be overall settlement, but the emphasis would be on process.

In considering the prospects for such an arrangement it is necessary to understand the sources of the conduct of Israeli foreign policy—the Begin style, and the strategy of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. While Menachem Begin will supervise the road to a possible Geneva for Israel, his chief foreign policy advisor, Dayan, will act as Begin's chief negotiator and idea man on the procedure rather than the substance of Israel's bargaining position.

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II

Menachem Begin is the last Mohican of the grand old Zionist generation born in the diaspora. Confounding some expectations, he assumed office as if he were born more to the statesman's manner than to the guerrilla's. His authoritative political style, coupled with strict regard for the forms of legal and constitutional process, has not been seen in Israel since Ben Gurion retired in 1963. Like Ben-Gurion, he is autocratic, patriarchal and charismatic, the leader of both his Herut Party and the coalition government composed of the right-wing bloc, Likud; the National Religious Party (NRP); Yigael Yadin's center reformist party, the Democratic movement for change (DMC); and assorted Orthodox parties. On a personal level he is more relaxed, less tense than Ben-Gurion, and is courteous, pleasant and open where Ben-Gurion was not.

Begin, again like Ben-Gurion, is a Herzlian Zionist. Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, was a nineteenth-century Viennese writer, dreamer and Don Quixote, but with a realist's view of politics. He regarded Zionism as essentially a political movement for territorial settlement of the Jews and considered the Zionist Congress organized by him in 1897 as the instrument to proclaim the Jewish aim of establishing a state (in Uganda or Zion, Herzl was indifferent). This political solution to the Jewish problem required that the great powers bestow on the Jews a political charter over a territory destined to become their independent state. This political Zionism—diplomacy with the great powers over the establishment of a Jewish state—was the Herzlian legacy that held overwhelming appeal for both Ben-Gurion and Begin.

Here the similarity between Ben-Gurion and Begin ends. The real chasm between the two is wide. They were deeply divided on the strategy to achieve Jewish political and territorial independence. Ben-Gurion represented the mainstream of political Zionist thought. Both he and former President Chaim Weizmann aspired to establish a state populated, if possible, only by Jews. Thus, although Ben-Gurion was a territorialist, for him practical Zionism meant the settlement—urban and rural—by Jews of those mandated areas of Palestine that were either sparsely or not at all populated by Arabs. In the case of the two major Jewish urban centers, Jerusalem and Haifa, where a mixed Arab-Jewish population existed, Jewish numerical, social, economic, and political hegemony over the Arabs was tenable.

The model of the practical Zionists was actually Tel Aviv, a new and strictly Jewish city, and the agricultural collective and cooper-

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ative settlements. Ben-Gurion and the socialist Zionists conceived of these agricultural settlements as being exclusively Jewish. Their idea was the "conquest of the soil," i.e., of empty or sparsely populated areas of land, by settlement, and the creation of an autonomous Jewish working force in the Jewish sector of Palestine. Population and sovereignty were seen as related variables. Jewish hegemony would be established over territory that was not occupied by Arabs, and was therefore suitable for Jewish settlement; a Jewish autonomous state would be carved out of historical and mandated Palestine that was now settled by Jews. Therefore, Ben-Gurion adhered to the concept of the partition of Palestine (he supported three British partition proposals) into distinct and separate Jewish and Arab states. Ben-Gurion, proclaiming the Jewish Commonwealth in 1942, clearly accepted the idea of the *divisibility* of Palestine.

Menachem Begin, the most dedicated disciple of Ze'ev Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism, conceives of the future and the structure of the Jewish state in different strategic, ideological and political terms. For Begin, following the dogma of Revisionist Zionism, the territorial and political integrity of Palestine is indivisible. Jabotinsky himself tolerated British rule over Palestine only as long as the latter did not subscribe to the partition of Palestine; his Revisionist Zionism had as its goal the eventual political domination of Zionism over the whole of mandatory Palestine, which at the time included Transjordan, today's Jordan. Revisionism in fact was born when Transjordan was eliminated from the original British Palestine mandate.

For Begin, the problem of the composition of the population in the Jewish state is secondary to a concern with its territory. For his part, Begin would prefer a Jewish majority over all of formerly western Palestine. In its absence, however, he claims the political indivisibility of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River; its settlement by Jews; and the eventual establishment of Jewish hegemony and political domination over those parts of western Palestine truncated by the 1947 U. N. Partition into separate Jewish and Arab states.

The political implications for conflict resolution on Begin's terms are profound. When Begin or his government speaks of Jewish settlement on the West Bank, it is in conformity with his vision of an independent Jewish sovereign polity destined to dominate historical Palestine. The matter of settlement for Begin is not just tactical but strategic and fundamental. In approaching the issue of the West Bank, the reality of the present irredentist

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claims to Judea and Samaria on the part of the Israeli government must be understood: these preclude the formation of a Palestinian state.

III

Apart from these fundamental ideological differences, Begin's approach to the mechanics of government is similar to that of Ben-Gurion. The common characteristics include: (1) almost total domination of their respective movements and political parties; (2) a manipulative skill that excludes the lower forms of infighting; (3) the granting of considerable leverage and influence to political subordinates; coupled with (4) restrictions on the roles of Cabinet officers and advisors. The reluctance to depend on advisors is particularly noteworthy in Begin's case; there are no *éminences grises* around him as there were for Ben-Gurion.

As to Ben-Gurion's party, Mapai, it was vital, highly functional and aggressive throughout his reign, strong enough, in the end, to oust him, after a struggle, in 1965. Begin's party, or bloc, dominated by his own Herut Party (actually a sectarian and rigid ideological group) has no resemblance to Mapai or the Labor Alignment during the regimes of Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzchak Rabin. His General Zionist partners have dissolved into Likud. Thus Herut, representing only 15 percent of the vote, is the dominant group in the coalition government. One can note the decline of party government in Israel since the 1977 elections and argue that the Labor Alignment, now torn asunder, and the Labor Party are slowly disintegrating under the strain of their unexpected collapse, the momentum of loss of power, the bitter struggle between Rabin and Peres, and their own inadequacy, corruption, and decay. But the victory of Likud did not actually create for the Likud party a political and electoral basis for power, despite its alliance with Herut, the General Zionists and the right-wing Labor splinter party, the National Faction. Nor is the Likud's new ally, Yigael Yadin's DMC, a political party; it is, rather, a protest movement composed of Alignment dissidents and defectors. In fact, the only cohesive, coherent, and integrated party in Israel today is the NRP.

In the absence of a powerful coalition party, and with Likud lacking the broad spectrum of socioeconomic support that Labor enjoyed, the secondary sources of power in Israel are the key members of Begin's Cabinet, senior civil servants, and Begin's few personal and political advisors. It is therefore significant to identify the role Begin has assigned to these individuals, and their individual contributions to policy.

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Unquestionably, like Ben-Gurion, Begin is the only person who decides on war and peace in Israel. He is Likud's ideologue (unlike Ben-Gurion) and supreme commander. Begin is a man of deep convictions. He will make few if any compromises in the realm of nationalist and Zionist ideology. His admiration for his mentor and leader Jabotinsky is second only to his admiration for Herzl. The two influenced Begin's concept of the new Jews—proud, magnanimous, and militant. This is his credo. He believes in Jewish *hadar* (majesty). This concept influenced his selection of three of Israel's most illustrious generals—Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizmann, and Ariel Sharon—as his Cabinet officers. The three are among Israel's most notorious hawks, but Begin acts as their supreme commander (*Mefaked Ellion*). He has tamed them.

In contrast to the Rabin government, where a political novice lacking authority over his party and his Cabinet had to contend with the powerful Peres—who dominated his ministry as his fiefdom and who stalemated the Prime Minister—Begin's government is largely composed of dependent ministers.

This is particularly true in the case of the generals. Dayan no longer has the Alignment as his constituency and arena in which to maneuver. Sharon, who barely won two seats in parliament, and Weizmann, are almost completely dependent on the supreme commander. Thus accountability in the new government is clearly vertical. Begin exerts direct control over the three generals via the Cabinet structure. He is also very sensitive to any cliques or alignments between the generals or for that matter between any of his ministers. Each is accountable only to the Prime Minister. Begin is a strict adherent of the British Cabinet concept of collective responsibility and he is unquestionably more powerful than the British Prime Minister.

As for the generals' functions, Dayan has been cast in the role of Begin's chief foreign policy advisor and chief negotiator, with Weizmann serving as Begin's chief defense advisor. Sharon, as Minister of Agriculture, might be considered insignificant in the foreign policy area, but, as the most militant of all Begin's ministers, he is pushing for a policy of large-scale settlement in the West Bank. To say this is an issue with great disruptive potential is an understatement. With each day that goes by, and with each new settlement that is made, it becomes more difficult for the Begin government—or perhaps for any future government—to retreat or dismantle the settlements.

The Dayan-Begin relationship is of great importance in view of the fact that Dayan will eventually become Begin's key, and

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probably only, foreign policy advisor. Although a Ben-Gurion disciple, a product of Labor Zionism, Palmach, and the agricultural cooperative settlement, Dayan's hawkish pragmatism appeals to Begin, the ideological and historical militant. During the era of the National Unity Government (1967–1970), Dayan and Begin forged a special and enduring relationship, and even before the elections, Begin offered Dayan a key Cabinet position if he joined Likud. For Begin, Dayan's integration is a historic achievement. He now possesses Ben-Gurion's disciple, Labor's most brilliant and controversial figure, the Israeli with the greatest international reputation and, above all, his opposite—a tactician whose concept of security will not be challenged by Begin, the Likud government or the nation. Dayan also commands considerable support among the NRP young militants.

IV

Because he is a maximalist, Begin, not unlike his Arab rivals, prefers grand solutions to the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. His strategy is basically two-pronged: (1) opposition to the Kissingerian step-by-step approach; and (2) opposition to the creation of any form of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. Step-by-step withdrawal, Begin feels, is not the frame through which Israel should be viewed by the world. It is a mode that portrays Israel as intransigent and uncompromising. Above all, since U.S. leverage on Israel is greater than on the Arabs, this kind of diplomatic strategy creates unnecessary friction between Israel and the United States. Therefore Begin prefers that even a "grand Geneva" conference deal with the less prickly issue of procedures and forego substance.

Begin's concept of the role of the United States as a mediator, negotiator and partner is quite different from his predecessor's. The Labor government informally accepted the Kissingerian concept of American-Israeli "coordination," meaning no American decision concerning an Israeli concession to the Arabs would be negotiated as an imposed American solution or without some compensation from the Arabs unless Israel was partner to the arrangements. This policy of coordination also required an American commitment to the outcome of the negotiations, to remuneration for Israel with full military and economic support and, above all, an American guarantee of the success of every troop separation deal. Begin rejects this approach. For him, the Labor policy of an Israeli-American "coordination" means an American form of *pre-negotiation,* a subtle form of imposed solutions.

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As Begin sees it, what the Arabs lose by war and violence they can gain from Israel through international extortion and the use of American leverage over Israel. This policy, according to Begin, leads Israel toward international isolation and unnecessary confrontation with the United States. The case of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is in his mind. In 1975, the Labor-Kissinger open understanding was that there would be no independent American negotiations with the PLO as long as the latter refused to change the paragraphs in its Charter calling for Israel's annihilation and as long as it refused to adhere to U.N. Resolution 242. In fact, according to both Begin and Dayan, the United States violated not only its oral understanding with Israel, but also the written, September 1975, second Sinai troop disengagement agreement inspired by Israeli-American "coordination." This clearly stipulated that if the PLO did not amend the Charter and accept Resolutions 242 and 338, the United States would not negotiate with the PLO. If negotiation should occur, then it would be only in "coordination" with Israel.

Neither the Nixon-Ford nor the Carter Administration has adhered to the "coordination" understandings, according to both Rabin and Begin. Rabin blames President Carter for violating the understanding by making—without consultation with Israel—public statements about a "Palestinian entity," a "Palestinian homeland," and for allowing American representatives to meet and negotiate continuously with the PLO.[1] Begin and Dayan also consider independent U.S.-PLO dealings an attrition of the policy of coordination. They object to President Carter's "pre-negotiations." The President's abrupt proposals for border modifications, made without prior consultation with Israel, are interpreted as a blatant violation of the policy of "coordination."[2] Thus Begin feels free to proclaim his adamant and uncompromising position on the PLO.

Here an insight into the Begin-Dayan relationship is crucial to understanding Israel's new strategy. Dayan recognizes Israel's security imperatives on the Jordan River rather than the historical claims of the Zionist Revisionist. He also knows, however, that he can differ only to a certain degree with Begin. Although there is no formal or informal, tacit or clandestine "deal" between Begin and Dayan as to who is the nice guy and who is not, there is mutual understanding that Dayan, as chief negotiator for Israel, must have some flexibility at his disposal. And he will use it,

[1] Private interview with Rabin, Tel Aviv, August 15, 1977.
[2] Private interview with Begin, Jerusalem, August 10, 1977.

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though stopping short of violating Begin's real commitments. Dayan is known to be loyal to his superiors. He is a soldier who precisely understands the nature of authority, as well as a politician who recognizes the limits of his political influence. Thus, Dayan has designed a fallback strategy both on procedure and substance by which he hopes to assure continuing momentum for negotiations even if Geneva fails, and that will lift any blame for stalling from Israel.

If Geneva does take place, however, the Begin-Dayan strategy will aim at achieving the best possible outcome despite conditions of duress, American political pressure, and Arab threats to resort to war. Because Dayan does not view as realistic the convening of a Geneva conference to achieve the final peace between Israel and the Arabs, his strategy is based on what he feels can be realistically achieved at this time. Dayan is more attuned to process than to a grand conference, and that is precisely how he envisions the construction of peace—as a long and arduous process. Neither Arabs nor Israelis, he believes, are ready to dismantle instantly several decades of hostility, mistrust and misperception. Dayan also doubts the political legitimacy of Arab regimes, their rulers' authority, and their political longevity. Thus, he prefers short-term arrangements.

Concerning the PLO, Dayan's position complements Begin's. He totally rejects negotiating with the PLO even if it is willing to amend its Charter or accept U.N. Resolution 242. For Dayan, as for Begin, the PLO means the political and physical annihilation of Israel. His reason for refusing to negotiate with an independent PLO delegation is that the purpose of such negotiations would be to establish, eventually, a PLO state in the West Bank and Gaza, which Dayan will not accept on any condition.[3] He does favor negotiating with Jordan on the future of the Palestinian population of the West Bank, so they may be granted greater social and economic autonomy. Like Begin, Dayan rejects absolutely the political autonomy or sovereignty of the Palestinians in the West Bank or elsewhere in western Palestine. He seems not to object to non-PLO, non-official Palestinian members in a Jordanian delegation, seeking in his way an Israeli-Jordanian functional solution for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank. Strategically, however, the security of the West Bank will be strictly Israeli. The Jordan River will be Israel's security border.

Politically, then, Dayan somewhat modifies Begin's concept of

[3] See Dov Goldstein, "Interview with Dayan," *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv) August 19, 1977, p. 24, and "Interview with Dayan," *Yedioth Aharonoth* (Tel Aviv), September 19, 1977, pp. 1–2.

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total domination over western Palestine. The Foreign Minister conceives of territory as a strategic-security asset, not as the essence of political-ideological Revisionist Zionist dogma. He consequently disagrees with Agriculture Minister Sharon over settlement.

In light of Begin's dedication to territorial goals, his public claim that he is willing to negotiate on everything is open to question. When he calls for an overall settlement based on Resolution 242, and strict adherence to the resolution which refers to the Palestinians as refugees, he means that he will not surrender the ideological commitment to territorial Zionism—in other words, that he will not accept a Palestinian state. Compromise on this is ideologically and politically untenable for Begin and the Likud party. This would seem to rule out an overall settlement.

Does this mean that Begin is an unregenerate ideologue and dogmatist? It is important here to realize how meaningful it is that he does delegate tactical authority. Dayan will command the procedural strategy both in and outside of actual negotiations. The Foreign Minister will have considerable influence on the actual Israeli negotiations and Begin has given him some freedom of action. On procedure, then, the Israeli government will foster movement—but on substance no deviation from Begin's Revisionist Zionism can be predicted.

V

The Begin-Dayan plan—not a peace plan in the ordinary sense, but more a blueprint for building a peacemaking structure—was presented to President Carter in July and September 1977. It was an outline for (1) procedure and (2) the settlement of separate substantive issues. Geneva as Geneva is not germane. The format of the meetings, not the place, is the important thing. (Dayan has told friends privately that he would meet in a men's room, if necessary.) The form of negotiations could be variously a "grand Geneva," proximity talks, or foreign ministers' meetings (direct or indirect, as in the shuttle diplomacy school).

The plan (like the U.S.-Israeli working paper subsequently released) called for the creation of joint Arab-Israeli commissions presided over by U.S. officials. These would serve as working groups—permanent procedural units—on *specific* issues such as territories, compensation, and refugees, in an effort to defuse the Palestinian issue and create suitable conditions for Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai and Golan. Here the plan addressed itself to the Administration's substantive proposals for peace in

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the Middle East, the Carter proposal being a nexus, composed of three indivisible (to use the Administration's language) parts: territories, the nature of peace, and the Palestinians.[4]

Dayan further proposed strict functional differentiation of issues, such as borders, troop separation agreement and withdrawal, demilitarized zones, greater autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, to be negotiated individually with the separate Arab confrontation states. Egypt would negotiate the future of Sinai, Syria the future of the Golan Heights and Jordan the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian population. In addition, one all-Arab delegation would meet with Israel to deal with the Palestinian question. The key was to separate the explosive Palestinian problem from other territorial issues. Dayan felt that a combined Arab delegation or lack of clear division would create rigidity, rhetoric and inflexibility of the parties. He believes the Arab coalition exists, but its political capability is limited and its influence skewed.

The PLO, the weakest force in the coalition, can prevent Egypt, militarily the most powerful, from reaching a peaceful settlement with Israel, despite Egyptian readiness to do so. Egyptian helplessness is evident in its adamant position on PLO representation at Geneva. Flexibility is in order if it is to be taken seriously as a moderate force. This is a case, as the Israelis see it, of the extremist tails wagging the moderate dogs. The very perception of Arab "moderates," in fact, is an American dream in the eyes of some Likud Cabinet members.

One purpose of Dayan's visits to Washington in September and October 1977 was to dampen the Administration's optimism about Geneva. He wanted to separate the achievable (procedure) from the questionably attainable (substantive agreement—possible only if the procedure is stable). What Dayan tried to do was both to support a piecemeal approach without angering a "grand Geneva"-prone Administration, and return to a modified policy of Israeli-American coordination without upsetting Begin. He desired that the United States not pre-negotiate, but only "coordinate" with Israel, over American-Israeli strategy. His concession to the idea

[4] Vice President Mondale outlined the American plan in his June 17, 1977 speech. Having considered that the imperatives of Israeli security are to be separated from the requirement of recognized borders, the plan conceives of Israel's return to the pre-1967 borders with only minor modifications. Mondale stated: "It is in this way that Israel could return to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor modifications as negotiated among the parties, and yet retain security lines or other arrangements that would ensure Israel's safety as full confidence developed in a comprehensive peace." Mondale also made clear that trading territory for peace (normalization) means also the establishment of some form of a Palestinian entity, separate or in connection with Jordan, all of which will define the nature of peace: withdrawal for normalization.

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of an all-Arab delegation to Geneva was made to placate President's Carter's unflinching commitment to a comprehensive Geneva settlement.

Dayan and his advisors felt it imperative that Begin's government, less threatened that Rabin's by American pressure but more subject to skeptical reception by the foreign press and world opinion, be more forthcoming in order to maintain its close ties with the United States. The Begin-Dayan peace plan, therefore, opened a channel closed since 1975. It was a strategy for maintaining the process of negotiations without surrendering Israel's vital commitments. Indeed, the very formulation of the plan may mean that Begin is no longer predictably a non-compromiser. He at least accepts the imperative of functional concessions as first steps to conflict resolution.

VI

Israeli foreign policy strategy is anchored in its political culture—the decision-makers' perceptions of the motivations, intentions, and goals of Israel's chief ideological rival, pan-Arabism, and of Israeli fears of the Arab states and the politically organized Palestinians, the PLO. Fear is intuitive, but is nevertheless a perception of a serious danger posed by the possibility of hostile actions by others. Perception is a categorical and cognitive view of friend or foe based on information available. It is not a question of seeing rightly or wrongly. The following are summations of the most significant perceptions of Arab goals and Israeli fears influencing Israeli decision-makers:

1. The Arabs do not want to make real peace with Israel. They do not strive for an overall political settlement and political peacemaking. They aspire to eventually bring about Israel's annihilation. (When it comes to an overall settlement the Israelis make no distinction here between moderate and radical Arabs.) Since they cannot do it through wars, having failed four times, they expect to accomplish it now by diplomacy and political extortion. The Israeli perception—and in more extreme forms, Begin's—is that the Arabs now employ a two-tactic strategy: Egypt and Saudi Arabia will act as moderators, throwing dust into the eyes of U.S. decision-makers and deceiving international public opinion, such as the démarche Sadat made toward Israel by inviting himself to address the Israeli Parliament. The PLO, in the meantime, really represents the pan-Arabist goal of the destruction of Israel. This idea of deception (to which Dayan probably does not subscribe) motivates Begin to refuse any form of a Palestinian autonomous state. Palestinianism, as the Israelis perceive it, has become the

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euphemism for the old pan-Arabist goal of the annihilation of Israel. Thus, Israel cannot reconcile itself to the idea of an independent Palestinian state no matter what its regime. Israelis take the PLO Charter very seriously indeed.

2. According to important Israeli analysts and key political leaders, the Arab moderates will opt for a "liberal" annihilation of Israel by drowning the Jewish majority in the burgeoning Arab Palestinian population. The radicals, according to the Israelis, are more frank and believable: they simply seek Israel's physical annihilation.

3. To achieve this goal the major Arab international and inter-Arab efforts are now directed toward gaining international recognition and legitimization of a Palestinian state. The formation of a Palestinian state, according to PLO ideology, is also a two-stage strategy. First, the formation of a PLO-dominated mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza and second, the eventual elimination of its neighbors, Israel and Jordan, and creation of PLO domination over the whole of (mandated) Palestine.

In their movement toward the legitimization of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, probably headed by Yassir Arafat, the Arabs gained a concession from Dayan on an all-Arab delegation which would include Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank. These Palestinians, though not officials of the PLO, could nevertheless be PLO sympathizers. The Arabs may achieve additional concessions, even before Geneva, from among the following options:

(1) to amend U.N. Resolution 242 so that it will delete "refugees" and substitute no less than President Carter's Clinton statement on a "Palestinian homeland" and integrate it as part of an amended 242.
(2) to request a new U.N. Resolution on a Palestinian homeland and rights which could modify 242.
(3) to introduce a resolution like that of the U.S.-Soviet accord in the United Nations, automatically securing U.S. support. Should the PLO endorse it also, the United States might begin negotiating with the PLO, despite Resolution 242 and the PLO pledge to bury Israel.
(4) to insist that after the formal Geneva meeting, the American-sponsored Arab-Israeli negotiations will be continued with the presence of Palestinian Arabs and some PLO members. If Israel refused, it would be portrayed as the intransigent party.

These options have been part of the Arab political effort directed since the 1974 Rabat Conference at achieving interna-

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tional—but most important *American*—recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian homeland and, eventually, state. This is Begin's nightmare. He fears such an entity would become a Soviet-Cuban Trojan horse. Border incidents on the Israeli-Palestinian boundary, if such a state existed, would bring an immediate U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation in the Middle East.[5] An alternative fear is of post-Vietnam American impotence to protect Israel against such a threat.[6]

VII

Israeli and Arab leaders know they cannot achieve an everlasting peace in the Middle East by themselves. The asymmetry of their goals and aspirations is too pronounced. Neither has the political or military strength to impose a solution. Israel has welcomed, and so have the Arabs, American mediation. But they see the American role differently. The Arabs, the Israelis argue, welcome American mediation in the hope that their political-economic influence will persuade the United States to impose an Arab solution on Israel. Israelis fear they will surrender territory for nonsubstantive and vague Arab statements on nonbelligerency and an end to propaganda and boycotts against Israel.

Dayan made this point several times during his trip to Washington in September and October 1977. Israel's greatest fear is an imposed solution, a plan conceived either without consultation with Israel or in spite of it. Dayan can challenge the United States on this because of the U.S. "betrayal," on paper, of the 1975 Sinai II American commitment to Israel, for a policy of coordination.[7]

The fact that American leverage is greater on Israel than on the Arabs makes it more likely, from the Israeli point of view, that a distasteful formula for settlement can be imposed upon them. Israel's past experience has been that the United States either failed to consult with Israel on what it must concede to the Arabs or that, because of the absence of American leverage over the Arabs, the Israelis came out short in the bargain. Israel is highly dependent on American economic and military support, therefore a great deal more vulnerable than the Arabs to enforced unequal

[5] Private interview with Begin, Jerusalem, August 10, 1977.

[6] Interview with former Prime Minister Rabin, Jerusalem, August 16, 1977.

[7] Former Prime Minister Rabin, after the Sinai II September Troop Separation Agreement between Egypt and Israel, was under fire from Likud opposition. In defending himself for supposedly surrendering Israel's tangible for Egyptian nontangible concessions, Rabin argued that his major purpose was not Egyptian concessions as much as it was Israel accommodation in order to achieve "full understanding with the United States." Thus, the meaning of Sinai II is in its political significance for Israeli-American understanding rather than concessions made to Egypt. These understandings with Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford were ratified and approved by the Senate. (Prime Minister Rabin's statement on the Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the Knesset, September 3, 1975 and author's interview with Rabin, August 15, 1977).

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concessions. American mediation, if not benevolent or neutral, considerably modifies Israel's bargaining position. Israel fears that Arabs may be able to sit back and rake in the benefits of American-secured step-by-step concessions on Israel's part. So, although they welcome and, in fact, seek American mediation, Israelis are also suspicious of the mediator.

The contradiction is inherent in the situation. The U.S. role as Israel's staunch defender conflicts with the U.S. role as mediator in the Middle Eastern dilemma. Sincere interest in Israeli survival is constantly demonstrated through American military and economic aid and verbal presidential declarations. But this American goodwill, according to Dayan, is offset by American impotence where the Arabs are concerned. Because of this, the Arabs stand to gain more. Thus, the Israelis perceive that the Arab strategy is to secure Israeli concessions through American pressure, without having to make tangible and commensurate concessions of their own.

The Carter Administration's determination to achieve an overall settlement in the Middle East, coupled with far greater U.S. leverage over Israel vis-à-vis the Arabs, is seen as an intolerable threat to Israel's security and sovereignty. The danger here is increased by the fundamental differences we have discussed in the current U.S. and Israeli views on territorial issues. Thus, Dayan argues that while an accommodating Israel is necessary and respectable, an Israel that will "surrender" to unequal pressure is neither respectable nor possible. In order to avoid confrontation, and maintain respectable but tolerable relations with the United States, it will be necessary for Israel to insist that the substantive negotiations not be framed in an overall settlement procedure or a "grand Geneva" solution.

The Israeli proposal for a two-tier negotiation, then, is in part an effort to help resolve its differences with the United States. Clearly, however, Dayan suggested the convening of a formal plenary Geneva session only on the understanding that substantive negotiations, if they are to take place, should not contradict two major Israeli fundamentals: (1) that substantive settlements be made in separate parts before the overall settlement can be achieved (in or out of Geneva); and, (2) that no unilateral Arab-Israeli solution be sought.

I doubt if the Israelis will modify these two fundamental concepts. At best, they will pay lip service to a grandstand in Geneva. They are keenly aware that world public opinion will condemn whoever balks at Geneva. But they will refuse to turn

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this conference into an overall negotiation stage. They will continue to seek, unrelentingly, separate negotiations to Arab-Israeli problems. So far as the Israelis are concerned, this is the only way they can escape their inequality. This is why, in October, they bitterly rejected the U.S.-Soviet joint guidelines for Geneva. A U.S.-Soviet sponsored conference, they feel, will make Israel even more unequal. The U.S.S.R., as the solicitor of Arabs and Israel's foe, stands only to strengthen the Arab position in a situation already tipped, however inadvertently, toward the Arabs.

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Israel will accept the idea of a Soviet-American Geneva as a permanent peacemaking conference when the chances would be that the United States might have to accept, in the end, the legitimization of a PLO-dominated Palestine. Israel will not accept U.S.-Soviet guidelines where the United States and the Soviet Union hope to resolve the conflict within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. A comprehensive settlement might be achieved if the Israelis could be persuaded that the Carter Administration could assume PLO acceptance of a politically autonomous and sovereign Israel or that a Soviet-American deal could produce the frontiers to which Israel is aspiring. Neither of the above can be delivered by the Carter Administration.

Thus the differences between Carter's Middle Eastern policy and Begin's goals and aspirations are vast. No Israeli political leader has openly defied or contradicted a U.S. President, and it is unlikely that Begin will openly defy President Carter. It is also doubtful, however, that Carter will achieve an overall Israeli-Arab settlement in the time framework he has set for himself. If the Administration sees Geneva merely as an opening step toward conflict resolution, then U.S. mediation might achieve its desired result. But if Carter's Geneva is perceived by Israel as an imposed solution, the President's goal of progress toward an everlasting peace in the Middle East will not be realized.

For U.S.-Israeli relations to be maintained at the level they have been for the last three decades, both parties will have to modify their goals: Begin, his uncompromising concept of the indivisibility of Palestine; and the Carter Administration, its rather rigid position on an Arab-Israeli overall settlement in the near future. I am convinced the two historical friends will not surrender so easily what they have shared in common in the past, but failure to approach the conflict realistically will only hamper efforts toward an everlasting peace. Neither the United States nor Israel is ready or willing to be blamed for not serving peace in the Middle East.

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Richard G. Darman

THE LAW OF THE SEA: RETHINKING U.S. INTERESTS

According to conventional wisdom, a failure to achieve a comprehensive agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference would have potentially disastrous consequences. A reappraisal of U.S. interests in these negotiations, however, indicates that this assumption is, at least in part, fallacious. The United States can best serve its proper interests and the world's by reorienting its Law of the Sea strategy and advancing a set of policies and initiatives that do not depend upon Conference approval for their beneficial effect.

The closing events of the last session of the Conference provided a strong stimulus to a fundamental rethinking of U.S. interests and strategy with regard to the Law of the Sea. On July 20, 1977, the president of the Conference released a negotiating document that many hoped would mark the final stage in the seemingly unending quest for a comprehensive treaty. On the same day as the "Informal Composite Negotiating Text" (ICNT) was released, the United States—without whose participation there cannot be a workable treaty—termed the deep seabed provisions of the text "fundamentally unacceptable." The chairman of the U. S. Delegation stated publicly that in light of the text's "unfortunate, last-minute deviation from what had seemed to be an emerging direction of promise in the deep seabed negotiations. . .our government must review not only the balance among our substantive interests, but also whether an agreement acceptable to all governments can best be achieved through the kind of negotiations which have thus far taken place."

Among those familiar with diplomatese, this was interpreted as very strong language—threatening what many internationalists view as unthinkable, the withdrawal of the United States from a major U.N.-sponsored negotiating effort, and a possible "rupture" in the "North-South dialogue." Indeed, such a withdrawal is taken

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to be unthinkable by the Conference leadership, who plan confidently for a degree of procedural reform, resulting in the participation of the United States at the resumption of the formal conference in March 1978, *and* preparation of a full draft treaty by April 1978.

Within the U.S. government, the announced state of "searching review" continues. And this is surely a good thing. It is desirable for tactical reasons at a minimum. But it is also desirable substantively. It is perhaps the last practicable opportunity to reexamine conventional Law of the Sea wisdom—before the executive branch becomes engaged in what may be an uncertain quest for ratification.

II

One of the many remarkable characteristics of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea is the scope of its ambition. Simply put, it seeks to establish a system of governance—political, economic, administrative and judicial—for two-thirds of the earth's surface. The apparent grandiosity of this conception should be set against the consideration that the surface involved is now largely undeveloped—indeed, covered with water. Nonetheless, the simple geopolitical conception is inescapably impressive. And it is obviously the more so when consideration is given to the fundamental connections between the oceanic two-thirds and the continental one-third of the earth.

The oceans are not merely a historic source of life and romantic undertaking. They remain literally vital to human existence and a source of exciting promise. They provide major portions of the world's protein, oil and gas supplies, and are of increasing importance to the satisfaction of expanding global food and energy demands. They enable efficient expansion of international trade through economical commercial transportation. They permit efficient global information exchange via undersea cable communication. On their seabeds rest vast quantities of hard minerals essential to industrial development. Their ecology influences patterns of weather, the quality of the atmosphere, indeed, the basic global environmental balance. They are essential to the conduct of conventional war, and also to the protection of peace—particularly through the preservation of a strategic military balance. And, not least, they are a source of aesthetic satisfaction and a vast frontier for man's continuing inquiry and exploration. Further, the goal of the conference to regulate all these areas gives the oceans an additional function, also arguably vital: they now provide the

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focus for a major experiment in global problem-solving and global institution-building.

The United States, of course, has important interests in all these functions. For the past decade, however, "national security" interests—particularly interests associated with military functions—have been predominant in the development of U.S. policy toward a comprehensive treaty on the Law of the Sea.

In 1966-67, the primary motive for initial U.S. attention to the possible desirability of a new Law of the Sea conference was an interest in stemming the tide of "creeping jurisdiction," the expanding claims of coastal states to increasingly "territorialist" extension seaward. In the preceding decade, since the close of the first U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, the expansionist pattern had become clear. Whereas 54 percent of coastal states claimed territorial seas of three nautical miles or less in 1958, a decade later the number had dropped to 35 percent. In the same period, the number of coastal states claiming territorial extensions of 12 miles or more increased from 18 percent to 43 percent.

This pattern presented obvious difficulties for the military, in the face of apparent U.S. foreign policy demands. Expansion of territorialist claims of 12 miles or more, if accepted, threatened to "close" more than 100 straits, removing from them the traditional high seas freedom of transit, and imposing instead the restrictions of "innocent passage." In particular, imposition of an innocent passage regime could require submarines to surface when passing through straits, and could seriously limit air overflight in crisis situations. Further, the functional expansion of coastal state jurisdiction toward increasingly broad "security zones," "economic zones," and "environmental protection zones"—independently of the straits problem—could threaten the capacity of the military to preposition and project force. Given the then-limited reach of submarine-launched strategic missiles and the associated concern for maximum ocean space in which to hide, and given the apparently unlimited intended reach of U.S. conventional forces a decade ago (the United States was increasingly committed in Southeast Asia), it was perhaps inescapable that the United States should consider the avoidance of "creeping jurisdiction" to be a dominant oceans-policy interest.

It is this perception of national interest that led the United States to help foster the current Conference. Along with a genuine concern for the disparities in international wealth, this perception also importantly influenced the United States to pursue a *compre-*

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hensive treaty—linking the lure of revenue-sharing from resources of the ocean floor to the effort to restrain coastal state territorialism. It is the perceived importance of this interest in stemming jurisdictional "creep" that has given the Department of Defense special weight within the U.S. Law of the Sea Delegation. And it is this assumption that has consistently guided not only the thinking of U.S. Delegation heads, but also the allocation of their direct personal negotiating effort.

However, this view of national interest—and particularly its tie to an interest in a comprehensive, global treaty—may now be misguided. It is at least excessive in its emphasis—a conclusion that can be reached by any of the following three lines of argument.

The first is the most extreme and most heretical. One might argue that it is *not* in the U.S. interest to stem the jurisdictional "creep" which threatens generally to limit freedoms of military maneuver. For purposes of argument one might assume the following U.S. foreign policy framework, which corresponds to outlines increasingly accepted today: that the United States has an overriding interest in maintaining a satisfactory strategic balance, a need to assure stability in the Middle East, and a need to control the spread of nuclear destructive capability; that U.S. policy must be particularly sensitive to the obvious special importance of relations with the great American countries with which it shares thousands of miles of borders and a certain amount of history; that the premise of "trilateralism" is to be taken seriously—that security alliances with Japan and Western Europe are to be given primacy; and that the implied premise of, for example, the "Nixon Doctrine" and the announced intention of Korean troop withdrawal is to be generalized. That is, one might assume that there is to be a consistent practical accommodation of the limits on U.S. politico-military capacity with respect to intervention in distant developing countries.

In terms of conventional requirements of the military, such a U.S. foreign policy would be less global in its ambition (which is not to say that the policy itself would be less ambitious) than it was when Law of the Sea policy was conceived a decade ago. Given this policy framework, we must now reconsider the extent to which increased territorialism would constrain direct U.S. foreign policy interests—and the comparative impact on the Soviet Union.

With the increased range and sophistication of U.S. missiles and missile-launching submarines, it is arguable that transit through straits is not necessary to assure strategic deterrence.

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Further, there are neither straits nor third-party economic zones separating the United States from either Japan or Western Europe. And the posited foreign policy would not seek the capacity to project force off the coasts of distant developing countries—the legal status of their waters would not, therefore, be a determinative constraint. (Even if the policy did seek such capacity, the realities of U.S. domestic politics and competing demands for resources would be the determinative constraints on distant force projection.) In the limited number of hypothetical cases where the United States might justifiably move militarily to protect its citizens from gross abuse in a distant developing country, it would presumably do so, for the foreseeable future, regardless of the state of international law—and with the understanding of the world community.

In contrast to this pattern of irrelevance with respect to most direct U.S. interests, however, the degree of territorialism has significant relative impact on Soviet interests. In the first place, the Soviet Union is far more dependent on transit through straits than is the United States. Second, the Soviet Union's foreign policy is less constrained by domestic politics than is that of the United States; the relative impact of external constraints is, therefore, greater for the Soviet Union. This suggests what may be a counter-intuitive conclusion: that an increasingly territorialist regime could be of net advantage to the United States.

The argument has not, however, addressed the obvious problem that universal territorialist expansion could create with respect to U.S. interest in Middle Eastern stability. In particular, territorialist expansion could seriously limit naval and air transit of Gibraltar and fleet movements in the Mediterranean. To the extent such limits are even arguably unacceptable, the United States (joined in some cases by the Soviet Union) should simply and firmly, in both diplomacy and practice, stand on what has been traditional international law with respect to military freedoms in the Mediterranean.

It is not utterly inconceivable, although it is highly unlikely, that the interested parties might negotiate a special Mediterranean agreement (possibly in the context of a Mideast settlement), which would formally affirm and preserve necessary freedoms. More likely, the United States would be asked to pay a price for these freedoms through increased pressure in otherwise unrelated bilateral negotiations with a limited number of Mediterranean states. In view of the fact that these freedoms have already proved negotiable in the Conference—without the payment of a significant

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price to these Mediterranean states, and without causing them evident pain—and given the breadth of interest in preserving Middle East peace, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that the necessary Mediterranean freedoms could be preserved, in any likely case, at a thoroughly tolerable price.

Be that as it may, the fact that universal "creeping jurisdiction" can be shown to present serious problems—with respect to a specific area such as the Mediterranean, or one (perhaps as many as four) of the 116 straits that a 12-mile territorial sea would affect—is hardly sufficient to justify a conclusion that "creeping jurisdiction" must be universally opposed.

A second general line of argument questioning the notion that a fundamental U.S. national security interest is in stemming the tide of jurisdictional "creep" proceeds inductively from the evidence of contemporary events. In the 20 years since the first U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, claims of territorial seas have consistently expanded. Sixty-nine percent of coastal states now claim territorial seas of 12 nautical miles or more. Eleven states claim territorial seas of 200 miles. In addition, 20 states specifically require prior permission or notification for warships to enter their territorial seas, and 32 states now claim one form or another of "security zone." The pattern of territorialist expansion has been inescapably clear—as, of course, have the individual cases. And the pattern of U.S. response has been equally clear. It has been, in general, a pattern of acquiescence. While religiously continuing obeisance with respect to the traditional high seas legal position, the United States has nonetheless consistently allowed that position to be eroded in practice. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the United States has treated the state of "relations" with the country involved as more important than the high seas freedom that may have been lost.

In addition to this executive branch pattern, there is the evidence of congressional behavior. It is generally agreed that the U.S. Congress has been a major force in increasing, not stemming, the territorialist tide—particularly by enacting the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The Congress is now seriously considering unilateral extension of U.S. jurisdiction for purposes of environmental protection. It is also seriously developing deep seabed mining legislation that, although it technically does not violate the traditional high seas conception, will be interpreted by many as doing so. It seems reasonable to suggest that if stemming the tide of "creeping jurisdiction" were a fundamental national security interest, one would have observed a

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different general pattern of executive and congressional behavior.[1]

The third line of argument that might challenge the prevailing perception of national interest and the Conference is less heretical than the first two. It could accept the emphasis on the need to stem "creeping jurisdiction," but it would question whether this objective is best pursued through comprehensive negotiations.

It is comprehensive negotiations, of course, that seemed attractive to the United States, and to several other key states, in planning for the Conference. As noted, the initial U.S. position called for a favorable linkage of restraint upon coastal state territorialism with revenue-sharing from resources beyond the 200-meter isobath and a licensing system for seabed mining. While this position may have adequately conceived the attractiveness of revenue-receiving, it failed to take into account the associated unattractiveness of revenue-sharing for those (including important allies) who would otherwise receive more. In addition to this practical shortcoming, the U.S. revenue-sharing proposal suffered from a psychological weakness in the connotation of its label, "trusteeship." For all practical purposes, the proposal has been rejected.

In rejecting the "trusteeship" proposal and limiting revenue-sharing to resources beyond 200 miles from shore, the Conference has changed fundamentally the nature and value of linkage. It has drastically reduced the amount of near-term revenue to be shared by excluding the vast oil and gas reserves located within 200 miles beyond the 200-meter isobath. In so doing, it has shifted the collective developing-country perception of interests. Revenue-sharing would now apply principally to deep seabed-mining, and significant revenue from this source would not be available until 1990 at the earliest. Given this removal of direct, positive, near-term economic interests for most developing countries, there is a tendency for them to give greater weight to their ideological interests, while also viewing more sympathetically the need to avoid near-term economic costs that might be paid by only some among them, the land-based hard mineral producers. As a result, the Conference now presents the United States with a comprehen-

[1] It is, of course, possible to argue that the evidence cited should be dismissed. Some would argue that Congress is not adequately sensitive to broad national foreign policy interests (which raises the philosophical problem as to how "interests" are properly to be determined and weighed in a democracy). And one might very well suggest that the systems for managing policy development within the State Department are so inadequate that the relationship between individual cases and broad policy may never have been explicitly raised for decision, or that general policy decisions have little influence in any case. Were it not for the general consistency of the pattern, such arguments might be persuasive.

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sive treaty text that includes limitations on territorialist expansion, but that also includes an ideologically antithetical deep seabed mining regime with a highly undesirable limit on production. This obviously is a very different trade from that originally conceived by the United States. Indeed, the original conception did not involve a "trade," but simply the linkage of independently desirable proposals.

The trade now suggested by the Informal Composite Negotiating Text could have a further absurdly ironic twist: the proposed new International Authority could combine normal bureaucratic expansionary tendencies with the legal authority to regulate scientific research, mining, and associated activities affecting the environment—and thus limit traditional high seas freedoms beyond 200 miles. But even without this twist, it seems clear that in assessing the value of a comprehensive treaty, the gains associated with limiting territorialist expansion will have to be balanced against considerable losses in other areas.

This suggests the possible desirability of "un-linkage." It is feasible analytically to separate broad substantive areas for independent negotiation. And in practice, the business of the Conference has been conducted this way through formally separate committees. But it is probably not possible to get the Conference to agree to separate that which it has now brought together. Although the work of the committees has been conducted independently, it has been with the understanding that their ultimate combined product must constitute a "package deal." And while there has been no significant, formal cross-committee trading, the concept of a "package deal" has surely influenced the development of delegations' substantive positions and tactics. Indirectly, it has influenced the capacity to achieve what is essentially conditional compromise. For this reason, if not simply for reasons of inertial force, the Conference is now likely to rise or fall as a "package." And "un-linkage" is a practical possibility only if one would assume or accept the Conference "falling."

The United States is obliged, therefore, to assess the likely consequences of the Conference "falling," to weigh the full range of its interests in possible "packages," to analyze current limits on the negotiability of an acceptable package, and to reorient its strategy in the light of this analysis. The remainder of this article is a subjective assessment of these issues, organized as an extended line of argument toward one possible reorientation of strategy.

III

The United States announced its entry into the 1977 session of

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the Law of the Sea Conference with a rhetorical flourish: "Rarely has any generation had so clear a choice to make between order and anarchy."[2] One might be inclined to interpret this statement more as a commentary on the real competition for media attention in America than on the likely competition for control of the oceans. But the statement generally conforms to what has become a conventional view among Conference advocates: that without a treaty, the world will witness "the biggest smash and grab since the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885 carved up black Africa."[3]

This view reflects what is, as one might expect, a profound cultural aversion to unilateralism within the community of individuals (not states) involved in multilateral negotiations. It is perhaps particularly characteristic of the Law of the Sea Conference community, peopled as it is predominantly by internationalist lawyer-codifiers. The internationalists' tendency to favor collective over individual action is combined with the codifiers' tendency to wish to see the world in neat, static terms. Above and beyond practical considerations, there is an aesthetic antipathy toward the "disorder" of non-uniformity, and a general distrust of the possible benignness of self-regulating, dynamic processes. More directly to the point: warnings of the "disaster" of Conference failure and associated unilateralism merit careful examination—not only because they may be right, but also because they may not be.

The practical concern from the U.S. perspective, among those who fear "disastrous consequences" of unilateralism, is that the oceans will be "carved up"—and that, as a result, scientific research and commercial and military mobility interests will be affected extremely adversely. The fear of adverse effects of unilateralism upon the freedom of scientific research is justified. But the realities of the negotiating process are such that the best likely outcome of the Conference will not significantly slow the "creep" of coastal state jurisdiction over scientific research. Having discussed military interests above, the need here is to focus on the seriousness of the threat to commercial interests.

It must, of course, be granted that commercial navigation interests are important to the national interest. Indeed, they are essential—as is most evident in the case of oil transportation. Serious interference with such transport could legitimately be said to promise disaster. But it must be asked: What are the prospects

[2] Press conference by Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson, the Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1977.

[3] Lord Ritchie Calder quoted by John Temple Swing in "Who Will Own the Oceans?," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976. p. 546.

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of such serious interference without a treaty?

The doomsayers seem to imagine that a decentralized, non-uniform legal framework will result in something like a rampant medieval disease with states spreading pikes across sealanes, breeding violent parochial conflict. This is, of course, a theoretical possibility. But then one must assume not only that states would wish to behave in this manner (as some might), but also that a state's assertion of legal power to close a strait, set a prohibitive fee, impose an unreasonable environmental standard, or otherwise limit transit will endow that state with sufficient power to do so. This assumption is simply not valid.

Further, the very fact that some hypothetical abuses by individual states could have extremely adverse effects for the United States, for other major powers, or for the global economy should suggest that such abuses would not be tolerated, in practice, by major powers or the global community. Indeed, the suggestion should be so obvious that it would only rarely, if at all, be put to the test. The extreme hypotheticals—irrationally diverting tankers or "closing" Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz or Malacca—make the argument considerably more dramatic, but considerably less realistic.

The more reasonable worry is not that, absent a treaty, consequences will be "disastrous"; rather it is that the system may be marginally less efficient. It is likely, for example, that a decentralized system would yield incongruent environmental protection requirements—initially. But as the incongruity became irrationally burdensome, pressures would mount and appropriate mechanisms would be found to reconcile differences, as necessary. It is possible that increased costs of investment, fees, or delays might arise. But the logistics of enforcement and alternative routes would ordinarily hold these to an acceptable minimum. Where intolerable monopoly rents were sought, they would either not be tolerated—or, as in the recent evolution of fishing zones, the global system would endure some tolerable friction and would adjust. Indeed, the recent history of coastal state seaward expansion generally is an argument that the current decentralized system can move itself to a new equilibrium without centrally negotiated rules, and without throwing itself disastrously out of balance in the process.

There is a major new source of worry for some, however: the prospect of unilateral deep seabed claims, starting with U.S. legislation and resulting ultimately in the "carving up" of the entire ocean. This, too, is a seriously exaggerated concern. In order to preserve the traditional high seas status of the deep ocean area, the bill developed by the U.S. House of Representa-

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tives is intentionally drafted in a manner that "in no way asserts any territorial or sovereignty claim." Instead, it would regulate U.S. citizens' deep-sea mining activities under the principle of "nationality" jurisdiction, i.e., a principle based on a state's authority to regulate its citizens and corporations wherever they may be. Arguably, it could nonetheless stimulate territorialist seabed claims. But the number of such claims would likely be very few. And support for such claims in the world community would likely be slight. Developed countries generally would wish to preserve the high seas status and, insofar as they mined the seabed, would likely do so through one legal contrivance or another intended to protect property interests without making sovereign claims. Developing countries generally would wish to preserve the principle of the "indivisibility" of "the common heritage of mankind"—and would have difficulty enforcing deep ocean territorial claims in any case. Their more likely reaction would be to oppose the action of seabed miners by legal counteraction, and to seek effective means of economic reprisal—although their legal case would have to counter the powerful high seas tradition by resting principally on nonbinding U.N. General Assembly resolutions passed in 1969 and 1970, and opportunities for economic reprisal would be seriously limited by a combination of self-interest and logistical difficulty.

It is at least conceivable, however, that countries would make extensive deep ocean claims—and that the "carving" would take place. In terms of ocean "territory" and resource distribution, this would mean that the United States and other developed countries would fare very well—at the expense of the majority of developing countries. The pattern would be similar to the one associated with the expansion of economic zones, which most benefits developed countries.[4] Actually the overall effect of carving up the entire ocean by fully extending coastal state jurisdiction would probably have an even more exaggerated tendency to favor developed nations.[5] Were developing countries to act in their collective interest, this fact should act as a deterrent to their stimulation of

[4] Economic zone expansion to 200 miles enlarges U.S. jurisdiction more than any other country's—adding area more than double the present U.S. land area. This includes addition of economic zones of U.S. territories and the trust territory of Micronesia. The added area is more than 80 percent of current land area if these territories are not included. Six of the top ten economic zone gainers are developed countries; and when consideration is given to the distribution of valuable economic resources, the pattern is clearly one that widens the gap between rich nations and poor.

[5] The prime manganese nodule mine sites now identified are in an area of the Northeast Pacific Basin, south of Hawaii. This area would be divided by one developed and one developing country, the United States and Mexico. For a view of the extent to which the overall pattern would favor the richer countries, see map, "World Lake Concept: A Theoretical Division of the Seabed," Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

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claims. But the same point has been equally evident with respect to economic zone expansion—and individual states have nonetheless pursued their individual interests.

Thus it seems reasonable to argue that further unilateralism would not likely be either destabilizing or fundamentally disadvantageous to the United States.

But unilateralism could have an adverse effect on the balance of global wealth—in which, as a matter of equity and humane concern, the United States must have a profound interest. For it is clearly more likely that states would decide to transfer ocean-based wealth in the context of multilateral negotiation of a more centralized deep seabed regime than in a "unilateral" system. Interest in the pursuit of greater equity is, therefore, a proper conception of a rationale for multilateral Law of the Sea negotiation—as is interest in the possible avoidance of marginal, but tolerable, levels of systemic friction or inefficiency.

However, to conceive of an interest in the avoidance of "disastrous consequences" or "anarchy" as a rationale is to be fundamentally misguided, for it is fallacious to presume that such an interest is at stake. To fail to place this perception of U.S. interest in proper perspective is to ensure that the Law of the Sea Conference must fail. In contrast to the equity-interest conception, which puts the United States in a positive posture, the avoidance-of-disaster conception is doubly negative. It can only lead foreign governments to demand more than they must have—and U.S. negotiators to give away more than they should.

IV

The principal area of negotiation in which more is now being demanded of the United States than can, or should, reasonably be given—the principal area of stalemate—concerns the regime for the deep seabed. It is on the deep seabed that vast mineral resources—including more than 1.5 trillion tons of mineral-rich manganese nodules—await development.[6] Here, too, it is essential to place in reasonable perspective what may really be at stake.

From one point of view, aptly expressed in *The American Journal of International Law*, it would be "one of the great ironies in the

[6] Manganese nodules form naturally over millions of years, generally in depths greater than 2,000 meters. They were first discovered and brought to the surface in 1872, but only recently have technology and economics made their exploitation commercially interesting. The nodules vary in metal content, and are estimated to average about 24 percent manganese, 14 percent iron, 1 percent nickel, 0.5 percent copper, 0.35 percent cobalt, in addition to small percentages of 22 other metals. (Nodules recovered from prime mine sites would have higher nickel and copper percentages—estimated now at roughly 1.4 percent nickel and 1.2 percent copper.)

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history of codification and progressive development of international law," if formalization of agreements already reached in other areas were jeopardized by disagreement over mining of deep seabed manganese nodules—"an activity that has yet to begin; that by the end of the century may account for little more than a dozen mine sites . . .; and that is likely to have less immediate effect on the basic interests of most states than other activities dealt with in the text." On one level, this deflated view of what is immediately at stake through seabed nodule mining is probably appropriate. It fails however, to treat two difficult questions: What are the longer term interests at stake, and how are they to be weighed in the overall balance? Unfortunately, the United States has tended to view its seabed interests primarily in terms of mining, and without much regard for the longer term.

Although the U.S. view has not been entirely consistent—the United States has at times postured as if access to seabed minerals were a fundamental matter of national security—the State Department, and more recently the Defense Department, have sought to place the specter of U.S. "vulnerability" in more balanced perspective by arguing that the prospects of land-based cartelization in these minerals are neither analogous to OPEC nor likely to prove consequential; that the combination of land-based reserves and reasonable stockpile policies provide adequate protection; and that deep seabed mining itself would be vulnerable in wartime.[7]

The State and Defense Department arguments on non-vulnerability may be seen as consistent with their general concern for the stemming of "jurisdictional creep"—and the specific negotiating situation that seems to demand seabed concessions as a price for a treaty. It is a fair assessment, however, that nodule mining is not a strategic U.S. interest for the near term. But there remains the question of long-term access to minerals. The U.S. steel industry, for example, has expressed some serious concern that the land-based supply of manganese—essential to the manufacture of steel—may be exhausted within 30 years. The current seabed negotiations contemplate a formal review of the seabed regime after 25 years. At that point, developed-country negotiating leverage will have decreased—if, as promised, technology and self-

[7] In 1976, the U.S. imported (net) 98 percent of its manganese and cobalt demand, 71 percent of its nickel and 15 percent of its copper—totaling roughly $1.5 billion in value. Deep sea-based reserves of these minerals are estimated at thousands of times land-based reserves. For more detailed statistics and discussions, see Congressional Research Service, *Ocean Manganese Nodules*, prepared for U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., February 1976. See also testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense David E. McGiffert, "Testimony before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives," July 25, 1977.

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financing capability have been transferred to the new International Seabed Authority. (If these have not been transferred, negotiators will have to cope with difficult arguments as to prior misrepresentation or bad faith.) At that point, also, sea-based production should represent a major portion of world nickel, cobalt, and manganese demand. The future potential for cartelization or political abuse of market power—through the new Authority—could be very high. If this potential is to be dealt with responsibly, if it is not to be traded away by default, it must be addressed in the current negotiating context.

The most important issues at stake in the deep seabed negotiations, however, are not merely questions of manganese nodule mining. What is fundamentally at stake is a set of precedents with respect to systems of governance.

The Law of the Sea Conference seeks to establish an ongoing governmental apparatus for the deep seabed area (the area beyond coastal state jurisdiction—at least half the earth's surface). It would do so through the creation of an International Seabed Authority, which would have policymaking and regulatory powers, along with taxing powers and direct operational capabilities intended to allow it to become fully self-supporting. Its jurisdiction would initially be limited to exploration for, and exploitation of, seabed mineral resources—which, as a practical matter, would seem to mean manganese nodules for the near term. But to assume, therefore, that the precedent-setting importance of the issues involved is similarly limited could prove to be naïve and short-sighted.

At a minimum, the seabed regime would govern the development of other seabed mineral resources as these become commercially interesting—petroleum, various gases, water and steam, sulphur, salts, phosphorites, ore-bearing silts, hard minerals in the ocean floor, etc. Commercial prospects for these are not now promising. But exploration and technological development are at what may be a very early stage for the deep seabed. In thinking about the seabed potential, it may be useful to recall the general lack of imagination that characterized the environment in which, for example, Alaska was purchased (and sold) a century ago. (The Alaska analogy may, of course, be misleading; it is in the nature of the problem that one does not know.) Even more to the point is the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The weakness of drafting in the definition of its scope reflects the fact that when it was signed—less than two decades ago—there were few who imagined that commercial manganese nodule mining would

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be technologically feasible.

In time, the Seabed Authority would likely expand its direct jurisdiction beyond mineral resources. It might do so within its initial charter, as noted above, through its responsibility for mining-related environmental regulation. And as the international community finds greater need for regulation of activities beyond coastal jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to expect that it will turn to the relevant governmental apparatus it may have already created, expanding the Authority's charter as necessary.

The precedential significance of the seabed regime extends beyond its direct jurisdiction, however. The world is struggling with the development and modification of global institutions for the increasing number of problems perceived to require global treatment. The struggle ranges from development of conventions for the governance of outer space to the somewhat more earthly reform of the increasingly complex set of institutions associated with the U.N. system. In this context, a new Authority for ocean governance must be a model that commands attention. Indeed, for a very large number of countries, the same individuals who are involved in the Law of the Sea Conference are also involved in the wide range of institution-building efforts associated with the U.N. system. And processes of connection are often rather direct.

There is a less direct process of precedent-setting connection that also merits consideration. It involves not the linkage among evolving global institutions, but the linkage between global institutions and the evolution of state systems of governance. In most federal or quasi-federal systems, the character of the central regime is replicated to some degree among the constituent parts. There seems sufficient reason to assume that this pattern will hold for many states—particularly, perhaps, the newer states—as global institutions are strengthened in their role and influence.

Given all these reasons for attention to precedents, the direction of the seabed negotiations must be deeply troubling for those who believe that the principles of governance affirmed by American experience are worthy of extension. Indeed, the inertial tendency of the Conference is clearly toward a regime that affirms principles of government and economics fundamentally antithetical to both American ideology and pragmatic experience.

This regime would impose an arbitrary governmental system of production and price controls—oriented toward protection of the current system of production and producers, without favorable regard to what may be the economic advantages of new systems of production or the dictates of consumer demand. It would mandate

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technology transfer—treating technological development as if it were a right in itself, not a favorable consequence of economic incentives and property rights. It would charter a new global commercial entity entitled to do business throughout the world, in favored competition with conventional commercial entities, without being subject to any state taxation. It would establish a new international governmental Authority with tax and regulatory reach far beyond the scope of activities and jurisdiction which require its creation. This Authority would be governed by a "supreme" Assembly on the basis of one-state-one-vote "majoritarianism"—a system which bears no sensible relationship to one-man-one-vote democracy, or to the real distribution of power, values or interests. And it would be governed without checks and balances, without adequate procedural protection of minority interests and without adequate scope for judicial review.

Unless the inertial tendency of the Conference is shifted significantly, the seabed regime of any likely draft treaty will conform in some considerable degree to all (or most) of these objectionable characteristics. From the perspective of one who would weigh these precedential elements heavily, the notion of conceding these to avoid the precedent of Conference "failure" (meaning "lack of agreement") seems absurd. It would be to trade long-term, substantive failure for avoidance of temporary procedural failure. Trading these objectionable elements for marginal gains in the systems of environmental protection and dispute settlement seems out of proportion.[8] Trading them for questionable interests in treaty protection of distant-water military mobility seems a tie to the past at the expense of the future. And trading them to protect interests that might just as well be protected without a comprehensive treaty seems no trade at all.

V

Weighing heavily the precedential elements of the seabed *regime* (as distinguished from seabed *mining*), and taking the rest of the treaty as being close to fully negotiated (and unamenable to significant change), it is easy to identify what must be the U.S. strategic negotiating objectives from here on. The Conference's inertial tendency with respect to the deep seabed area must be

[8] The ICNT provides a framework within which states may responsibly develop environmental regulations; it does not, in and of itself, promise to affect the quality of the environment significantly. The ICNT also establishes a system of compulsory settlement of disputes. While this is a valuable precedent in the abstract, it has a number of specific weaknesses—particularly in the selection of judges and the scope of judicial review.

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changed considerably—if a treaty worth signing is to emerge. There is, however, no easy means to accomplish this objective.

The negotiating realities seem inescapable. The Conference is regrettably polarized. The United States and a few developed countries are, in effect, on one side, with the "Group of 77"—now comprising over 110 developing countries—on the other. The Group of 77 has formally adopted a full set of extreme positions and associated texts. Although many in the Group of 77 may have accepted the texts for only tactical reasons, it is extremely difficult for them formally to moderate their positions.[9] They enforce a kind of rule of unanimity among themselves, which, in effect, now gives veto power to a relatively small number of extremists. The problem is compounded by the fact that many states, believing they have no interest higher than Group of 77 solidarity, instruct their delegations simply to "vote with 'the 77'."

Insofar as there is a significant split within the Group of 77, it is between a group of pragmatists and a group of ideological purists. The former has been dominated by a few land-based producers who are willing to compromise on some issues of principle in exchange for extreme production controls. The ideological purists are dominated by a few individuals whose countries have no significant direct economic interest in a Law of the Sea treaty and who are free to insist on their principles to the end. The split, then, simply suggests the possibility of two different types of unacceptable "compromise"—which elements of the Group of 77 would be willing to substitute for the unacceptable Informal Composite Negotiating Text seabed regime.

There is, of course, no natural groundswell seeking to displace the ICNT regime. Were it not for firm U.S. opposition, the ICNT seabed regime might be acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Conference participants. The U.S. reaction may help assure that the ICNT regime is put aside. But replacing it with an acceptable regime is obviously an entirely different matter.

Analytically, one can identify several types of economic regime that might be acceptable to the United States: a simple licensing regime; a "clean parallel system" in which access is unequivocally assured for state-sponsored parties, and in which an international "Enterprise" is also assured of effective participation; a "unitary joint venture system" in which access is permanently assured, and in which equity interests of state-sponsored parties are fully valued

[9] Members of the Group of 77 can and do informally agree to moderate positions. But they cannot then "deliver" the Group as a whole. Rather, they can at best—and this is not insignificant—prevent the Group of 77 from formally rejecting a possible compromise.

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and fully protected on a continuing basis; and, perhaps, a "mixed" system along the lines of the compromise proposed by Norwegian Minister Jens Evensen, but in which access on reasonable terms is more clearly assured and the production control is less severe.[10] Such a mixed system could result in a pluralistic variety of seabed miners—including state entities, private corporations, an international "Enterprise," and a range of joint arrangements involving groups of these. Each regime could be designed in a manner that would not affirm undesirable institutional precedents. (There are, of course, additional variants. But all raise the same difficult negotiating issues; and one must beware of the fallacy of the presumed greater negotiability of that which has not been negotiated.)

The first of these alternatives is certainly not negotiable. The second is virtually non-negotiable. The third has less than one chance in 20 of proving satisfactorily negotiable. And the fourth—which is the only alternative among these with a plausible chance—would represent an improvement, from the U.S. perspective, upon a proposal that the Group of 77 is willing to treat as a "basis for further negotiation, but not compromise." Further, in order to get the necessary improvements, the United States might have to agree to a more stringent, quasi-mandatory system of effective technology transfer (through supplementary fair licensing or joint-venture arrangements). But this new "mixed" alternative, negotiated in its very best possible form, would have highly uncertain prospects of Senate ratification.

Indeed, relating the international negotiating realities to domestic political realities seriously compounds the dilemma. The non-seabed provisions of the treaty (as they now stand) are unlikely to gain a high degree of visibility. Although scientists would probably oppose the treaty, internationalists, many concerned with military and commercial navigation, and many environmentalists would support it, and the balance would be moderately affirmative. But it would not be vigorously affirmative. Senate ratification, in any case, must be viewed with respect to potential negative constituencies, and the one-third of the Senate sufficient to veto.

In assessing the prospects of non-ratification, it would be easy to be misled by the continuity of support for the Law of the Sea

[10] The Evensen "Proposed Compromise Formulations" were the product of weeks of "informal" negotiation among all Conference participants within the formally established Committee I Chairman's Working and Negotiating Groups, see UNCLOS II, Document 77-76231, 3rd rev., June 11, 1977 and Document 77-76619, June 29, 1977. Both the United States and the Group of 77 seemed willing to accept the "Evensen text" as a "basis for further negotiation." (The Group of 77 was unable to agree to oppose it.)

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Conference during two Democratic and two Republican presidential administrations—and by the further consideration that the principal compromises of economic ideology were advanced by a Republican administration. The substance of the negotiations has had very little public attention, and it has had relatively narrow attention within the Senate. This will change, of course, if there is a treaty to be examined. And if the seabed provisions were to conform with the current inertial tendencies of the Conference, their exposure might prove shocking. They would not only be criticized vigorously and visibly by the mining industry. They would attract criticism from economic interests generally, and from conservative and some traditional liberal philosophers and ideologues. For the seabed provisions would not only lend themselves to extensive criticism on the merits, but also to a high degree of demagogic excess.

Continued quest for a comprehensive treaty, therefore, must be viewed as a risky course. In returning to the Conference, the United States would presumably gain approval of means to remove the grounds for its recent objections to Conference procedures. But having done so, the United States would face the very high probability of finding itself a party to unobjectionable processes of negotiation, capable of producing a widely supported "compromise" that improves on the ICNT—but which is non-ratifiable.

VI

The U.S. strategy, therefore, must not only seek to change the Conference's inertial tendency with respect to the seabed regime; it must also seek to develop a sound contingency plan to be activated in the event of Conference failure. These two general objectives can be mutually reinforcing. A strategy to serve them both could be oriented well by effective pursuit of three more specific objectives.

First, the United States must dispel the impression that it believes, at least partly, that it could not satisfactorily endure Conference failure to reach agreement. This is not an unfounded impression. It reflects what has been a weakness in underlying U.S. policy analysis—compounded by tactically misplaced rhetorical excess, and by the natural tendency of some states to confuse the strength of interest in modifying adverse texts with an affirmative interest in those texts once modified.

For reasons stated, the belief is not only self-defeating as a negotiating posture, it is also wrong. And it is wrong not only with regard to the interests directly treated by the Conference. It is

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wrong insofar as it presumes that failure to reach agreement would have a serious adverse effect on the "North-South dialogue." The economic interests at issue in the "dialogue" are sufficiently fundamental not to be significantly affected by the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference. In any case, there is little or no practicable room for developing-country positions to become more extreme. The "climate" might temporarily be affected marginally. But, on the other hand, it could not long be well served by disguising fundamental differences on the merits, where these may be present.

As a second more specific objective, the United States must seek, within the Conference framework, to end what is excessive and artificial polarization between the developed and developing countries by encouraging the potentially wide moderate base within the Group of 77, beyond the land-based producers, to assume greater leadership responsibility. That is, the relative power of extremists within the Group of 77 must be reduced. The United States has no significant leverage to bring to bear upon them, however. Their principal Conference interests are ideological, not economic. They weigh precedential considerations more heavily than the United States has—and seem prepared to insist on their principles to the end. And for some of them, the "threat" of U.S. unilateral mining action is no threat at all. They would welcome the visible opportunity to condemn what they would characterize as "exploitative economic imperialism in violation of 'the common heritage of mankind.'" If the power of the extremists is to be reduced, it must be done by the Group of 77 itself. This requires that the Group come to perceive the extremists' veto as an abuse of power—an abuse which is contrary to the interests of the majority of the Group of 77.

It requires a more sophisticated appreciation of where real interests lie than is possibly connoted by North-South bloc posturing. Here the United States could help by refusing to accept the absurdly simplistic North-South mindset. Indeed, the specific interests and cultures within the South are so widely varied, that were it not for a posture of unity reactively assumed by the North, it is difficult to imagine what abstraction could serve to hold the Group of 77 together.

Abandoning the North-South mindset would help expand U.S. intellectual and practical attention to interests that cut across North and South. Those who worry about Conference "failure," for example, could usefully increase their attention to the extent of this worry among land-based producers (who have a powerful

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interest in getting some form of production control), and among moderate African states (who have a major interest in proving the workability of U.N. machinery). Those concerned about an international commercial "Enterprise" out of control could find eager colleagues among land-based producers who have far more confidence in multinational corporations' ability to plan and execute rational market entry (without spoiling markets) than they do in the Enterprise's. And so on—for consumer interest; interest in becoming sea bed miners; interest in the avoidance of any tyranny of a majority; and even interest in a framework that respects pluralism and allows diverse polities to thrive.

The third more specific strategic objective for the United States must be to develop support for a seabed "mini-treaty"—to be developed outside the U.N. Conference framework, and brought into effect only if it is clear that the Conference will not reach satisfactory agreement. Given the heavy odds against satisfactory agreement, this objective must be pursued as a matter of responsible policy development. As it happens, it would also serve to increase marginally the probability of Conference success.

The current seabed contingency plan seems to assume that if the Conference fails, U.S.-led consortia will mine the seabed "unilaterally," along with a small number of other states' mining entities. This approach would preferably include reciprocal agreements among mining states to assure orderly process, regulatory consistency, and mutual respect for security of tenure at mine sites. (Occasionally, this scheme is conceived more formally, by some, as a limited "mini-treaty" among mining states.) In the absence of a satisfactory international regime, this approach could be sensibly followed. It has two disadvantages, however. It is likely to fail to address adequately the international equity issue; that is, it is unlikely to be structured to provide much direct benefit to developing countries. And as a matter of appearance, it would tend to confirm the negative image of multinational corporations and of the United States.

The "mini-treaty" approach advocated here would be designed specifically to remove, or at least reduce, these disadvantages. It would be a treaty open to all states. Although a large number of states would not be expected to participate, it would be intended to attract both developed and developing countries. It would conform to the U.S. view of an optimal regime through which to develop seabed resources in the best interests of the United States and all mankind. It would be essentially a licensing regime, with a framework through which to coordinate the development of

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environmental regulation, but without any significant new bureaucracy, nor any international "Enterprise." As such, it would be unattractive to the Group of 77. But the mini-treaty would also provide for developing country participation through loan guarantees by signatory states to participating developing countries. It would provide for the transfer of necessary technology to developing countries through their participation in joint ventures. It would also provide for the taxation of seabed miners and the transfer of associated revenues to those among the poorest developing countries that would be parties to such a treaty.

It is not inconceivable that this "mini-treaty" would prove attractive to several developing countries with high potential as seabed miners—e.g., Mexico, Brazil, India, Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia. Only a few of the poorest states would likely wish to participate. But this would mean that revenue-sharing per state would be at a level capable both of having significant effect and of attracting interest. In encouraging developing countries to become seabed miners and to share in seabed revenues, the "mini-treaty" would not only provide an attractive legal and political framework for developed country miners, it would also address responsibly the equity interest in meaningful developing country participation.

Such an approach would, of course, be denounced by many developing countries while a realistic hope of Conference success remains. But this predictable public reaction should not be taken as a measure of the mini-treaty's practical prospects. In the event of Conference failure, it would provide the United States, other mining countries, and many developing countries with a far more satisfactory alternative than bare unilateralism.

In sum, U.S. strategy should be reoriented in three rather different, but nonetheless mutually consistent, directions: (1) it should exhibit a clear-eyed willingness to accept Conference failure as a non-disastrous, indeed thoroughly tolerable, outcome. (2) It should deliberately seek to break down "North-South" polarization—not by concession, but by greater practical attention to, and argument on behalf of, interests that cut across North-South lines. (3) As both a hedge against Conference failure and a prod toward Conference success, it should proceed with the development of a "mini-treaty," outside the Conference framework. In addition, the United States must, of course, continue all conventional elements of negotiation in good faith—relying particularly on vigorous intersessional consultation and pre-Conference informal negotiation—across the full range of disputed issues. Whether this would be enough to yield a satisfactory comprehensive treaty, however, must remain uncertain.

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VII

Considering the scope of the Conference, the existence of these problems is not unreasonable, nor should it have been unpredictable. In view of the Conference's ambition, the divergence of views and interests, and the need to negotiate among 150 nations simultaneously, the fact that it is now in its fifth year should not be surprising. With the conflict among ideologies, however, the only likely compromise on a seabed regime would seem to be a form of "mixed" regime. This could be structured as an exciting ongoing experiment in cooperative pluralism—worthy of wide affirmation as such.

But if agreement cannot be reached on a satisfactory seabed regime, the United States should hardly despair. It should wait for a more favorable world negotiating climate, while continuing to mine within the framework of a satisfactory "mini-treaty." Contrary to the general view, time may be on the U.S. side. The recent history of ideological conflict notwithstanding, it is conceivable that as the many newer states gain pragmatic experience and leave rigid ideology behind, they may come to appreciate the need for sound economic incentives, for decentralization, for greater tolerance of diversity, for a more flexible pluralism. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the future evolution of states and attitudes is not likely to be in this direction, it is all the more reasonable for the United States to treat the principles of government and economics it thinks to be right as if they are precious.

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Geoffrey Kemp

SCARCITY AND STRATEGY

After a generation of taking the availability of resources for granted, awareness of the politics of scarcity has mushroomed since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the ensuing oil embargo. Clearly, access to resources such as oil, food, minerals and fresh water is now high on the agenda of global issues to be faced in the years ahead.[1]

As to its political aspects, more gloomy observers cite the apparent growth in the number of incidents involving the use of military force over such access, which they see as one aspect of a new mercantilism involving protectionism and trade wars. They stress the increasing vulnerability of Western oil supplies to physical interruption and price increases engineered by Third World suppliers; the effects of rapid population growth and high prices upon the economic viability and food supplies of the very poor countries; the scramble for the offshore resources of the world's oceans; and, most basically, the sporadic outbreak of actual fighting over resources in recent years and the tremendous increase in arms sales to states that seek, in large part, to protect their resources and access routes.

To more optimistic observers, the emerging patterns of economic interdependence between industrial and less-industrial states, and between communist and non-communist states, are seen as trends that may help to reduce, rather than intensify, the long-term prospects of economic and military conflict. They argue that the problems of "scarcity" will change shape over time and that the present dependencies upon oil are neither necessary nor inevitable; that the dire neo-Malthusian predictions of the "population explosion" made in the early 1970s have not come to pass; that the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference will eventually impose

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some order upon the new maritime era; and that military skirmishes to date have been more than offset by the rapid expansion of trade and other cooperative ventures between a very disparate group of suppliers and consumers.

Regardless of whose predictions turn out to be more accurate, what can be argued with some certainty is that the emerging environment will change some of our basic perceptions relating to the role of force. Thus it seems fruitful to focus upon the strategic elements of the resource debate. Here three particular issues seem most significant: First, to what extent may competition for oil, food and minerals add to the potential for violent conflict in the world? Second, what is the likely impact of resource scarcity, real or imagined, on the military requirements and operational effectiveness of the major military powers? And third, what are the longer-term strategic implications of likely efforts by nations to develop alternative resources and technologies to complement and reduce their current set of dependencies?

II

By way of prelude, let us look for a moment at the past. History is full of examples of the relationship between military strategy and the need for resources, and for the routes and logistical systems necessary for their transportation.

Access to Egypt's granaries was a vital component of ancient Rome's grand strategy. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and of Alexandria in 1517 to the Turks, by effectively closing the land routes from Europe to the Far East, helped to give impetus to the development of long-range seagoing capabilities and navigation systems that transformed the military as well as the economic outreach of Western Europe. The exploitation of Latin American silver and gold deposits both attracted Spain to the New World and helped to trigger war between Spain and Britain. The search for resources and markets led the Vikings—like the British at a later time—to develop a blue-water navy to patrol the sea-lanes of empire. Without the discovery of gold in South Africa in the 1880s, it is unlikely that the Boer War between Britain and the Afrikaner's republic would have become the British equivalent of Vietnam.

And, in the twentieth century itself, an extremely bloody and costly war was fought between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s over a disputed area (the Gran Chaco), believed to be rich in oil deposits, and both nations had support from others expecting economic benefits. In the event, Paraguay won, but no oil was

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found. Perhaps most vividly for older Americans today, Japan's lack of resources undoubtedly played a significant part in its aggressive policies of the 1930s and in the eventual decision of 1941, after the United States had imposed an oil embargo, to attack Pearl Harbor and to seize control of Southeast Asia.

Within the past decade, Britain and Iceland have periodically engaged in military skirmishes in the so-called Cod War, over access to fish. And finally, since 1973 there has been talk of the use of Western military force to "liberate" Arab oil fields in the event of an embargo, and it has even been suggested that Iran, faced with the rapid drawdown of its own oil supplies, may eventually be tempted to attack across the Persian Gulf in order to control the vast reserves of at least part of the Arabian peninsula.

There is, therefore, some evidence, both historical and contemporary, to give support to Henry Kissinger's reminder in early 1974 (in a veiled threat to the Middle Eastern oil producers) that states have on occasion gone to war to assure supply of resources. Equally, though, the historical record suggests that there is nothing inevitable about this. In recent times particularly, short-term problems of resource scarcity have been overcome by combinations of new technologies or substitution, the development of new trade routes, and changing political alignments. Thus, although correlations between access to resources and the projection of military power can be established, most non-Marxist scholars have remained unconvinced that economic and resource explanations alone contribute very much to a general theory of war. Wars, be they historical or recent, large or small, almost invariably involve other determining factors.

The other necessary prelude to this analysis is the clarification of the term "scarcity." A resource may be "scarce"—and a nation perceive itself to be in a condition of "scarcity" requiring action—because there is only a finite supply of the resource in the world and because there exists no known substitute, or because the nation's geography and climate make an adequate supply of the resource extraordinarily difficult to produce or procure. Phosphates may be taken as an example of the first condition; most modern techniques for fertilizing agricultural land are worthless without them, there are no substitutes, and the bulk of the world's supply is located in three areas—the United States, the Soviet Union, Morocco, and the adjacent area, which was formerly Spanish Sahara. And fresh water is, for at least a few nations, an example of the second type of what might be called objective "scarcity."

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Over the next decades, instances of this sort may multiply. But for the proximate future, national perceptions of "scarcity" are likely to derive much less from the existence of an absolute situation of shortage, or even the prospect of one, than from difficulties of access in terms of economic and political factors. This is most notably true in the case of oil. If the United States were prepared to accept the economic and political costs of steadily growing dependence upon Middle Eastern oil, there would be far less reason for the energy program that President Carter has put forward.

On the other hand, while the possibilities of substitution and new technology do indeed reduce the importance of outright shortage, particularly in the case of minerals, one should note the opposite impact of national habits, especially in the area of food. It will not do to tell a Japanese or Briton that he could well get along on ten percent less fish, and accept soybeans instead. Even a relatively small shortfall in the accepted levels of supply may amount to the kind of "scarcity" that affects national behavior.

Confusion also arises when comparing the relative degree of scarcity of a material to different consumers. Oil is, in theory, equally "scarce" for the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—in the sense that all three require major imports from the Middle East. But, given the present politics of oil, the United States has a major advantage over the other two in that most oil-producing countries want American military support and, in greater degree, American economic products—ranging from soybeans to arms—in exchange for oil. Again one sees how subjective the concept of "scarcity" is. What matters is a particular nation's sense of scarcity.

Finally, on the question of which "scarce" resources are the most important, if history provides any lesson at all, it is the difficulty of predicting exactly where the most critical *future* shortages will come and what the strategic and economic implications will be. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the most important strategic material was the coal needed to fuel the navies and railways of the world. In terms of coal supplies, Britain was the nineteenth-century Saudi Arabia, and its accompanying control of coaling stations throughout the world gave it great leverage in exercising its maritime power. Yet, within 20 years, oil had emerged as the premium fuel, at least for naval shipping, and the Royal Navy became dependent on U.S. oil. It was this change in requirements that gave impetus to Britain's efforts to increase its political leverage over oil-rich countries in the Middle East.

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III

Turning to the present energy crisis, two main effects upon global strategy stand out: it has highlighted the importance of the major sources of oil, especially in the Persian Gulf region; and it has accelerated the scramble for alternative oil sources in areas as diverse as the northern polar region and the jungles of Ecuador and Peru. While we all now take for granted the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf, less than ten years ago the term "energy crisis" was not in household use, and few military analysts were concerned about Iran's military aspirations and the strategic security of the Straits of Hormuz. Middle Eastern oil will remain essential for the Western economies until alternative supplies are found, other forms of low-cost energy are discovered, or a political revolution that changes our lifestyles occurs in the Western world. The last contingency is not likely to occur except in the event of war, when rationing could be invoked and priorities for oil supplies changed.

Access to Middle Eastern oil has been a factor in European strategic thinking for many years, but U.S. dependency upon Persian Gulf oil, especially from Saudi Arabia, is new and is growing at a rate equal to all European Community (EEC) imports; there have also been reports, notably from the Central Intelligence Agency, that the Soviet Union may need to import more oil in the decade ahead. These factors imply that the EEC countries, Japan, the United States, and possibly even the Soviet Union will be "competing" for Middle Eastern oil. In addition, the military buildup by the oil-rich countries themselves, indigenous conflicts within the Gulf, and the proximity of the oil fields to the Arab-Israeli military theater increase the potential for disruption in the area. Even more likely than fighting over access to petroleum is an outbreak of fighting initially not having anything to do with oil—for instance, a new Arab-Israeli war—which could expand to embrace the oil areas and could shatter the political solidarity of the Western world.

Although the Western industrialized nations face many possible military threats to Middle Eastern oil supplies, the most serious would be a situation in which the Soviet Union became embroiled in a conflict whereby it gained control over or destroyed the Saudi Arabian oil fields. Just how this could come about is the source of endless speculation: the prospects for a direct invasion by the Soviet Union of Saudi Arabia seem remote, at least until such time as Soviet air and sea lift capabilities have markedly improved.

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From bases in the Horn of Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan, Soviet aircraft could mine the Straits of Hormuz or even bomb the oil fields. However, such acts would be considered such a blatant threat to the West that they would probably—but not necessarily—be part of an overall Soviet offensive involving military activity on the high seas, in Europe and in the Far East.

A less dramatic, but for that reason more plausible, threat would arise from formal Soviet political and military alliances with radical governments in the Persian Gulf, including the deployment of forward base facilities there. If a radical Saudi government came to power, either as a result of the internal dynamics of rapid social change or because of military defeat in a new war involving Israel, the Soviet Union might end up in de facto control of Saudi oil without firing a shot. Yet such control should not be equated with withholding or destruction of the oil. The Soviet Union's initial interests would probably point in the direction of continuing supplies to the West. Responses to this contingency would probably politically divide rather than unite the OECD countries (especially if it occurred in the aftermath of another Arab-Israeli war).

Another possibility is that the Soviet Union itself would be motivated by a need to secure access to Middle Eastern oil to fill its own and Eastern Europe's projected requirements. Although the U.S.S.R. has little hard currency to pay for Middle Eastern oil, Soviet inability to meet this demand could have very negative implications for its internal political stability. Thus exchanging its one marketable commodity—arms—for oil may well seem mutually advantageous to both the Soviet Union and certain Middle Eastern countries. Because the West's strategic stakes in the oil are likely to remain greater than those of the Soviet Union for years to come, the Soviet Union could afford to take a gamble in a crisis situation, which, if correctly called, could result in a major shift in the strategic control of the region.

It has also been suggested that in a general wartime situation the Soviet Union would be in an increasingly powerful position to interfere with the flow of Western oil supplies. If the Soviet Union were intent upon targeting the oil, attacks at the source would presently make more military sense than threats in transit. A war at sea involving attacks on oil tankers could be contemplated, but the Soviet Union is not well prepared to consider such operations given its present basing structure, which makes its distant-water fleets extremely vulnerable in any protracted conflict. This vulnerability could be lessened, if the Soviet Union were to establish a presence in southern Africa and the Indian

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Ocean that gave it major shore-based facilities from which to operate its aircraft and to support and to maintain its surface ships and submarines. If, for instance, the Soviet Union were eventually to have access to South Africa's excellent maritime infrastructure, it would, in effect, be able to control the Cape route, which would have serious implications for the West.

However speculative some of these possibilities may seem, access to Middle Eastern oil has now become a primary focus of U.S. military planning for non-nuclear hostilities—alongside the Central European front and the Korean peninsula. It can therefore be anticipated that continuing efforts will be made to ensure that the United States has the military capability to intervene in the Persian Gulf region in the event of a serious crisis. The precise circumstances under which such an intervention would occur cannot be specified, except that the most *unlikely* circumstance would probably be a unilateral U.S. invasion against the local countries to secure oil supplies. More likely would be a situation where the United States came to the help of states such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, which felt threatened by their neighbors or by the Soviet Union.

From a military point of view, the United States can probably still deploy major forces to the Middle East at about the same rate as the Soviet Union, especially if local conflict is already underway. For when all is said and done, the Soviet Union cannot disregard the fact that some of the richest oil states and the strongest military power, Israel, are, first and foremost, anti-Soviet. If, from a Soviet "worse-case" perspective, one thinks of having to fight a non-nuclear war in the Middle East, the Soviet planner must assume that Israel and Iran would probably support the West, in which case Haifa, Lod, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar, as well as Diego Garcia and possibly Greece and Turkey, could become forward bases for the projection of American power. If Egyptian and Syrian facilities were denied to the Soviet Union, either for political or military reasons (e.g., an Israeli victory giving it local air superiority), it would have problems operating in the eastern Mediterranean, let alone sending an expeditionary force into the Middle East.

Nevertheless, there is no room for complacency on the part of the West. The delicate balance of power in the resource-rich Middle East could be shifted in the Soviet Union's favor if any one of a host of possible events occurred, such as a change of regime in Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, over time the Soviet Union can redress its present military weaknesses and

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develop forces and infrastructure capable of greater long-term power projection.

Although the Middle East is the most critical area for conflict over oil, there has already been fighting and military posturing over oil-related issues elsewhere. In 1975, China and South Vietnam fought a brief skirmish over the ownership of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines is currently deploying military force into forward islands in the South China Sea in consequence of its outstanding conflict with Vietnam and Indonesia over offshore resources. Unresolved disputes between Korea and China, and between Taiwan and China, all point to the fact that the region of the Yellow Sea and East and South China Seas is likely to be the scene for many oil-related conflicts in the future.

Elsewhere, access to the oil in the Cabinda enclave has been a factor in the ongoing conflicts between Zaïre and Angola; offshore disagreements between Venezuela and Colombia, including military posturing, were about potential oil supplies, and in the northern seas there have been disputes between Norway and the Soviet Union over the demarcation of the continental shelf and potential oil resources of that region.

In sum, it is easy to come up with a long list of oil-related disputes. In judging their potential for escalation into military conflict, the state of political relations between competitors for all resources in all-important: where they are good (e.g., Britain, Norway, France), disputes have been resolved; where the competitors will not even speak to each other for other reasons (e.g., Taiwan and China, Greece and Turkey), oil as a catalyst for war becomes more likely.

IV

With regard to possible conflict over minerals, the situation in southern Africa seems likely to be most problematical. The mineral wealth of southern Africa is based on varied items such as gold, chrome, diamonds, uranium and iron ore. In economic terms, the most important mineral is gold. Significantly, the Soviet Union is the world's second-largest producer of gold after South Africa. Although the importance of this conjunction should not be overdrawn—it is not likely to be a threat to the Western monetary system, for example—it does offer potential opportunities to the Soviet Union. If the export of South Africa's gold were curtailed or fluctuated wildly—either as a result of deliberate

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policy by a successor regime in Pretoria or, more likely, because of increased industrial disruption in that country—the Soviet Union would certainly be in a position to benefit from selling more of its own gold. Again, the advent to power of radical regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia or Namibia would create general uncertainties for Western consumers. Although these regimes would probably benefit from mineral exports to the West, it can be questioned whether they would have the capacity to market the minerals if the infrastructure were in disarray and capital investment was difficult to obtain. In this regard it is worth remembering the great importance of access to the railroads of southern Africa for the transportation of minerals. For example, Zaïre presently has to export most of its copper through South African ports owing to the absence of a railroad link between its copper mines in Shaba province and its ports, the temporary closure of the Benguela railroad through Angola due to civil war, the overloading of the alternative railroad between Zambia and Tanzania and the poor port facilities at Dar Es Salaam.

Problems relating to gold are different from problems relating to chrome, vanadium or uranium. For example, uranium is found in large quantities primarily in southern Africa, Canada, Australia, the Soviet Union and the United States, and its supply is linked to the debate on the future of nuclear energy. If, for whatever reasons, uranium exports from the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia were restricted, it can be argued that South Africa and Namibia would become more important to West Germany and Japan, who need major imports of uranium. Yet, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which these consumers would consider the role of force to secure uranium supplies. It is more likely that military conflict in southern Africa *not* directly involving the consumers will make access to these minerals more precarious.

In all these situations, it is also important to distinguish between the economic and military implications of mineral scarcity. In a situation where the wartime rules of economics apply, changes in supply-and-demand schedules can be implemented without seriously jeopardizing overall military potential—provided adequate stockpiles are available. However, in peacetime situations where there are clear economic trade-offs between shifting supply-and-demand schedules and stockpiling strategic materials, the preferred course of action is less obvious. Marginal changes in mineral costs or short-run disruptions in supply may have a serious effect upon a peacetime "boom" economy but less effect in wartime. In

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general, the strategic problem of mineral access is not nearly as serious for the United States as the problem of oil, unless a war of the magnitude and duration of World War II is contemplated. For Europe and Japan, however, the mineral stakes are higher and for that reason there also may be scope for disagreement among the Western allies on preferred political actions to be taken to secure access to them.

V

In addition to oil and other mineral resources, access to food and water is also a potential source of conflict. The bulk of the world's food supply comes from relatively small areas of the land and sea. Food from the land requires constant supplies of fresh water and, if productivity is to be high, adequate supplies of fertilizers. Thus land-food scarcities often correlate with fresh water scarcity and fertilizer scarcity. Two of the three primary fertilizers are derived from petroleum products and from phosphates. The costs of the former have increased; the latter are non-substitutable.

In the case of land food, recent military skirmishes and posturing have occurred over access to grazing areas, water supplies, and fertilizer deposits. Usually, however, these are very localized disputes and have only become serious when they coincide with other conflict issues. Thus the various crises between Israel and Syria and Jordan over access to the waters of the Jordan River reflect the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the seriousness of water shortages themselves. Similarly, the potential for war betwen Algeria and Morocco over the Spanish Sahara and its phosphate deposits has to be seen in the context of the historical rivalry between these two countries. However, in this case, it can be suggested that the phosphates of this region are likely to become extremely important in future global terms since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is expected to remain net exporters of phosphate.

Fish are a much more serious actual and potential source of conflict. Conflict over food supplies usually arises because of asymmetries in demand and distribution rather than because of shortages in total supply. The bulk of the world's major fishing areas is located in less than ten percent of the oceans, and most fish are found within 200 miles of shorelines. For both dietary and historical reasons, a great many important nations are accustomed to a high fish content in their diets—notably the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea, and most of the countries surrounding the South

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China Sea. The advent of advanced fishing technology has made it possible for such fish-seeking nations to range far from their own zones and into territories historically fished by other nations.

Hence, it is not surprising that over the past ten years there have been a large number of fishing incidents involving the use of force. Aside from the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, the most serious have been in the northwest Pacific, where there have been numerous encounters between Japanese, Russian, and North and South Korean fishermen, sometimes involving death. In the 1960s, there was violence in the southwest Atlantic between the Soviet Union and both Argentina and Brazil. This gave impetus for Argentina and Brazil to extend their territorial seas out to 200 miles and to deny the Soviet Union access. Soviet fishermen then shifted their focus of attention to the rich fishing areas in the southeast Atlantic off West Africa.

The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference now has agreed in principle to a general rule of 200-mile offshore zones of economic control, which would embrace fishing rights. And a very large number of nations, including the United States, have already acted unilaterally to establish such zones. Apart from the remaining problems of delineation, interpretation and policing, the establishment of 200-mile fishing zones, while resolving some disputes, may tend to increase the intensity of competition in the remaining areas. Thus increased Soviet fishing activity in the remaining "free" areas of the southern seas is seen by some in the context of an overall expansion of Soviet maritime power. The prospects for confusion, Western misperception, and Soviet deception as to the true purpose of the fishing activities are great for some of the remaining rich fishing areas off Angola, Namibia, Somalia and Saudi Arabia.

The one area of the world that contains enormous quantities of seafood but does not, at present, fall under anyone's jurisdiction is the Antarctic. The area south of the Falkland Islands contains billions of tons of Antarctic krill. These tiny shrimp-like crustaceans are found there in abundance (in part due to the Soviet and Japanese over-fishing of the whale population, some of which can eat up to five tons of krill an hour). It has been estimated that 50-100 million tons of krill per year could be extracted from this region on a sustainable basis. This could equal or double the world's total seafood catch, depending upon whether the low or high estimate is correct, and already Russian and Japanese fishermen are trying to exploit this resource. The main problems with krill are, first, that it decays very rapidly when caught and

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therefore needs almost instant freezing, and second, that it is not particularly tasty after it has been frozen. Were other states to become seriously interested in exploiting the krill, there would be potential for disputes and possibly conflict over access to the resources of the far southern seas. This could have some importance in the case of Antarctica because it is not only believed to contain oil and minerals but is also the world's largest source of fresh water.

VI

Turning to the impact of resource scarcity on military planning, it is already clear that the combined impact of the energy crisis and the search for alternative resources has begun to influence the configuration and mission of peacetime military forces. Increasing numbers of countries are buying and deploying forces either to deter resource conflicts or to make sure they can contain them if they occur.

While the major arms buildup being conducted by Iran and Saudi Arabia has many objectives, protecting their oil resources and oil lines of communication (in the case of Iran especially) has undoubtedly been highly significant. The effect on Soviet planning is more speculative. While one can assign a number of broader political objectives to the Soviet effort to extend its influence in Africa, including the acquisition of base rights for its own sea-control missions, the possibility of posing a threat to the major oil lifeline of the West cannot be absent from Soviet thinking.

Far less portentous, but by no means insignificant, is the kind of situation that may be developing in areas of offshore oil exploitation. In the North Sea, for example, where such activities have expanded rapidly—and where there is also a dispute between Britain and several EEC countries over the exact extent of fishing zones—even Britain has felt constrained to initiate new force deployments (including the so-called Tapestry missions by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy) designed to meet a number of requirements, including political presence, surveillance and, if necessary, protection of offshore resources. While one would hardly foresee actual military conflicts among nations that otherwise enjoy very close relations, there is certainly the possibility that military forces may be required to police increasingly strict transit regulations, as well as to control fishing.

And if one visualizes the extension of similar offshore oil activities in such areas as the Yellow Sea, the possibilities for conflict and for interference with normal maritime activity become

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progressively greater. Inevitably, contiguous states are bound to respond by developing more extended patrol and other military capabilities.

Similarly, the progressive extension of 200-mile economic resource zones worldwide is already resulting in a proliferation in the number of military vehicles, especially patrol vessels, around the world. Such vehicles can easily be armed with new generations of sophisticated stand-off weapons, such as anti-ship cruise missiles.

To carry the argument one step further, the extension of offshore jurisdiction, in part due to expectations of resource availability, together with the military and constabulary forces designed to protect and survey these areas, may mean that access to certain regions is likely to be more politically controversial than in the past. For example, it can be questioned how free U.S. access from its major base in the Philippines, Subic Bay, through the South China Sea and the Indonesian Strait into the Indian Ocean would be in the event of a new Middle Eastern war, if the local states were to decide that U.S. military deployments through their waterways were to help protect Israel. Such considerations would have been unheard of ten years ago. Yet today they at least have to be discussed by military planners.

Similarly, constraints on Soviet military freedom of movement through the North Sea regions may become greater, given the surveillance activity in that region and the fact that there are numerous hazards to shipping, which, from the Soviet point of view, could have anti-military potential. Another area where "closed seas" are likely is the Persian Gulf, where the ability of the great powers to deploy in this region against the will of the major littoral states can no longer be taken for granted.

The point is not that these areas are becoming "closed" in a legal sense; neither is it to say that local powers will be able to deny the United States or the U.S.S.R. access in wartime. But in a "limited crisis" situation the major powers might not wish to exercise their access rights for fear that the political costs of doing so would outweigh the benefits.

Thus, one wonders whether the United States would today repeat its 1971 action during the India-Pakistan war, when it sent the *Enterprise* through the Straits of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal against the wishes of the littoral states. These constraints, although perhaps not decisive in time of major war, have begun to influence the manner in which the maritime powers can deploy their forces for the important peacetime presence mission.

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If the political access problem is examined in conjunction with the overall logistical requirements for maintaining a maritime presence worldwide, the emerging environment is even more constrictive for countries like the United States. Overseas basing facilities and fuel supplies are still essential, and without them even nuclear-powered ships would have difficulty fulfilling any major military mission that involved high-tempo operations.

At still another level, the high costs of petroleum have already diminished the force readiness of the major U.S. fleets. The number of sea days that the Sixth Fleet has been able to operate since 1974 has been reduced considerably, which, in turn, has had its impact upon operational capabilities. The extent to which concern about the U.S. military establishment's oil bill is a new factor in planning can best be illustrated if one could imagine the United States having to fight another war of the same intensity and duration as that in Vietnam but at today's oil prices. During the height of the Vietnam War, U.S. forces consumed more than one million barrels of oil a day at prices one-quarter to one-fifth of today's. Although the United States could undoubtedly obtain the oil if it were needed, the political and economic consequences would now be so great that the President would have to decide almost immediately whether the situation warranted putting the nation onto a full-fledged war footing.

VII

Over the long term, many of the issues discussed in the previous sections may be superseded by fundamental structural changes in the nature of the international system that may bring about new strategic alignments and perceptions of security among new groups of states. Of the many resource factors that could alter strategic coalitions, two are worthy of special note. First, the need for resources may lead to the expansion of new geographic frontiers and the development of new logistical systems to exploit those frontiers; second, intensive programs to discover and develop alternative economically viable resources, especially energy sources, may have important military spinoffs.

The Soviet Union, Brazil, central and southern Africa, the polar regions and the deep ocean, as well as outer space, offer major prospects for further development and exploitation by the end of the century. The Soviet Union is still an underdeveloped country. Its population, although large by world standards, is concentrated in several high-density regions, leaving vast tracts of Siberia, the Soviet Arctic and Far East virtually empty. Attempts

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to develop and settle these areas have been beset with difficulties, not the least of them being climate and the absence of roads or railroads. In recent years there has been talk of joint U.S.-Japanese-Soviet investment in the infrastructure and technologies to extract oil and natural gas from Siberia and the Far East. However, mutual suspicions on all sides have, so far, effectively limited the extent of this cooperation. Were such a relationship to evolve or were the Soviet Union able to succeed in developing the area on its own, the effect would be to create a new industrial area that would use local energy sources. In this regard, the Soviet decision to build a new railroad parallel but to the north of the present trans-Siberian line is of considerable strategic importance not only in the event of a war in the northeast Pacific, but also as a means of supporting a greater Soviet maritime presence in the Pacific.

Brazil has plans to become a continental power by the end of the century and, perhaps more than any other country in the world, reflects today the same sense of manifest destiny found in the United States in the nineteenth century. An essential ingredient of this destiny involves the opening of the frontiers along its long and distant borders and in the interior of the Amazon Basin and the Mato Grosso. Since Brazil's borders are contiguous with all the states of South America except for Chile and Ecuador, the internal dynamics of Brazil's economic development will inevitably have strong political repercussions on her neighbors. So far, the impact of Brazil's expansion has been most noticeable in the southwest, where good agricultural land and the need for energy has led to development plans for the gigantic hydroelectric complex at Itaipu on the Parana River on the border with Paraguay and less than 100 miles from the Argentinian border. Itaipu symbolizes the complicated geopolitics of the La Plata Basin, and the extent to which the expansion of Brazilian economic power and its concomitant need for energy and a logistical infrastructure have drawn its neighbors into a closer web that has the potential both for cooperation and conflict. Although the elements of resource conflict between Brazil and Argentina are often stressed—for instance the impact of the Itaipu dam upon the water level in Argentinian ports—this could change if, as some believe, Argentina, rather than Brazil, were to discover major offshore oil, a commodity in short supply in Brazil.

In the Amazon, the plans to settle the interior, although suffering major setbacks due, among other things, to the oil crisis and the greater appeal of the southwest, are bringing Brazil into direct contact with the bordering countries of Peru, Colombia and

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Venezuela. This "spread" of Brazilian economic activity is occurring at a time when the border states themselves are slowly expanding towards their interior boundaries. The result is that enormous areas of land that, until recently, have not been considered important in a strategic sense have now begun to be so. The unanswered question, though, is over what time frame Brazil will be able to establish a major economic presence in the Amazon Basin. Early estimates of the speed with which the region would be settled as a result of the new trans-Amazon road and generous land offers to the overpopulated northeast have proven to be greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, by the end of the century, and possibly sooner, parts of the interior could begin to resemble the United States in the mid-nineteenth century.

In Africa south of the Sahara, several areas have enormous potential in terms of resource development. The Sudan could become another major land-food area; Zaïre, South Africa and Namibia could become leading mineral exporters. However, here, as in the Amazon and Siberia, with the exception of South Africa, the logistical systems and skills are not available: whether they will become so will probably depend far more upon external political factors than in the previous cases.

Each of the polar regions is potentially important: in the north the resources, primarily oil and fish, are already a major strategic issue and the question of "ownership" of these resources is a matter for negotiation or conflict among the major Arctic powers (the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Norway and Denmark). However, the southern polar regions are presently not owned by any state and yet, as mentioned earlier, abundant but difficult to retrieve resources are to be found there. The circumstances under which Antarctica could become a focus for strategic concern might well be conditioned by future political developments in South America, where there remain serious disputes between Argentina and Chile and between Argentina and Britain over the status of the offshore area near the Beagle Channel and the Falkland Islands respectively. If oil were discovered off southern Argentina, and if France were to start towing icebergs to Saudi Arabia, as has been proposed, then the area would almost certainly be perceived to be more important by everybody.

The last two frontiers, the deep ocean and outer space, offer the most dramatic prospects for a new geopolitical era. If the economics of deep-sea mining and outer space resources prove attractive, they will undoubtedly be exploited, since the basic technology for doing so is already here. However, this technology

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is only available to very few countries and, in the case of outer space, the United States has a major economic advantage over the U.S.S.R. with its development of the space shuttle. This latter system could become an extremely important logistical system if—and it is still a big if—the economics of space prove as important as advocates have made out.

In strategic terms, the advanced industrial powers, but especially the United States, have the ability to either "go it alone" or to cooperate in sharing expertise for deep-sea and space exploration. So far the United States has been generous—some would say overly generous—in its willingness to cooperate in these ventures. Were the international climate to change toward more open economic confrontation, the United States could, if it made the commitment, adopt a more aggressive and self-serving ocean and space policy and, with political will, forge a new economic order and a new dimension to its imperial role.

VIII

Turning to the impact of new technologies, it is at once obvious that the prospects for nuclear weapons proliferation have been enhanced by the increased demand for nuclear power reactors throughout the world, which in turn stems directly from attempts to alleviate the energy crisis. With this example in mind, it is well to ponder some of the potential military implications of the numerous research-and-development programs currently underway at the laboratory level to solve our resource problems.

Once more, history can be a useful guide. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, few military experts foresaw the impact of the steam engine and the internal combustion engine upon land, sea and air warfare. Yet railways and the motorized vehicle probably did more to change military strategy and tactics between Napoleon and the Treaty of Versailles than all the improvements in firepower and weapons system design. In recent times, the breakthroughs in the design and costs of micro-electronics have greatly improved the lethal effectiveness of non-nuclear weapons. Yet this trend was not foreseen by those writing about military affairs in the early 1960s.

Therefore, if we can be reasonably sure of anything about the future, it is that major changes in military performance could well result from technological breakthroughs not initially related to the more narrow confines of military research and development. For example, the development of a lightweight, powerful, long-endurance fuel cell of sufficiently low cost to warrant mass production

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could revolutionize the conduct of conventional warfare without requiring any basic changes in weapons system design. Eliminating, or drastically reducing, the dependency of modern military forces upon the internal combustion engine and its cumbersome, increasingly costly and vulnerable petroleum-oil-lubricant supply line would introduce a new flexibility into the operation of a military division or company similar to the freedom given to submarines with the introduction of the nuclear-powered engine.

More exotic examples could be suggested, especially those that could result from the spinoffs of economic exploitation of space alluded to earlier. The ability to build vast solar power stations and establish research colonies of scientists and technicians initially tasked with the job of "mapping" the unknown and maintaining existing space systems has far-reaching military implications, and the country that has developed the infrastructure and technology will have a major initial advantage.

At the other extreme, in the deep ocean, advanced technology developed for ocean mining and processing can also have military implications. That the CIA's *Glomar Explorer* used deep-sea mining techniques in the effort to locate and to retrieve Soviet submarines from the ocean bed is the best evidence that much of this technology is already with us.

IX

To summarize, wars over access to scarce resources are neither necessary nor inevitable, but they can occur for complex reasons. Three military issues over scarce resources can be identified: first, military conflict to control, destroy or to protect a given resource, such as an oil field, a watershed, fishing areas, arable land, or precious mineral areas; second, military deployments to annex or protect a land or sea area believed to contain or to be close to potentially valuable resources such as offshore islands near oil-bearing rock formations; third, military conflict that affects access routes to and from sources of supply—sea, air and land lines of communication, especially straits, and airstrips, railroad systems and ports. In each of these three categories, the importance of the resource factor will vary. We can distinguish between a conflict where the resource conflict is the dominant factor, e.g., the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, and those conflicts where it is a secondary, albeit potentially catalytic, factor, e.g., Greek-Turkish conflict over possible Aegean oil deposits.

Access to Middle Eastern oil will remain the most serious, if not the most likely, resource-related possible source of conflict for the

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next decade. Elsewhere there may be higher probabilities of resource conflict but their impact may be regional and economic rather than a potential catalyst for World War III.

The indirect effects of resource scarcity are already having an impact upon military policy leading to the establishment of "constabulary" forces, which could eventually place greater constraints on access in regional sea areas now considered "international." These factors, together with the effects of high fuel costs upon military operations and training, and uncertainty over foreign base rights, suggest that Soviet and U.S. ability to exercise political-military power in distant waters may eventually decline.

Finally, over time, the interaction of population, technology and resource trends may lead to the opening up of new geographical frontiers, including outer space, and the development of new technologies, which have major military application. In strategic terms, the long-run prospects for the United States look poor if our vision is restricted to current resource dependencies and logistical systems. If, however, the United States shows imagination, it can exploit its undisputed lead in advanced technology and continue to be the pathfinder in a potentially revolutionary new era. However, whether the United States will have to contemplate this role in the context of growing international conflict or improved cooperation will be dependent in large part on its ability to overcome the short-term constraints of the energy crisis.

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Ansley J. Coale

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF MEXICO

Twenty years ago, there were two polarized positions with respect to the implications of population trends: one pessimistic and the other optimistic. The pessimists asserted that rapid population growth constituted a trap for the poorer countries: their best efforts to develop could serve only to maintain an ever larger population under unimproved or even deteriorating conditions. Those holding the optimistic counterposition denied any ominous implications of population growth, asserting that poverty was caused by remediable institutional defects, whether these be a highly unequal division of property, the capitalist system, or the unwarranted interference of the government in a free market. The pessimists offered the classical Malthusian argument that the supply of basic requirements such as food could not expand as rapidly as the population tended to grow; unless the birth rate was reduced immediately, efforts to achieve social and economic development were bound to be ineffectual. The optimists replied by contending that the world was technically capable of providing a much larger population with a much improved diet, and that the concern for excessive population growth was misdirected.

In a book we wrote then,[1] Edgar M. Hoover and I accepted neither a priori position: we were not prepared to assume either that population growth, if continued, was bound to lead to an early disaster, nor that population growth made little difference to development. Our strategy was to examine as objectively as we could the prospect for economic development in specific countries

[1] *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

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in an effort to ascertain how much difference it would make if the future population within the country were to develop according to one or the other of two strongly contrasting possible paths. Specifically, we calculated the future of the population if the rate at which women bear children (up until then essentially unchanging in most less-developed countries) were on the one hand to continue for another generation or more without any change, or, alternatively, were to be reduced by 50 percent in a period of 25 years. The purpose of our two alternative projections was to show how the population would grow and how its age composition would change if the rate of childbearing were to remain constant, or if it were to decline, smoothly but strongly, over a generation.

Our next step was to calculate, on the basis of conventional assumptions about factors that influence the growth of the national product, how different would be the evolution of the economy, given the two different projected populations. We were not interested primarily in predicting precisely what would happen in either instance, but rather in showing what difference it would make to the economy and the society if for any reason fertility were to fall, as opposed to continuing to remain unchanged.

Stated in irreducible minimum terms, our economic argument was as follows: the alternative population projections would necessarily yield the same number of persons above age five at the end of five years, above age ten at the end of ten years, and so on. On the provisional assumption that mortality rates would be the same in the two populations, the difference between the population with unchanging rates of childbearing and the population with falling fertility would be confined to a difference in the number of persons born after the projections are initiated. There would be a widening gap in the number of births in the two populations; after 25 years the difference would be a little more than 50 percent of the larger number of births.

To the extent that effective participation in productive activity does not begin much before age 15, especially in a modernizing economy, there would be little difference in the size of the effective labor force in the two projections until after 25 or 30 years. After 20 years, for instance, the population aged 15–64 would be only four percent greater in the high-fertility projection, and only nine percent greater after 30 years. If allowance was then made for the greater availability of women for economic activity outside the home when the rate of childbearing is 40 or 50 percent lower, it seemed clear that there would be no large advantage for 25 or 30 years in the availability of productive labor

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in the population that had sustained high fertility, as compared to the population with reduced fertility.

At the same time, there was no reason to suppose that the natural resources available in a given country would be different over a generation according to whether fertility remained constant or was reduced. That is to say that the mineral deposits, forests, and agricultural land that are potentially exploitable are not a function of the size of the dependent population, especially if the size of population at ages of labor-force participation is essentially the same.

Two of the principal factors contributing to the national product (labor and resources) are, then, prospectively about the same for 25 or 30 years, whether fertility remains the same or is reduced. The third classical determinant of national product is capital. We argued that additions to capital (net investments) are at least potentially larger with reduced fertility. The reason is that additions to capital stock are taken from that part of national income that is not currently consumed, and as lower fertility reduces the number of children in the population, it would be easier (without reducing consumption per head for the adults or the other children) to divert part of current output from consumption to net additions to the capital stock.

Since two of the principal factors of production would be essentially the same in the two projected populations, and since the accumulation of capital would be larger in the population with reduced fertility, during 25 or 30 years the total national product would increase more in the population that followed the low-fertility alternative. The low-fertility population, in addition to the evident advantage of dividing the national product among a smaller number of consumers, would have the surprising advantage of a larger product to divide.

This scheme of analysis was applied first to India. In our study of India, the bare outline just stated was fleshed out with nearly 300 pages of detailed data and descriptive information about the Indian population, economy and society and by a formal model of economic growth. Our conclusion was that whatever increase in income per person could be achieved by a projected population with no decline in fertility in a 30-year period, that increase could be surpassed by 40 to 50 percent in a population that reduced its fertility by one-half in 25 years.[2]

[2] Actually we calculated income per equivalent adult consumer, a computation in which children were counted as only half as heavy consumers as adults. This allowance prevents an overstatement of the effect on a per capita basis.

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After our study of India was finished, we wanted to examine the same set of relations in a developing country in another part of the world. We chose Mexico as the second example because it was less densely populated than India, had substantially higher per capita income, was experiencing much more rapid growth in real national product, and in general was less impoverished and further along the road to an advanced state of development. Our next step, then, was to repeat the same schéme of analysis, using projections of the Mexican population and data and coefficients from the Mexican economy. The surprising result was that the relative advantage foreseen for a population with reduced fertility relative to one that maintained its fertility unchanged was about the same in Mexico as in India.

This conclusion was a surprise when it first emerged from our analysis, but the reasons for similar conclusions became clear once we thought further about them. We were not making absolute judgments about the relative progress in two different economies; we were not saying that India would enjoy as rapid progress as Mexico, only that both countries would, over a generation, gain about the same relative advantage from a reduction in fertility. Moreover, within the intermediate time perspective of 25 or 30 years, when the size of the effective labor force is not much different in the two projections, we had no reason to emphasize shortages of land or other resources that might make difficult the effective use of a growing labor force. Limits of this sort are an inevitable eventual concern if population continues to grow indefinitely. India is probably closer to a problematic relation between the aggregate size of its population and the area and resources of the Indian subcontinent than is Mexico. But in a single generation, the relation of population to resources is not a relevant consideration in the comparison of two alternative projected populations.

II

During the more than 20 years that have passed since we analyzed the alternative prospects in India and Mexico, how has the public discussion about the relation of population to development changed? The debate about population and development persists in about the same terms as 20 years ago. The argument, common at the time that Hoover and I were working, between optimists and pessimists on the role of population in development has, if anything, sharpened. The pessimists are found among environmentalists, biological scientists, and supporters of the Planned Parenthood movement, groups that have been more

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vocal in the past 20 years than they were at the time we began our work. The pessimistic view has been expressed in books with alarmist titles such as *The Population Bomb,* and *Famine 1975!*.[3] The latter book, in addition to forecasting the inevitability of famine by 1975, proposed that the less-developed countries in the world be put in categories sometimes used by medical personnel at battle stations when casualties are very severe. This doctrine (*triage*) divides the casualties into those so seriously wounded that the overtaxed medical facilities have little chance of saving them, those lightly enough wounded that their lives will not be endangered if they are not given immediate attention, and a third category of those at neither extreme on whom the limited immediate medical care is concentrated. The authors suggest by analogy that there are countries in which the population situation is so desperate that efforts to help are useless. I am sure that this very gloomy position is not only inhumane, but illogical as well.

The metaphor of *triage* is simply inapplicable to national populations. Battle casualties so far gone that medical care is useless are neglected because under the stated conditions death is inevitable. But populations do not die out because of their growth; growth is not like a severe wound. If any country falls in the too-late-to-save category of *triage*, it is Bangladesh. Yet with or without technical assistance, there will certainly be more people in Bangladesh at the end of the century than now. At the worst, poverty will have become more acute, and population growth will have slowed down because of increased mortality rather than reduced fertility. Unlike neglected battle casualties, neglected poor countries do not disappear. To advocate neglect is to contend that the poorer countries are condemned, not to death, but to eternal poverty—an extreme view indeed of man's lack of adaptability and ingenuity.

At the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, the pessimistic and optimistic views were very conspicuous in a debate (among government representatives rather than professional demographers and statisticians) that was highly political. As an advisor to the U.S. delegation, I was very conscious of the influence on the U.S. position of the pessimistic (or immediate crisis) conception of population trends. In my opinion the extreme position taken by the American delegation helped prevent the adoption of a stronger World Plan of Action. The optimistic tradition was upheld at Bucharest by delegations from many

[3] Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1968; William and Paul Paddock, *Famine 1975!*, Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1967.

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countries in Africa and Latin America, with support from the Soviet bloc. These delegations took the position that it is wrong to ascribe any of the serious problems in the world to population trends. What is needed, they argued, is not population policy, but a new economic order, land reform, a more equitable distribution of income, and recognition of the rights of women. Two popular slogans were: "Take care of the people and the population will take care of itself," and "Development is the best contraceptive." I can see no objection to defining and advocating more effective economic and social policies, but cannot understand why it is improper, at the same time, to discuss explicit policies on population, especially at a world population conference.

Neither of the opposing positions expressed at Bucharest left room for the modest position that Hoover and I had offered to the effect that a low-income country with high fertility would achieve better progress if it could reduce its fertility than if it did not do so. If the country began with a very poor, unhealthy, and uneducated population and a stagnant economy, economic progress would be slow, but less so if fertility were reduced. If a low-income country already had a fairly well-educated population, and the organizational ability, the social order, and the natural resources to develop rapidly, even with sustained fertility, it would do still better (about 40 percent better per consumer over a 30-year period) if fertility were reduced.

Some economists have questioned the validity of our assumption that there would be more investment with lower fertility, and I must acknowledge that I am far from certain that our economic model was wholly realistic on this point. Even without substantially greater investment, however, the balance of forces would yield a slightly higher national income and substantially higher income per equivalent adult with reduced fertility.

The purpose of this article is not to review these old arguments themselves, but to see what has actually happened in one of the two countries we studied (Mexico): to reexamine the relationship between population growth and development after 20 years of both.

III

I will begin this reexamination by comparing the actual changes in the Mexican population since 1955 with our alternative population projections. The comparison is easy: the population of Mexico has followed the higher projection very closely.

The population projected with unchanged fertility was calcu-

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lated to increase by a factor of 1.93 in 20 years. The actual increase was by a factor of 2.03. The population doubled in just under 20 years! Table 1 below shows the projected and recorded average birth and death rates during the four quinquennial intervals from 1955 to 1975, and a comparison of the number of persons under 15, 15 to 65, and over 65, in 1975, as projected 20 years earlier, and as currently estimated. The projection with unchanging fertility slightly underestimates the actual growth of the Mexican population. Our projected age distribution closely resembles the actual, but the actual has somewhat higher numbers at younger ages, apparently because the assumption of unchanged fertility was an underestimate of its actual course.[4] Our projections of the death rate appear to have been basically correct: slightly too low in the 1960s but right in line with official data in the early 1970s.

I have spelled out in some detail a comparison of the projection with unchanged fertility and the actual population in part because among the large number of projections with which I have been involved, this is one of the few to be approximately verified by the subsequent actual population. However, the verification of a projection that was intended to be merely illustrative is not a source of much pleasure. Of the two alternative future populations that we worked out 21 years ago, it was the alternative with the less favorable consequences. If our reasoning was correct, the population in Mexico would in many respects be better off if the other projection (with declining fertility) had been correct. Before describing a number of the concrete ways in which reduced fertility might have improved the current social and economic situation in Mexico, I should like to spend a few minutes on the paradox implied by the continuation of high fertility itself. I have just noted that the actual trend of births in Mexico was higher than in a population projection (otherwise quite close to reality) in which it was assumed that fertility did not change from the level of the mid-1950s.

In Table 2 are shown selected changes in Mexico from the 1950s

[4] Despite an appearance to the contrary, the slightly declining crude birth rates in the projection (shown in Table 1) are not inconsistent with an assumption of constant fertility. The assumption in the projection was that the rate of childbearing by women at each age would remain fixed. The decline in mortality from 1955 to 1975 has, as demographers know, the somewhat surprising effect of increasing the proportion of the population at the younger ages and diminishing the fraction elsewhere, including the fraction of women at the ages of childbearing. The reduction in the proportion of the population consisting of women at the ages of maternity is the source of the gradually declining crude birth rate in our projection. In the actual population the birth rate did not decline consequentially through the early 1970s. This failure to decline implies either that the fertility of women of childbearing age has risen slightly or that registration of births has improved (implying that the birth rate was understated in the earlier years).

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TABLE 1

A. *Birth rates and death rates in Mexico 1955–1975. Projected and recorded.*

	1955–1959	*1960–1964*	*1965–1969*	*1970–1974*	
Birth rate	43.3	42.1	41.6	41.3	Projected
(per thousand)	44.9	44.4	43.2	44.1	Recorded
Death rate	12.2	9.7	8.2	7.1	Projected
(per thousand)	12.2	11.0	9.5	7.2	Recorded

B. *Mexican population, 1975, according to projections from 1955 and contemporary estimates (thousands).*

Age Level	*Projected (Jan. 1, 1975)*	*Estimated (June 30, 1974)*
0–14	26,779	27,876
15–64	30,663	30,198
65+	2,012	2,071
TOTAL	59,454	60,145

SOURCE: Projections from Coale and Hoover, *op. cit.*; birth and death rates from *Population Index*, Office of Population Research, Princeton University; estimated population from *Demographic Yearbook 1975*, United Nations.

TABLE 2

SELECTED CHANGES IN 20 YEARS FROM THE 1950s TO THE 1970s IN MEXICO

	1950s	*1970s*	*1970s figure/ figure 20 years earlier*	*Dates Used*
Total population	29.7 million	60.2 million	2.03	1955–1975
Population 6–14	6.0 million	12.4 million	2.07*	1950–1970
Attending school	2.25 million	8.01 million	3.56	1950–1970
Percent attending	37.5	64.4	1.72	1950–1970
Literate, ages 6+	11.8 million	27.5 million	2.34	1950–1970
Percent literate	56.8	71.7	1.26	1950–1970
Urban population	11.0 million	28.4 million	2.58	1950–1970
Percent urban	42.6	58.8	1.38	1950–1970
Expectation of life at birth	48.1 years	61.4 years	1.27	1951–1970
Growth in income at constant prices				
TOTAL			3.69	1955–1975
PER CAPITA			1.89	1955–1975

SOURCES: Population data including school attendance, urban population, and literacy from Mexican censuses of 1950 and 1970; expectation of life at birth in 1951 and 1970 from *Demographic Yearbook 1966* and *1973*, United Nations; growth in income calculated from *Yearbook of National Acounts Statistics 1963, 1972,* and *1975*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, United NAtions.
* Estimates, 1955–1975, 2.10.

to the 1970s. Together these data show impressive progress: a 72 percent increase in the proportion of the population of primary school age attending school, a 26 percent increase in literacy, an 89 percent increase in per capita income at constant prices, a 38 percent increase in the urban proportion, and a 27 percent rise in

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the average duration of life. These large and sustained positive changes in the Mexican economy and society certainly are contrary to the pessimistic view that rapid population growth in a low-income country is inconsistent with progress. They reveal more strongly the error of assertions that to double the population of a country no better off than Mexico was in the 1950s in only 20 years inevitably leads to impoverishment, malnutrition, and social collapse. It has not. The Mexican experience is a very useful counter to the over-simplified attribution to excess fertility of every impediment to social and economic development.

The Mexican experience must also be viewed as paradoxical for those who hold the optimistic position that countries with rapid population growth need have no concern about it, because social and economic progress automatically bring down birth rates. Suppose one were to tell the policymakers in India and Bangladesh that the proper policy is to concentrate on social and economic progress: since development is the best contraceptive, the birth rate will come down without any special interventionist measures. Could we say, to illustrate this point, "For example, look at Mexico?" The Mexican population in 1975 was more than 72 percent literate and more than 60 percent urban, the per capita income had nearly doubled in 20 years, the expectation of life at birth had risen to about 65 years and was still increasing; nevertheless, fertility until about 1975 was, if anything, somewhat higher than it was 20 years before.[5] The levels of income, literacy, and mortality are less favorable in many parts of South Asia today than they were in Mexico 20 years ago. Current progress in South Asia is much more gradual, and is unlikely with any measures that might realistically be imagined to duplicate the rapid progress in Mexico. In short, Mexico presents a puzzling picture for those who expound a simple version of the "demographic transition," the name that has come to be given to the theory that modernization brings predictable changes in mortality and fertility.

In the study that Hoover and I made, we summarized the transition theory of fertility as follows:

> The theory of the demographic transition asserts that the high birth rates, as well as the death rates, characteristic of an agrarian low-income society are affected by economic development. The changing structure of production, with a declining importance of the family as a production unit, with the growth of impersonal systems for the allocation of jobs, and with the development of

[5] Data taken from Tables 1 and 2, with the following exceptions: the expectation of life at birth in 1975 is taken from the U.N. *Demographic Yearbook 1975*; the urban proportion (58.8 per cent in 1970) was surely above 60 percent by 1975.

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economic roles for women outside of the home, tends to increase the possibility of economic mobility that can better be achieved with small families, and tends to decrease the economic advantages of a large family. One of the features of economic development is typically increasing urbanization, and children are usually more of a burden and less of an asset in an urban setting than in a rural. The whole process of economic change, moreover, weakens the force of traditional customs and beliefs. In most countries that have undergone the economic transition from an agrarian to an industrialized, market-oriented economy, the custom of the small family has started in the urban groups at the higher end of the socio-economic scale and has spread to smaller cities, lower-income groups, and eventually to rural areas.

Mexico is one of several examples that show that the relationship between social change and the decline of the birth rate is a complex one, and that each stage of progress is not necessarily accompanied by lower fertility. In an intensive study at the Office of Population Research (in Princeton) of the decline of fertility in Europe, we have found a number of instances in which the decline occurred in populations that were rural, not very well educated, and still subject to high infant mortality (sections of France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, provinces in Hungary in the nineteenth century, whole regions of Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, in the 1920s). We have also encountered the puzzling anomaly that the nationwide decline in fertility began in France nearly a century before it began in England, although it was England that was the leader in the Industrial Revolution.

In the contemporary world, Mexico is perhaps the most conspicuous national example of a country in which the theory of demographic transition would certainly seem to indicate that fertility should have shown a major reduction and yet none occurred (at least none before 1974 or 1975). There are other populations within large countries that are as paradoxical in this respect as the population of Mexico. I refer specifically to the populations of the Central Asian republics within the Soviet Union. These populations were traditionally Muslim in religion and culture, and were almost entirely agricultural or pastoral at the time of the Russian Revolution (the republics in question are the Kirgiz, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Uzbek Republics, with a total population of 22 million). In 1926, fewer than one percent of the women aged 20–29 had been reported in the census as literate. By 1970, at least 85 percent of the women aged 20–29 had completed a primary school education. The expectation of life at birth was well above 60 years. (After all, 1970 was some 52 years after the Russian Revolution.) Nevertheless, the fertility of married women

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in the rural population of these republics was nearly 50 percent higher in 1970 than in 1926. Marital fertility also increased (after due allowance for underregistration of births) between 1959 and 1970. Fertility in these areas is just as high as in Mexico, and rather than falling during the 1960s, actually increased.[6]

We find that the Mexican experience in the last 20 years, in short, supports neither the simplistic view that population growth is the principal source of all difficulties in any low-income country, nor the notion that progress in education, increases in per capita income, and concentration of the population in urban areas rather than in a rural setting have an inevitable, automatic effect of causing a reduction in the birth rate.

IV

What does the Mexican experience indicate retrospectively about the analysis that Hoover and I attempted 21 years ago? The extensive social and economic progress accompanying very rapid population growth with no decline in fertility is in no sense a contradiction of our argument. The question is whether there is evidence that in spite of impressive progress, the continuation of high fertility has been a detriment to the quality of Mexican life. To put the point more directly, is there evidence that important additional progress would have occurred if fertility had fallen rather than remaining constant or even rising slightly?

If fertility had fallen beginning in 1955, the striking difference between that hypothetical population and the actual population is in the number of persons under 15—there would be about 25 percent fewer had fertility fallen according to our lower projection. The smaller numbers would yield many advantages for the whole population, including the possibility of some 15 percent higher income per equivalent adult consumer. But the most evident advantages would be for the children themselves. With four or five children in the completed family rather than six or eight, there would be less crowded living conditions, better food, and better parental care. Recent research has shown that school performance is related to the average educational level within the family in the years of infancy and early childhood. Exposure to parents and to older siblings who have had some schooling apparently helps in the intellectual development of the child; constant contact with children only a little older is less helpful. Hence small families

[6] Data from A. J. Coale, B. A. Anderson, and Erma Härm, *Human Fertility in Russia since the 19th Century: the Demographic Transition in a Unique Historical Setting*, in preparation.

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and wider spacing of births produce an advantage in the acculturation of the children.[7]

Let us look further at the extension of education, as an instance in which progress has surely been inhibited by high fertility, which has led to a very rapid increase in the child population. Because reductions in mortality have been especially large in infancy and childhood, the effect of falling mortality has been not only to accelerate the growth of the population, but to accelerate it especially at the younger ages. Therefore, the increase in the population of primary school age has been even greater than the increase of the population as a whole. While the total population increased by a factor of 2.03 from 1955 to 1975, the school age population increased by at least 2.10 (Table 1). Looking at the data on school attendance in the years of the censuses, we saw that from 1950 to 1970 the number attending primary school had risen from 2.25 million to over 8 million, being multiplied by a factor of 3.56, an extraordinary 6.3 percent average annual increase. Despite the sustained allocation of large resources to education (something on the order of 15 percent of total governmental expenditures), the number of children *not* enrolled in school increased from 3.75 million in 1950 to 4.42 million in 1970. Very rapid increases in enrollment could not reduce nonattendance.

Had there been a linear decline in fertility beginning 20 years ago, of the sort that we predicted in the lower fertility projection, the number of children of primary school age in 1975 would have been 21 percent less. If the same resources had been devoted to expanding education, the current school attendance ratio would be approaching 90 percent of the population of primary school age instead of attaining merely 64 percent, and the number *not* in school would have been sharply reduced, rather than increasing.

Population growth has contributed to a similarly regrettable trend in the number of illiterates. While the number of literates rose from 11.8 million to 27.5 million between 1950 and 1970, the number of *illiterates* rose from 8.9 million to 10.9 million. Again, with a more moderate rate of growth occasioned by reduced fertility, the number of children who have grown up during this period without achieving literacy would have been greatly reduced, and the record of rising literacy would be substantially better.

But the most acute disadvantages that we can now see resulting from the failure of fertility to fall in Mexico during the *last* 20

[7] R. B. Zajoric, "Family Configuration and Intelligence," *Science*, April 16, 1976, pp. 227–235.

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years are the built-in difficulties that the past continuation of high fertility makes inevitable in the development of the Mexican population during the *next* 20 years. Since the persons who will be over 15 fifteen years from now are already born, and since any reduction in fertility is likely to occur gradually, we can foresee the size of the population over 15 in 1995 with some confidence. Mortality rates are already quite low and further declines in mortality will have only the modest effect of slightly accelerating the increase in the population above age 15. We can foresee then, with little margin of uncertainty, that there will be more than twice as many persons over 15 twenty years from now as today.

One of the more intractable problems in designing development programs for rapidly growing low-income countries is the provision of adequate employment opportunities for the increasing population at the ages at which participation in economic activity is at its peak. Modern technology, which offers the potential of much greater productivity for the labor force, often requires disappointingly modest additional inputs of manpower in countries where unemployment and underemployment are already at distressing levels. Rapid increases in output, both in agriculture and in industry, can often be attained with only slight increases in the number of workers involved. In recent years, as the worsening international economic situation has reduced the demand for goods in international trade, the precarious nature of job opportunities in many less-developed countries, including Mexico, has become evident. Estimates of unemployment in Mexico run as high as ten percent; and there is much underemployment (involuntary short hours, work at excessively low pay, work for which the employee is overqualified).

President López Portillo, in an address to the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population in August 1977, emphasized the problems, both for Mexico and the United States, of illegal migrants and noted their origin in the inadequate economic opportunities in Mexico. The number of persons aged 15-65 today would be almost the same if fertility had fallen in the past ten years, but the rate of increase would be less. It would surely be an easier prospect for those responsible for the development of the Mexican economy and society if the increase in the labor force in the next 20 years were expected to be only 60 percent, as would be the case if fertility had begun a substantial decline 20 years ago, rather than the actual prospect of an increase of 105–110 percent!

One of the principles that technical demography has to teach us

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is the principle of the momentum of population growth. This principle is illustrated by what I have just said about the inevitability of the growth of the adult population in Mexico in spite of any declines in fertility that may begin in the near future. The fact that fertility has remained high means that the recent cohorts of those born each year are twice as large as those born 20 years earlier. The passage of these enlarged cohorts through the successive years of life makes substantial future population growth inevitable, even if from now on, miraculously, Mexican parents were to bear a greatly reduced number of children. If fertility were to be cut in half in 25 years beginning today, and were then maintained at no more than 50 percent of current levels, the population of Mexico would still be multiplied by 11 in 150 years. Multiplication by 11 would mean about 660 million, which exceeds the present population of India. On the other hand, to imagine the unimaginable of 150 years more in which fertility was not reduced is to think about a population multiplied by nearly 250 (to reach some 15 billion) or nearly four times the present total population of the world.

These longer range calculations illustrate the undeniable point that the birth rate must eventually come down and come a long way down, if the low mortality that modern science and medicine can bring is to continue. What Hoover and I tried to show, and what I feel after this review is essentially correct, is that an immediate reduction in the birth rate also brings tangible advantages. Some potential advantages have already been lost because no reduction was achieved in the past two decades. Further postponement of the reduction that must occur sooner or later means more opportunities passed up, and worsening of some difficult long-range problems. No one need worry about too small a future population. Even with much lower fertility, the population of Mexico will reach very substantial size in the not very distant future.

V

What is the difference between the situation today and 20 years ago? Mexico is richer, has much larger industrial and agricultural output, per capita as well as total; it is much more urbanized, and literacy is more common. But the population is twice as large, unemployment is more acute, and the labor force is growing more rapidly. It requires much more investment to maintain adequate employment and productivity for a rapidly growing labor force than for one growing more slowly. It may be even

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harder now than during the past two decades to attain a level of investment sufficient to supply productive employment.

One important difference between the mid-1970s and the mid-1950s is in the attitude toward population among Mexico's leaders. Hoover and I were very cordially received in 1956, but our ideas found a less hospitable reception. Now the advantages of a lower birth rate are widely perceived. In 1974 a constitutional provision was adopted asserting that, "Every person has the right to decide in a free, responsible, and informed manner the number and spacing of his or her children." There is now a National Council of Population in the Ministry of the Interior, and governmental as well as private programs for the promotion of family planning.

Finally, it appears that the birth rate has begun to go down. The number of registered births indicate that the rate has fallen from 44 per thousand to perhaps 40 per thousand in the last three or four years. Because births in Mexico are registered after a delay, some of the apparent decline may be spurious. However, to some extent the drop is very likely genuine. Sober estimates indicate that in 1975 nearly 10 percent of women aged 15–49 were clients of one of the public or private family-planning programs.

It is not always easy to make available the information and facilities that can accelerate a decline in fertility. But the magnitude of the resources that might be devoted to such a program are not great. President Johnson was persuaded to insert in one of his speeches a statement that one dollar spent on the reduction in fertility in a high-fertility population was better than 20 dollars devoted to general development. Professor Etienne van de Walle, of the University of Pennsylvania, says this statement is wrong. What is true is that 20 dollars spent on development are more effective if one of them is devoted to a population program. In the long run no country with very high fertility can afford to ignore it.

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Eduard Mark

THE QUESTION OF CONTAINMENT: A REPLY TO JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

In the July 1977 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, which marked the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance in its pages of George F. Kennan's famous "X" article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," John Lewis Gaddis ambitiously attempted to resolve once and for all the seemingly interminable controversy that has surrounded Kennan's call for containment ever since that first public enunciation. Diplomatic historians doubtless noted with interest that Professor Gaddis contends, quite categorically, that the retrospective elucidation of containment found in the first volume of Kennan's *Memoirs* is wholly satisfactory with respect to what have been far and away its most controversial features: to wit, the assertions that the policy was "political" rather than "military," and that it was to be cautiously implemented within strictly defined geographical limits rather narrower than had commonly been supposed.

The burden of this essay is that Kennan's belated apologia was misleading, and that Gaddis errs in his reconstruction of containment as regards the crucial questions of its means and scope. For neither in life itself nor in Kennan's postwar writings can "political" and "military" measures be so sharply distinguished as the onetime policymaker's reminiscences suggest. And, while containment was certainly no rationale for uninhibited global intervention, fundamental objectives and concerns of the policy tended to promote a broader interventionism than Kennan admits or Gaddis realizes.[1]

Professor Gaddis bases his reconstruction of containment in some measure on Kennan's denial that communist ideology was a "determinant of Soviet policy." While probably not without some effect on the Soviet leadership's perceptions of political realities, communism was essentially a façade: domestically it provided a legitimizing myth for a usurping regime; in the realm of foreign affairs it cloaked Russian "national interests" with the appearance of beneficent purpose and made willing stooges of gullible foreign revolutionaries. Disposing of ideology as a "determinant," however, raises an obvious question that Gaddis does not really answer: How then did Kennan account for Soviet expansionism? He states only that the diplomat believed that the Soviet leaders felt toward the West a deep hostility that sprang from a sense of "insecurity," itself the product of Russia's unhappy past and their own conspiratorial backgrounds. Presumably, therefore, the object of Soviet expansionism was security.

[1] John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," *Foreign Affairs* July 1977, pp. 873–887. Kennan's explanation of containment may be found in his *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 354–367.

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This rendering of Kennan's portrayal of Soviet motives is not so much incorrect as it is incomplete—so incomplete that the flavor of Kennan's warnings about Soviet expansionism is lost along with some of the dimensions of containment. If, for example, a desire for national security explained Russian actions, one might reasonably conclude that a tier of buffer states constituted the limit of the U.S.S.R.'s hegemonic aspirations. But the apostle of containment was most explicit that the Soviet objective was "world revolution," "the destruction of capitalism everywhere," and that the United States itself was menaced by "a great political force" intent upon its "destruction."[2]

Had he taken his own advice and delved deeper into the documents he produces as a *deus ex machina* to redeem Kennan's *Memoirs* and to prove that the "X" article was not a "definitive statement of containment" (as though any historian of the last 20 years or so had attempted to analyze that policy without recourse to other documents), Gaddis would have seen that, in Kennan's estimation, the "insecurity" that afflicted Stalin and his henchmen was of a very special type. It was the product not only—indeed not so much—of Russian history and the personal backgrounds of its leaders as of the dictatorial form of government they had imposed on a long-suffering people. This latter anxiety had a very dire consequence for other nations: because of it Soviet totalitarianism was the functional equivalent, the analogue, of classical world revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, quite without regard to whether Stalin took that doctrine seriously or not.

Until early 1946, Kennan explained Soviet expansionism much as Gaddis states that he did: he traced it to Russia's traditional sense of vulnerability, exacerbated by Marxist suspicions, although thinking it "questionable" that ideology animated "to any appreciable degree the power of the Kremlin."[3] Insofar as domestic imperatives bore upon Soviet aggressiveness, it was probably in that Stalin's heavy reliance on the specter of "capitalist encirclement" to justify his dictatorship precluded any reliance upon collective security arrangements such as the United Nations, lest there be created the appearance of a community of interest between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois states.[4]

But with his famous "Long Telegram" of February 22, 1946, Kennan began to argue that Soviet totalitarianism imbued Soviet expansionism with potentially unlimited ambitions. He wrote that the Soviet hierarchy sensed that its rule was "relatively fragile in its psychological foundations, unable to withstand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries." The Soviet Union, therefore, sought "security only in patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival power, never in compacts or compromises with it."[5] In the unsent letter to Walter Lippmann cited by Gaddis, Kennan stated explicitly that Soviet tyranny was threatened by the existence of freedom anywhere:

[2] George F. Kennan, "Current Problems of Soviet-American Relations," May 9, 1947, George F. Kennan Papers (hereinafter cited Kennan Papers) at the Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey. See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

[3] *Ibid.*, "Russia—Seven Years Later," pp. 519–520; *ibid.*, "Russia's International Position at the Close of the War with Germany," p. 537. In the same volume, see "Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 22, 1946," p. 533.

[4] See, for example, *ibid.*, "Russia—Seven Years Later," pp. 517–518 and Kennan to James F. Byrnes, October 4, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945* (hereinafter cited *FRUS/1945)*, V, Washington: GPO, 1967, pp. 888–891.

[5] Kennan, *op. cit.*, "Telegraphic Message of February 22, 1946," p. 550. Kennan stated that Czarist absolutism had been subject to the same compulsion—a token of his essentially unideological analysis.

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> It is the Russians, not we, who cannot afford a world half slave and half free. The contrasts implicit in such a world are intolerable to the fictions on which their power rests. *The final establishment of communist principles can only be universal.* It assumes a Stygian darkness. If one ray of light of individual dignity or inquiry is permitted, the effort must ultimately fail.[6]

In short, while the security of *Russia as a state* could be assured by a limited sphere of influence, the security of the *Soviet totalitarian system* required the subjugation of as much of the world as possible to dictatorial controls approximating those in the Soviet Union.

On March 15, 1948, Kennan warned Secretary of State George C. Marshall that a Russian invasion of Western Europe might be imminent. While he had previously supposed that the Soviets would avoid a "military contest" with the United States, the recent coup in Czechoslovakia had led him to revise that estimate. It now appeared that they might resort to outright conquest, at once lured by the prospect of an easy victory and driven by the fear that there could be no final consolidation of their position in Eastern Europe as long as there remained an independent "Western civilization" to act as an economic and political lodestone for the peoples of that region—a clear application of his thesis that ultimately the maintenance of totalitarian control required the elimination of all that furnished a basis for invidious comparison.[7]

Ordinarily, Kennan bade his countrymen "distinguish what is indeed progressive social doctrine from the rivalry of a foreign political machine which has appropriated and abused the slogans of socialism."[8] Occasionally, however, he spoke of Soviet expansionism as though it were ideologically motivated because it was rhetorically effective to do so and because his analysis amounted to the same thing in a practical sense. Thus he warned one audience that the Soviet objective was "world revolution," but added that this early Bolshevik objective had been retained because "for reasons too intricate to go into here, it has become closely associated with internal political conditions in the Soviet Union; and the men in the Kremlin could not depart from it, even if they wished to."[9] (The "X" article is to a degree an example of Kennan's resorting to ideological rhetoric.[10]) Gaddis has, in short, small warrant for distinguishing Kennan from those who used communist ideology as a "predictive instrument" and thus presented the "Soviet threat in global terms."

[6] Unsent letter to Walter Lippmann (emphasis added), April 6, 1948, Kennan Papers. This argument is strongly stated in another document found in Kennan's Papers, "Foreign Aid in the Framework of National Policy," November 10, 1949. See also George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1951, p. 114. One observer noted that in conversation Kennan "talks sparingly of democracy and communism. . . . He bases his thinking on the 'profound differences between the liberal and the totalitarian concepts of human society'. . . . " Brooks Atkinson, "America's Global Planner," *New York Times Magazine*, July 13, 1947, p. 9.

[7] Kennan to George C. Marshall, March 15, 1948, *FRUS/1948*, III, Washington: GPO, 1974, pp. 848–849. It will be instructive to compare this cable with Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, p. 400.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

[9] "Current Problems," *supra*, footnote 2.

[10] See, for example, George F. Kennan ("X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, p. 574 and p. 582. The "X" article also stresses the implications of the Soviet political system for the U.S.S.R.'s external relations at pp. 569–571. Upon close examination, all of Kennan's references to Soviet "dogma" stress its role as a "Figleaf" for motives quite unrelated to world revolution. The emphasis placed upon ideology in so much writing about Kennan—and the early cold war generally—is the product of hindsight, affected by later events.

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II

It is safe to say that nothing in Kennan's *Memoirs* has inspired more skepticism than the disclaimer that he had envisioned "not the containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."[11] "Political" and "military" are not often—*pace* Clausewitz—opposed in such fashion with respect to international relations, and one must suppose that Kennan thought that the Soviet threat was of an unusually pacific nature for this blunt juxtaposition to be warranted. Professor Gaddis certainly does. He writes that Kennan believed fears of a Soviet attack "groundless," and then blithely quotes a highly equivocal statement the diplomat made in October 1947 to the effect that ". . . as things stand today, it is not Russian military power which is threatening us, it is Russian political power. . . . If it is not entirely a military threat, I doubt it can be effectively met entirely by military means. . . ."

In point of fact, the assertion that Kennan believed that the Soviet threat was solely "political" in a sense opposed to "military" flies in the face of much documentary evidence. And the statement that containment was "political" in a similar sense presupposes, as we shall see, a very special definition of that word. Kennan was a consistent advocate of "a powerful and impressive military establishment, commensurate with the responsibilities we are forced to bear in the life of the world community."[12] Statesmen, to be sure, value military strength as a matter of course. But Kennan's advocacy also proceeded from a very specific postulate: that overt aggression by the armed forces of the Soviet Union was possible in certain circumstances. (In the October 1947 statement quoted by Gaddis the emphasis should be placed on "today.")

In the late summer of 1946, President Truman's Special Counsel, Clark M. Clifford, and his assistant, George M. Elsey, prepared at the Chief Executive's request an evaluation of the cold war entitled "American Relations with the Soviet Union." Since its publication in the memoirs of the late Arthur Krock, this document has been contrasted by Gaddis and others with Kennan's "political" containment because of its conclusion that "the main deterrent to Soviet attack on our territory, or on areas vital to our security, will be the military power of this country."[13]

When the first draft of "American Relations with the Soviet Union" was completed in September 1946, a copy was sent to Kennan for his comments. "I think the tone is excellent," he replied, "and I have no fault to find with it." He endorsed with particular emphasis the report's call for the development of nuclear and biological weapons, adding that it was "important this country be *prepared* to use them if need be, for the mere fact of such preparedness may prove to be the only deterrent to Russian aggressive actions and in this sense the only sure guarantee of peace." (At his suggestions these words were included in the final draft.[14]) Kennan also warned that when the Soviets

[11] Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, p. 358.

[12] George F. Kennan, "The International Situation," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XXI, September 5, 1949, p. 324. Kennan said on one occasion, ". . .I think we should follow the classic advice of Theodore Roosevelt: to speak softly and carry a big stick," "Current Problems," *supra*, footnote 2.

[13] "American Relations with the Soviet Union," in Arthur C. Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line*, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1948, p. 477. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 322–323.

[14] Kennan to Clark M. Clifford (Kennan's emphasis), September 16, 1946, George M. Elsey Papers at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, Box 63. This memorandum is not signed by Kennan but is identified as his by a marginal notation in Elsey's handwriting. Mr.

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developed atomic weapons they "would not hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by so doing they thought they might materially improve their own power position in the world."[15]

Kennan thought war unlikely not because of the intrinsically "political" character of Soviet expansionism, but because the Soviets were "still weaker by far than the capitalist world" and understood that "if they were to become involved with a superior force, it might lead to catastrophe for them."[16] His assurance on this score was far from complete, however, as the March 1948 warning to Secretary of State Marshall unmistakably shows. Moreover, while American military strength might deter overt Soviet aggression, it also redirected Soviet expansionism into other channels. Kennan warned that insofar as the U.S.S.R. was deterred from open aggression, it would seek to realize its hegemonic designs covertly through the subversive manipulation of foreign communist parties and allied and duped groups of every description. He often epitomized Soviet policy by stating that it sought "a maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility," and from this expectation derived the second, *active* use he foresaw for military power: its role in containing indirect Soviet aggression.[17]

In his *Memoirs* Kennan provides a definition of the "political" threat he perceived. First in his columns and then in his book *The Cold War,* Walter Lippmann assumed that the newly famous Mr. "X" was predicting a series of invasions by the Red Army. To explain his actual fears Kennan refers to a letter he wrote (but did not actually send) to the journalist in April 1948:

> The Russians don't want to invade anyone. It is not in their tradition. They tried it once in Finland and got their fingers burned. Above all, they don't want the open responsibility that official invasion brings with it. They far prefer to do the job politically with stooge forces. Note well: when I say politically that does not mean without violence. But it means that the violence is nominally *domestic,* not *international* violence.[18]

The difficulty with this passage (apart from reconciling it with the solemn warning to Marshall of not two months before) lies in the arbitrary use of "political" to describe Soviet-inspired civil or guerrilla wars. Even if this be allowed on the questionable grounds that the violence in question was "nominally domestic," it by no means follows that containment was to be exclusively "political" in any sense consonant with ordinary usage. While Kennan was of the opinion that "the use of U.S. regular forces to oppose the efforts of indigenous communist elements must generally be considered as a risky and profitless undertaking," he did not categorically rule out such intervention.[19]

In 1946, aware of the "imperative need for acceptance of limited warfare,"

Clifford and Mr. Elsey have kindly confirmed Kennan's authorship; Clifford to the author, June 10, 1975, enclosing Elsey to Clark M. Clifford, June 3, 1975. Compare this sentence with Krock, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

[15] Kennan to James F. Byrnes, September 30, 1945, *FRUS/1945*, V, pp. 884–886.

[16] Kennan to Clark M. Clifford, *op. cit.* See also "Telegraphic Message of February 22, 1946," *supra,* footnote 3, p. 558; Kennan, *supra,* footnote 10, p. 281.

[17] For a list of prospective Soviet agents, see *op. cit.*, "Telegraphic Message of February 22, 1946," pp. 554–555. For this characteristic of Soviet policy see "Russia's National Objectives," April 10, 1947, Kennan Papers; Kennan to James F. Byrnes, July 15, 1945, *FRUS/1945,* V, pp. 866–868; and Kennan to Carmel Offie, May 10, 1946, *FRUS/1946,* V, Washington: GPO, 1969, pp. 555–556.

[18] Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950,* p. 361 (Kennan's emphasis), and pp. 219–220.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

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Kennan began to urge the creation of "small, compact, alert forces, capable of delivering at short notice effective blows in limited theaters of operation far from our own shores."[20] Succeeding years showed the uses he envisioned for the "alert forces." In December 1947 (if we may trust a rapporteur's notes) he contemplated the use of American forces in Greece.[21] Four months later, in any event, he unequivocally advocated military intervention in Italy. Greatly worried by the prospect of a communist victory in the forthcoming elections, Kennan proposed that the ostensibly independent Italian government "outlaw" the Communist Party. The civil war sure to result would give the United States

> grounds for the reoccupation of the Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.[22]

Kennan also urged intervention in Korea, and regarded American unpreparedness for that conflict as proof of the need for "alert forces."[23] In a magazine article of 1951, moreover, he directly linked Korea with containment, writing that the "X" article of four years before had foreseen just such attacks as that on South Korea. This is a claim that may well be believed, for as Kennan had warned in the 1940s that the Soviets would seek "maximum power" with "minimum responsibility" through the use of "stooge forces," so his contemporary judgment on the Korean War was that, seeing an opportunity for expansion "at relatively little risk to themselves," they had unleashed their "Korean puppets."[24]

There was undeniably a "political" aspect to containment. Kennan was an author of the Marshall Plan and incontestably believed that improved socioeconomic conditions were of the greatest importance in fostering resistance to Soviet expansionism.[25] But as he himself wrote, "The fiber of political resistance among our allies to Moscow Communist pressure will be deeply affected by the extent to which they continue to feel themselves secure in the military sense."[26] "Political" measures alone, however, would neither deter Soviet invasion nor quell armed subversion. Indeed, given the peculiar susceptibilities of Soviet totalitarianism, successful "political" containment might, insofar as it created viable democracies, even prompt Soviet aggression in one form or another. (Kennan's March 1948 warning to Marshall should be recalled in this regard.) It was necessary, therefore, to contain the Soviets "*both militarily and politically.*"[27]

[20] *Ibid.* See also Kennan's address to the National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, January 23, 1947, Kennan Papers.

[21] Memorandum of conversation by John D. Jernegan, December 26, 1947, *FRUS/1947*, V, Washington: GPO, 1971, pp. 466–469.

[22] Kennan to George C. Marshall, March 15, 1948, *FRUS/1948*, III, pp. 848–849.

[23] Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, p. 312.

[24] George F. Kennan, "Let Peace Not Die of Neglect," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 25, 1951, p. 41.

[25] See, for example, Kennan to George C. Marshall, May 23, 1947, enclosing "Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe: Views of the Policy Planning Staff," *FRUS/1947*, III, Washington: GPO, 1972, pp. 223–230; Kennan, *supra*, footnote 10, pp. 581–582; "Telegraphic Message of February 22, 1946," *supra*, footnote 3, p. 559, and "Current Problems," *supra*, footnote 2.

[26] George F. Kennan, "Is War with Russia Inevitable?," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XXII, February 20, 1950, p. 271.

[27] George F. Kennan transcript of lecture to State Department personnel, September 17, 1946, Kennan Papers (emphasis added).

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III

Arguments about the scope of containment admit of less precision than those about the means since they concern questions of degree rather than of kind. It may be said, however, that Gaddis takes in a rather literal way the impression Kennan seeks to give in his *Memoirs* that containment, as originally conceived, was precisely circumscribed in a geographical sense. Gaddis adduces several arguments in favor of a "narrow" containment, none of which is compelling. Correctly observing that Kennan distinguished between communism and Soviet expansionism, Gaddis assumes that containment had a limited purview because it was directed at the latter and not necessarily at radical movements drawing their inspiration from the former. This conclusion, however, does not follow because, as we have seen, Kennan deemed the ambitions of Soviet expansionism essentially unlimited and argued that they would work through the many radical movements around the world whose allegiance the Soviet Union commanded. In opposing that expansionism, therefore, American policy would at times inevitably have to oppose radical movements, however tolerant of left-wing ideology it might be in principle.

Professor Gaddis also notes that Kennan appreciated that American resources were finite and that he doubted the need for containment "beyond the reach of Soviet military or police power" because he thought it unlikely that a communist regime could long survive without direct Russian support or that if one did it would willingly remain a tool of Soviet imperialism.

The first of these arguments really tells us little since any policy must be limited necessarily by the means available to implement it, and it is not shown that Kennan believed American resources to be more limited than did other policymakers.[28] The second argument overlooks the simple facts that the Soviet Union is by far the largest nation in the world, sprawling as it does over Europe and Asia, and that clearly a great deal of territory falls within its "reach"—even when one exempts East and Southeast Asia (including China) from the purview of containment, as Kennan did in 1948.[29] His alarmed reaction to the prospect of an electoral victory by the Italian Communists, even then the most independent in Western Europe (thanks to the intellectual legacy of Antonio Gramsci and the leadership of Palmiro Togliatti), suggests that in practice Kennan was not prepared to gamble on either the viability or the autonomy of communist governments. It is arguable that before Tito's final June 1948 break with Moscow, Italy could be regarded as within "the reach of Soviet military or police power." But in that case the Italian episode must be regarded as an example of how much territory that reach encompassed.

At first reading the most convincing of Gaddis' arguments for a "limited" containment is the undeniable fact that in 1948 Kennan argued that the principal task before American foreign policy was to preserve from Soviet control the as yet non-communist major industrial regions: Great Britain, the Rhine Valley, and Japan. A moment's reflection, however, will suggest that it by no means follows that a policy designed to protect those regions was necessarily to be implemented in or even near them. (Gaddis assumes that it

[28] Gaddis notes, for example, that Kennan thought it beyond this country's ability to deal with China effectively. But this was also the dominant belief in the Truman Administration. See, for example, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: Signet Books, 1970, pp. 463–465 and pp. 400–403.

[29] George F. Kennan, "Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy," September 17, 1948, Kennan Papers.

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does, and describes containment as "a limited application of effort in a few key locations.") The most obvious objection to such an inference is that modern industrial societies (particularly those of the three regions mentioned) are highly dependent upon the natural resources of the underdeveloped world. We have, of course, had this fact rudely called to our attention in recent years, but it was no less appreciated during and after the Second World War, as evidenced by Allied relations in Iran, the Anglo-American rivalry in Saudi Arabia or State Department opposition to the recognition of Israel. (Kennan himself referred to the dependence of Western Europe on Middle Eastern oil in the document Gaddis cites to support his point about Kennan's emphasis on the industrial areas.[30])

Even disregarding the obvious facts of economic dependence, containment could be restricted to the major industrial regions only if at least one of two propositions were true: that Kennan believed Soviet expansionism would be directed only against those areas and/or that he thought the United States might with impunity ignore Soviet thrusts elsewhere. But both are demonstrably false. In 1946 he warned that the Soviets would seek to weaken Western influence in colonial and backward areas in the belief that "insofar as the policy is successful there will be created a vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration." Later the same year he wrote that the Russians planned to make Turkey "a puppet state, which will serve as a springboard for the domination of the eastern Mediterranean."[31] Kennan plainly thought these challenges could not be ignored. In 1947, for example, he limited containment to "highly strategic areas" where the victory of communism would have serious consequences for the United States, but spoke of backward Greece in the same breath as Germany.[32]

There were several reasons why Kennan's concept of strategic importance embraced underdeveloped countries. He greatly feared, first of all, the moral consequences of communist victories. He supported the Truman Doctrine on the grounds that the fall of Greece and Turkey would facilitate Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Soviet gains there, he argued, might propel the communist parties of Western Europe into power and drive England into neutrality.[33] As we have seen, in 1948 he advocated intervention in Italy with the argument that a communist electoral victory would produce panic in the surrounding areas. His reasons for supporting the intervention in Korea were similar.[34] Gaddis is not unaware of this psychological "domino theory" but describes it as an "unanticipated difficulty" that arose from the need to calm the fears of those peoples in whom containment sought to instill a sense of self-confidence. His failure to understand that it was an intrinsic part of Kennan's conception of strategic importance (which was never narrowly geographical), coeval with containment itself, is surprising because he correctly stresses "the extent to which Kennan's strategy relied upon psychology."

It is also interesting to note that there are indications that during 1949 and

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] "Telegraphic Message of February 22, 1946," *supra,* footnote 3, p. 553 and p. 555; Kennan to Clark M. Clifford, September 6, 1946, Elsey Papers.

[32] George F. Kennan, "Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy after Moscow," May 6, 1947, Kennan Papers.

[33] George F. Kennan, "Comments on the National Security Problem," March 28, 1947, Kennan Papers.

[34] Kennan to George C. Marshall, March 15, 1948, *FRUS/1948,* III, pp. 848–849; *Memoirs: 1925–1950,* p. 486.

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1950 Kennan moved away from his emphasis of 1948 on the importance of the major industrialized regions toward a less discriminating conception of geographical importance. In 1948 he viewed the prospect of a communist victory in China with relative equanimity, but in August 1949 he described the impending triumph of Mao Tse-tung as "a catastrophe not only for the people of China but for the prospects for stability and peace throughout the Far East."[35] The following November he described at some length the conditions under which the United States should extend aid to nations imperiled by Soviet expansionism without mentioning any test of strategic importance.[36] And in February 1950 he warned that if the Soviets succeeded

> by means short of war, in bringing under their influence the remaining non-Communist countries of Europe and Asia, our security would be more subtly (but *perhaps as dangerously) undermined than by an atomic attack on our territory*. For the world balance of power would then be turned, at least temporarily, against us.

Therefore, Kennan concluded, the United States "must continue the policy of throwing its weight into the balance *wherever there are relatively good chances* that it will be effective in preventing the further spread of the power of international communism."[37]

Furthermore, one of the fundamental purposes of containment militated against basing the policy upon a purely geopolitical foundation. Kennan maintained that the "possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined." Indeed, the United States had it

> in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate . . . and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.[38]

In part, the mellowing or destruction of Soviet power was to be encompassed by demonstrating the viability of the American way of life, by giving the lie to the "keystone of Communist philosophy," the belief in the "palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world."[39] But it was also to be accomplished by frustrating Soviet expansionism—which Kennan likened to a "fluid stream which moves wherever it is permitted to move"—"indefinitely."[40] He argued in 1947 that

> if you could start rolling back the international Communist movement today, if you could bring about a set of circumstances where they are not making the first downs but where somebody else was making the first downs time after time against them, I

[35] "The International Situation," *supra*, footnote 12.

[36] "Foreign Aid in the Framework of National Policy," *supra*, footnote 6.

[37] Kennan, *supra*, footnote 26, p. 270 (emphasis added). For a less explicit expression of what appears to be the same thought, see George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 5–6.

[38] Kennan, *supra*, footnote 10, p. 582.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 581.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 575 and pp. 581–582.

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> think you might see a general crumbling of Russian influence and prestige which would carry beyond . . . the satellite countries, and into the heart of the Soviet Union itself. Now, that is why I feel what we are trying to do in the case of Greece and Turkey is of such vital importance, because if it is successful, it is going to have that type of effect.[41]

This aspect of containment, it will be observed, is mentioned neither in Kennan's *Memoirs* nor in Gaddis' article. The reasons for the omission in the one and the oversight in the other are, it may be presumed, one and the same: insofar as containment was intended as an indirect assault on the Soviet system through the constant frustration of the Soviet drive for universal dominion it had a purpose that transcended the importance of specific areas. It could not consequently be limited to those areas.

It is in fact highly probable that Kennan's indignant insistence that containment was not open-ended stems not so much from limits inherent in the policy itself as from the faith he once had in the capacity of containment to exacerbate certain fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet system. These were, as Gaddis notes, serious. They included the problem of succession after Stalin's death, a demoralized population, pervasive economic incompetence, and the problems of holding in submission the more civilized peoples of Eastern Europe. At one point in 1945 Kennan permitted himself to believe that "another five or ten years should find Russia overshadowed by those clouds of civil disintegration that darkened the Russian sky at the outset of the century."[42] In his unsent letter of 1948 to Lippmann he was at pains to refute the argument that "containment was a passive, negative policy which, even if successful, would solve nothing and would oblige us to remain indefinitely, armed to the teeth, trying to defend a long series of over-extended positions. . . ." He mentioned, however, *not one* of the limitations he had previously discussed in connection with the policy, rather writing that he was tried by the assertion that containment meant indefinite and indeterminate confrontation,

> because I thought I had pointed out, in the X article, that the Russians, too, are made of flesh and blood; that time has a habit of running out on them, just as it does on other people; and that we had good reason to hope that some of the internal contradictions of their own system would eventually catch up with them. . . .

It was not necessary, Kennan continued, "to draw up any program for the defeat of Soviet power, if we can only be successful in the policies we are now pursuing. The Russians will defeat themselves."[43]

IV

Containment, in summary, was partially "political" in that Kennan understood that pervasive socioeconomic discontent was fertile soil for communist subversion. But it was also military in that he believed that the polymorphous impulses of Soviet expansionism could, as it were, be channeled into "containable" subversion only as long as the superior power of the United States assured the failure of overt aggression. It was equally so because Kennan expected the

[41] "Russia's National Objectives," *supra*, footnote 17. See also the transcript of the discussion following this lecture.

[42] "Russia's International Position at the Close of the War with Germany," in Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, p. 535.

[43] Unsent letter to Walter Lippmann, April 6, 1948, Kennan Papers.

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local minions of Soviet expansionism to resort, as in Greece and Korea, to the "nominally domestic" violence of insurrection and civil war and thus advocated armed intervention where indigenous resistance was unequal to the task.

Kennan was also of the opinion that the boundless ambitions of Soviet totalitarianism would be responsible for, or at least seek to take advantage of, a goodly portion of the world's revolutionary ferment. This expectation, together with his concern for the world balance of power, his fear of the psychological consequences of Soviet successes, and his belief that the constant frustration of Soviet expansionism would promote desirable changes in the U.S.S.R., tended in practice to erode his reservations about a policy of broad purview.

John Lewis Gaddis Responds

Eduard Mark's rejoinder to my article calls to mind a "perhaps apocryphal" story, told by David Hackett Fischer in his book, *Historians' Fallacies*, about a scientist "who published an astonishing and improbable generalization about the behavior of rats. An incredulous colleague came to his laboratory and politely asked to see the records of the experiments on which the generalization was based. 'Here they are,' said the scientist, dragging a notebook from a pile of papers on his desk. And pointing to a cage in the corner, he added, 'there's the rat.'"

It is easy to demonstrate that Kennan regarded the Soviet threat as *in part* a military problem. One can even find isolated instances in which he seemed to see such a threat as imminent, as Mark points out. Certainly, as I noted in my piece, Kennan believed military strength to be a prerequisite for negotiations with the Russians.[1] And Mark is quite correct in observing that he favored the development of small, compact forces, ready to conduct limited operations on short notice. Kennan was then and still is no pacifist: his model of an efficient military organization has long been the U.S. Marine Corps.

But to conclude from this that Kennan saw either containment or the problems that gave rise to it as *primarily* military, or even equally political *and* military, is to generalize from a set of what Fischer calls "lonely facts." For every instance in which Kennan called for a military response to a military problem, one can find numerous instances in which he warned against precisely this kind of thinking. He repeatedly pictured the problem as a crisis of confidence brought on by a complex of political, economic, military and psychological difficulties, and called for an equally multifaceted response. The historian, it would appear, has a responsibility to generalize on the basis of representative and not atypical evidence. I am not sure what justifies Mark's selective emphasis on the military aspect of Kennan's thinking, at the expense of its other components.

This raises a second problem. Mark at several points credits me with having said things I did not say. For example, he writes that "the assertion that Kennan believed that the Soviet threat was solely 'political' in a sense opposed to 'military' flies in the face of much documentary evidence." But at no point in the article did I make that assertion. And the very quote Mark uses from Kennan to support his point in fact refutes it: "If it is not *entirely* a military threat, I doubt it can be effectively met *entirely* by military means." (Emphases added.)

[1] John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977, p. 880.

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There is another more serious example of selective quotation. Mark has me describing containment as "a limited application of effort in a few key locations" and assuming, on that basis, that it was to be implemented only in or near the regions containment was supposed to protect. But a glance at the complete sentence from which this passage was lifted conveys precisely the opposite impression: "It was not all that difficult, then, to slide from a belief that the balance of power required nothing more than a limited application of effort and a few key locations to a conviction that the balance could be maintained only by massive expenditures of energy in peripheral areas."[2] I find it difficult to be comfortable with a method of quotation that produces so substantial a distortion of the original context.

My point was that while Kennan in theory intended to apply containment on a selective basis, in practice he found this difficult to do. Mark argues that Kennan never intended to apply containment selectively. This is, I think, an argument from effect to intent. It derives the theory of containment from its admittedly imperfect implementation, not its original formulation. Why, one wonders, does Mark think Kennan talked at the time of the need for selective containment if he did not in fact believe in it? To deceive his colleagues within the government? To mislead future historians? In the absence of evidence to the contrary it would appear reasonable to accept the simplest explanation: that Kennan meant what he said.

Finally, I am at a loss to explain Mark's charge that I fail to mention as one aspect of containment the idea of rolling back the international communist movement. My article devoted several pages to that subject, concluding with the observation that "there was no contradiction between the concepts of 'containment' and 'liberation,' if by that latter term is meant the cautious encouragement of centrifugal tendencies within the international communist movement."[3] Containment was of course intended, as Mark says, "as an indirect assault on the Soviet system through the constant frustration of the Soviet drive for world dominion." But it does not follow from this that distinctions between vital and peripheral interests faded into insignificance; or that the United States was obliged to act wherever Soviet aggressiveness manifested itself; or that Kennan regarded action by the United States and its allies as the only means of frustrating Soviet ambitions. Mark himself quotes Kennan as proclaiming that it was not necessary "to draw up any program for the defeat of Soviet power, if we can only be successful in the policies we are now pursuing. The Russians will defeat themselves."

There is probably a certain amount of poetic justice involved in having an essay on misunderstandings of the "X" article misunderstood. I cannot help but feel, though, that a more careful reading of my piece would have eliminated much of the confusion. At the same time, I am indebted to Mark for including in his essay so many points that contribute to its own refutation.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 882.
[3] *Loc. cit.*

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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF THE NORTH PACIFIC. By Oran R. Young. New York: Nichols, 1977, 260 pp. $16.00.

Problems of collaboration and management will be at the heart of all international issues for the rest of this century. These two books are major efforts to grapple with these problems. The Brookings book takes up the question of equitable sharing of scarce resources in the oceans, in the frequency spectrums and in climate control. In an exceptionally well-integrated study by four prominent students of international affairs, an imaginative set of proposals is buttressed by a solid, readable analysis. Professor Young, in his pioneering theoretical case study, indicates how resource management can be developed at regional levels to provide benefits for all participants. No future examination of international institution-making should fail to cite this remarkable work.

CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION. By Julius Stone. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, 234 pp. $14.50.

A well-known international legal scholar painstakingly analyzes the recent Consensus Definition of Aggression adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1974. He provides a logically and historically compelling argument that a disputable principle of jurisprudence can also be a central political stake in conflicts between rich and poor societies, oil exporters and importers, and the Soviet bloc and Western governments.

ORGANIZING FOR PEACE. By Clark M. Eichelberger. New York: Harper, 1977, 317 pp. $12.50.

A sometimes fascinating personal account of the role played by individuals, including the author, in the League of Nations and the founding of the United Nations. The observations by a former consultant on the role of consultants and other nonofficial individuals in the treatment of public issues by international agencies are especially rewarding.

THE SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING VALUES AND POLITICAL STYLES AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS. By Ronald Inglehart. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 482 pp. $30.00 (Paper, $9.95).

Inglehart's rich and graceful analysis documents the shift from material to

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quality-of-life values in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the revolution may be neither silent nor as permanent as Inglehart contends, it surely is a major factor in contemporary Western societies. However debatable some of its conclusions, the book is masterfully written and demonstrates that political science can be scientific, relevant and free of arcane jargon.

ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN WORLD. Edited by Milton J. Esman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 399 pp. $17.50.

While there are convincing reasons why ethnic conflicts have accompanied the processes of decolonization and state-building, there are only limited perspectives on why the politics of ethnicity have become so central to a number of industrial societies. Twelve case studies and three theoretical essays cover the most significant examples of the politics of ethnicity in Western Europe, Canada, and Yugoslavia. The diagnosis is more complete on the descriptive than on the explanatory level.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OIL IMPORT QUOTA. By Yoram Barzel and Christopher D. Hall. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977, 96 pp. $8.95.
MYTH, OIL AND POLITICS. By Charles F. Doran. New York: Free Press, 1977, 211 pp. $12.95.
THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL OIL POLITICS. By Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 389 pp. $16.50.
THE ARAB OIL WEAPON. By Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein. Leiden: Sijthoff/Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana, 1977, 370 pp. $27.50.
THE POLITICS OF CRUDE OIL PRICING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1970-1975. By Richard Chadbourn Weisberg. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977, 170 pp. $3.50 (Paper).

Neither governments nor analysts have found a way to meet the need to coordinate domestic and foreign energy policies, financial policies, and foreign policy in general. But efforts to understand the multifold political aspects of oil in the international system now abound. Barzel and Hall's short study attempts to analyze the entrepreneurial capacity of the domestic petroleum industry to evade restrictions imposed by import quotas and the effects of those quotas on market behavior and on the market's contours. Professor Doran's excursion into the political economy of oil is rich in observations and assessments. After examining carefully the central shibboleths surrounding international oil—the just price, the role of Israel in OPEC pricing, excessive profits, the role of consumer solidarity, the effects of divestiture, and OPEC durability—the author proposes a theory of co-dependence among consuming and producing nations on the one hand and the oil industry on the other. Similar conclusions are developed in Weisberg's study, which develops a model to explain bargaining between and among these three parties in the first half of this decade. Professor Klinghoffer and Paust and Blaustein are more narrowly focused. After analyzing the much-neglected political economy of state trading in oil by the Soviet government, Klinghoffer examines the domestic and geopolitical bases of the Soviet Union's international energy policies. Paust and Blaustein's book is a rich source for documents and commentaries on the political use of oil embargoes as an instrument of Arab governmental policy.

BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS. By Neil H. Jacoby, Peter Nehemkis and Richard Eells. New York: Macmillan, 1977, 294 pp. $12.95.

Three management school professors, with wide experience in government-business relations and corporate practices, provide an outstanding and readable study of the politics and economics of political payments abroad. Their mapping and classification of the extent of payments and current debates over them are followed by an original and convincing analysis of why payments are made and are criticized. The book concludes with a critique of all major proposals for reform and a sensible blueprint of how businesses, governments and interna-

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tional agencies can reduce bribery and extortion. The study is perhaps the most extensive and accessible work on this subject to date.

HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES 50, 1927–1977: LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANS UN MONDE EN MUTATION. By Jacques Freymond and others. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1977, 434 pp.

Twenty-one scholars associated with the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva provide essays in English or French in celebration of the Institute's 50th anniversary. Jacques Freymond's history of the Institute is followed by studies on education in international relations, world order models, international political economy, and international law. The essays reflect the uneven development of the Institute but also attest to its vitality and to the remarkable contributions it has helped generate in the analysis of major world problems.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Richard G. Head

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET STATE. By Marshal A. A. Grechko. Washington: U.S. Air Force, 1977, 349 pp. $3.20 (Paper).

A major statement of Soviet strategic military doctrine by the late Minister of Defense. (Original Russian version noted in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976.) The Soviet copyright agency required changes in this translation, deleting several hard-line statements and, for instance, substituting ones emphasizing the CPSU's "struggle to ban new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD POLITICS. By David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin and John H. Barton. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1977, 370 pp. $10.95 (Paper, $6.95).

Four authors each analyze a different nuclear "regime" which might govern the role of nuclear weapons in the 1980s. Mandelbaum argues strongly for preservation of existing U.S.-Soviet mutual deterrence and nuclear predominance, and Garwin for a significant reduction in the role of nuclear weapons—even if this requires unilateral restraints. Barton discusses a nuclear-free world, but discounts its likelihood, and Gompert analyzes the consequences of increased nuclear competition and proliferation. Garwin's argument is the most intriguing, but in the end Mandelbaum is the most convincing. As a whole, the book provides the best insight yet into the tremendous complexities of the current nuclear balance and the few alternatives our policymakers face for the 1980s.

Jan Lodal

THE LAST SIX MONTHS: THE FIRST AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA'S FINAL BATTLES WITH HITLER'S ARMIES IN WORLD WAR II. By General S. M. Shtemenko. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 436 pp. $10.00.

General of the Army Shtemenko's second book on the official Soviet version of World War II campaigns, this one almost exclusively from the point of view of the General Staff, or Stavka. Some insight is gained into the Russian high command, but no surprises.

SOVIET ARMED FORCES REVIEW ANNUAL: VOL. I, 1977. Edited by David R. Jones. Gulf Breeze (Fla.): Academic International Press, 1977, 277 pp. $29.50.

This is an attempt to present in a standard format all basic relevant Soviet public information on military affairs. As a reference source the first volume

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has the strength of being well documented, but the quality is uneven, and subsequent volumes will have to be more current to be fully useful.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY: MYTH AND REALITY. By Eric Morris. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977, 150 pp. £5.95.

A light review of the heritage, buildup and foreign policy uses of the Soviet navy, including separate chapters on each of the four geographical fleets. The author, a lecturer in military and international affairs at Sandhurst, argues that the expansion of the Soviet navy is merely a reaction to American sea power and an attempt to develop a "sea-denial" capability.

THE JENNIFER PROJECT. By Clyde W. Burleson. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall 1977, 179 pp. $8.95.

A fascinating account of how the CIA contracted with Howard Hughes to build the Glomar Explorer to recover the remains of a Russian Golf-class nuclear submarine, sunk 17,500 feet down in the Pacific Ocean. Widely researched, the book reveals more about the technical details than about the policy background. The resultant story is part fact, part supposition, and part conjecture. Burleson maintains that, despite the tremendous expense and still-controversial results, the adventure was an intelligence coup.

ARMS, MEN, AND MILITARY BUDGETS: ISSUES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978. Edited by Francis P. Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 346 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

This second annual U.S. defense budget survey by the National Strategy Information Center is a straightforward hard-line approach to the military balance. Its conclusion—the U.S. needs to increase its dangerously inadequate investment in defense—is not new, but acquires more plausibility with each year of the Soviet military buildup. An especially good condensation of Soviet conventional war doctrine is included.

AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY: 4th ed. Edited by Lt. Colonel John E. Endicott and Major Roy W. Stafford, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, 619 pp. $22.50 (Paper, $7.95).

The new edition of the Air Force Academy's widely used volume continues to bring together the latest writings with the classic works in the field of national security. Articles by Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, Morton Halperin, Les Aspin, Graham Allison, and Samuel Huntington successfully span the worlds of scholarship and policymaking. Expanded sections include those on arms control, the policy process, and the impact of changing cultural values—including the issues of women's rights and unionization—on the role of the military in American society. Perhaps the best book of its kind in the field.

WOMEN AND THE MILITARY. By Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 134 pp. $7.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A study of the controversial role of women in the U.S. armed forces. The authors, one a former officer and the other still on active duty, point out that the major restrictions on recruitment and functions of women are not primarily legal but derive from current policies and preferences. The work, well organized and documented to the degree possible in this "soft" area of public policy, sharply marshals for debate both the practical issues—numbers, quality, trends, strength, aptitude—and the emotional issue—combat.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND STRATEGY MANAGEMENT: A STUDY IN DEFENSE POLITICS. By Douglas Kinnard. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977, 169 pp. $13.75.

THE WAR MANAGERS. By Douglas Kinnard. Hanover (N.H.): University Press of New England, 1977, 216 pp. $14.00.

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These are two very different books by a retired Army general who earned his Ph.D. from Princeton in 1973. The first is a good—but not great—study of Eisenhower's strategic policymaking, the thesis being that, contrary to popular belief, Eisenhower was a strong leader and manager. The second work provides the best view to date of the opinions of 108 Army generals who fought the Vietnam War. The generals' responses to standard questions were extremely varied, indicating an absence of the so-called military mind. The only consensus was on the quality of the South Vietnamese army and the role of the media. Three disturbing conclusions emerge: there was a complete breakdown in communications between top civilian and military leaders; the generals criticized the war's tactics extensively; and there was no mechanism for eliciting or considering the generals' dissent while they were on active duty.

GROUP CAPTIVES: THE RE-EDUCATION OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR 1945–48. By Henry Faulk. London: Chatto & Windus, 1977, 233 pp. £7.50.
STALAG U.S.A.: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF GERMAN POW'S IN AMERICA. By Judith M. Gansberg. New York: Crowell, 1977, 223 pp. $9.95.

At the Potsdam Conference the Allies adopted a policy to "denazify and democratize" German POWs. These books contrast two approaches to that policy: Britain's to denazify, the U.S. to democratize. Gansberg concentrates on U.S. Army archives and the administration side; she had only limited success in learning the prisoners' side. What emerges is a picture of a well-intentioned but formalistic attempt to "teach" American history and civics in an almost wholly political program. Faulk, the principal organizer of the British re-education program, emphasizes the human side—defining the problem as not primarily political but psychological, the re-establishment of the prisoners' sense of individual worth and group identity—and has produced a first-rate sociological study of men under stress.

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WAR: AMERICAN PLANS FOR POSTWAR DEFENSE, 1941–45. By Michael S. Sherry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 260 pp. $12.50.

This account owes much to previous works of Perry McCoy Smith and Vincent Davis. The thesis is a variation of revisionist military history: that World War II military and scientific leaders developed and propagated an "ideology of military preparedness" which fueled the arms race and diminished U.S. security through its misguided faith in American technology. Nevertheless, what emerges from the impressive archival research is a statement about the complexity and pitfalls of political-military planning.

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE AFRIKA CORPS. By Ronald Lewin. New York: Quadrangle, 1977, 197 pp. $10.00.

Military history at its analytical best, incorporating new information from electronic (code) intelligence. Lewin, previously a biographer of Rommel, attributes Afrika Korps success to four factors: leadership, technological superiority, standardization, and organizational improvisation. The work is flawed only by its relative neglect of the air battle.

TERRORISM. By Walter Laqueur. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, 264 pp. $15.00

Companion volume to his definitive *Guerrilla*. Laqueur concludes that terrorism is not simply an offshoot of guerrilla warfare, but is rooted in a different tradition. Eschewing extended descriptive commentary on recent terrorist activities, the author focuses instead on the more difficult—and more valuable—task, a systematic analysis of terrorist history, doctrine, sociology, patterns, motives and efficacy. Although one may disagree with the author's conclusion that it is publicity, not terrorism, which is on the increase, the book itself is bound to become a classic.

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THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: THE CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. Edited by Gerald O. Barney. New York: Crowell, 1977, 160 pp. $7.95 (Paper, $3.95).

This task force report sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is a short, action-oriented, policy-focused manifesto which attempts to draw together the major environmental issues and problems into one ready reference guide. The philosophy is a modified "limits to growth" approach, as opposed to Herman Kahn's more optimistic one; the editor is currently serving on the President's Council on Environmental Quality. The impact may be limited by the polemical style, but the work goes far to heighten sensitivities to the global implications of environmental issues.

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Donald R. Kelley. New York: Praeger, 1977, 245 pp.

One of the first approaches to a comparative study of national energy and environmental policies. The contributors, mostly young political scientists, comment on the variety of patterns in meeting the energy-environmental dilemma and the chaotic state of most nations' energy policies. Lacking an overall framework, the articles do not constitute a comparative analysis, but they do present important issues for policymakers.

CLIMATIC CHANGE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By Crispin Tickell. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1977, 78 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $3.95).

Although the politics of weather modification are well known—especially in the western U.S.—the issue of worldwide climatic change is only just beginning to be seriously discussed. This slim essay by a British diplomat describes recent theories of change—including man-made changes—and probes their economic and political implications. A first-rate inquiry into our collective future.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

WAR, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1939–1945. By Alan S. Milward. Berkeley: University of California Press, 409 pp. $12.95.

This remarkable book should be the standard work for a long time. A true comparative study, it relates the experience of all the main countries (and sometimes others) to a series of key issues that are deftly analyzed and not just described. In addition to the basics—production, consumption, food, finance and organization—the book deals with such famous themes as war as the bringer-of-growth and stimulus-to-technology, and such special questions as the exploitation of occupied areas and economic warfare. Throughout, Professor Milward of Manchester relates economics to strategy in an illuminating way. The final chapter on recontruction strikes an odd note by treating the crises that preceded the Marshall Plan as the death of wartime ideals and hopes.

THE FUTURE OF NONFUEL MINERALS. By John E. Tilton. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 113 pp. $8.95.

An excellent book that trenchantly analyzes all the key issues: depletion, shortages, cartels, investment, fluctuations and governmental policies.

GLOBAL FRACTURE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Michael Hudson. New York: Harper, 1977, 296 pp. $12.50.

An alliance of Europe and the Third World; statism replacing the market

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internationally with socialism resulting at home; a contraction of American income as the U.S. loses the ability to appropriate the output of the rest of the world. The case for these provocative prospects is based on some good and some poor arguments. The faults that many readers will find with Mr. Hudson's interpretation of the past and present should not blind them to the need to think seriously about a number of the possibilities he suggests for the future.

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By Joan Edelman Spero. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 326 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95).

In an excellent synthesis of an impressive amount of material, Professor Spero keeps a sharp focus on the political shaping of economic issues and takes a look at the uncertainties ahead.

THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. By Stephen D. Cohen. New York: Praeger, 1977, 208 pp.

A Department of International Commercial Policy, a presidential assistant and a Cabinet committee, plus reinforcement of the rest of the government, are recommended to cope better than the U.S. has done in the past with the increasing intricacies of issues that are foreign and domestic at the same time. The author worked on the staff of the Murphy Commission.

CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR CONTROL. Edited by Alexander K. Swoboda. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1976, 236 pp.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY REFORM. Edited by Robert Z. Aliber. Montclair (N.J.): Allanheld, Osmun, 1977, 270 pp. $21.00.

Two conferences on the indicated subjects with papers by excellent people.

ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDUSTRIAL STATES. By Wilfrid L. Kohl. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 246 pp. $18.00.

In these papers on seven countries, the European Community, North-South relations, and prospects for future management of the international economic system, there is good material for the comparative study of foreign economic policies.

EAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF MONEY AND FINANCE. By Jozef M. Van Brabant. New York: Praeger, 1976, 426 pp. $26.50.

One of the leading Western analysts of COMECON integration here digs most knowledgeably into the great difficulties of devising useful monetary and financial links among national economies.

WIRTSCHAFTS-KOOPERATION WEST-OST. By Albert Masnata. Diessenhofen: Ruegger, 1976, 190 pp. Swiss Fr. 28.

The Swiss specialist's review of experience and prospects in East-West economic relations is systematic and sensible. He proposes various improvements but is reserved about the possibilities of overcoming the fundamental difficulties.

EAST-WEST TRADE: MANAGING ENCOUNTER AND ACCOMMODATION. By the Atlantic Council Committee on East-West Trade. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 194 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

A balanced, detailed argument for a less restrictive American policy put forward by an experienced group. Some useful special studies are attached.

THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY. By William A. Wares. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 130 pp.

At a time when the dumping issue is alive again, this is a useful review—and some revision—of basic issues. But the author's efforts to refine the definition of dumping, while narrowing the field for American anti-dumping action, seems to involve contradictions even though each effort makes good sense separately.

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HOW THE OTHER HALF DIES: THE REAL REASONS FOR WORLD HUNGER. By Susan George. Montclair (N.J.): Allanheld, Osmun, 1977, 308 pp. (New York: Universe Books, distributor, $12.50; Paper, $4.95).

A lively analysis that puts most of the blame on agribusiness, the governments of the industrial countries and the elites of the developing world. The prescription is for change.

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE. By William Nelson Turpin. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 165 pp. $15.00.

In the course of showing that Western experts are right in their basic ideas about the Soviet trade system, this concise book makes excellent use of Soviet writings. Drawing on his experience in the U.S. Foreign Service, Turpin provides clear and sharp judgments on a wide range of key issues.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1977, 384 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $9.95).

The result of a 1975 workshop at M.I.T. Considering the talent assembled it is not surprising that this discussion should be lively and creative or that the participants—who include C. Fred Bergsten, Richard N. Cooper, D. Gale Johnson, Harry G. Johnson, Charles P. Kindleberger, among many others—have many disagreements.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By the Atlantic Council Working Group on the U.S. and the Developing Countries. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 150 pp. $14.00 (Paper, $5.95).

As rapporteur for a sizeable group of experienced people, a veteran American official, Edwin M. Martin, sets out a series of well-argued proposals covering aid, trade, coordination and the conduct of relations with developing countries. The meaning of these ideas is underlined by an interesting summary of how they differ from the received wisdom of the early 1960s.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY TANGLE. By Guillaume Guindey. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1977, 128 pp. $10.00.

A blend of Bretton Woods, limited floating, larger currency swaps, more cooperation among the leading financial countries and less special treatment for the dollar is the prescription offered by a former French official and onetime Director General of the Bank for International Settlements.

MULTINATIONALS, UNIONS, AND LABOR RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. Edited by Robert F. Banks and Jack Stieber. Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1977, 200 pp. $10.00.

There are many valuable facts and observations in this conference report. Unfortunately, they are accompanied by standard polemical junk from both labor and management and some weak academic surveys. An important subject continues to lack first-rate analysis.

MULTINATIONALS FROM SMALL COUNTRIES. Edited by Tamir Agmon and Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1977, 224 pp.

A good subject that is only spottily covered in seven papers. Highpoints are Swiss and Swedish experience and foreign direct investment by Latin American and other developing countries.

MEZHDUNARODNAIA KAPITALISTICHESKAIA TORGOVLIA (PROBLEMY I PERSPEKTIVY RAZVITIIA). By P. I. Khvoinik. Moscow: Mysl, 1977, 307 pp.

Economic and trade problems of the capitalist states as they face conditions of crisis in the 1970s and must cope with the increased power of the multinational

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monopolies, the advance of the scientific-technological revolution, the need for raw materials and the challenge of the developing countries. But the author of this well-conceived and documented though slanted book does envisage an expansion of capitalism's economic relations with the socialist world.

J.C.C.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON. VOL. VII: CONTINUING EDUCATION AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 1957–1961. Edited by Walter Johnson and others. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, 655 pp. $22.50.

This volume, in a monumental series, brings Adlai Stevenson through the 1960 election and to the eve of his final service at the U.N. Even his bread-and-butter letters are original and interesting.

ADLAI STEVENSON AND THE WORLD: THE LIFE OF ADLAI STEVENSON, VOL. II. By John Bartlow Martin. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 946 pp. $15.00.

The concluding volume of a loving and sometimes too detailed biography. Recommended for those who do not have the time to read the letters (see above).

TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER. By Maeva Marcus. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 400 pp. $14.95.

In April 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman announced the government's temporary seizure of the nation's steel mills in order to prevent a threatened strike that would cripple war production. The Supreme Court shortly thereafter denied that the President had the authority to so act. The mills were returned to the companies. Here is a first-rate account of those events.

CONFLICT AND CRISIS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S TRUMAN, 1945–1948. By Robert J. Donovan. New York: Norton, 1977, 473 pp. $12.95.

A lively, readable account of Truman's first term. The portrait is familiar—for Truman was not a misunderstood President—but many of the details come from recently opened files.

UNCERTAIN GREATNESS: HENRY KISSINGER AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Roger Morris. New York: Harper, 1977, 312 pp. $10.95.

The author, who served on the staff of the National Security Council, is a powerful writer and critic. Although he has deep reservations about aspects of Kissinger's performance, Morris admires his triumphs over the bureaucracy. The material on U.S. policy toward Africa is original and important.

TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW. By Morton H. Halperin and Daniel N. Hoffman. Washington: New Republic Books, 1977, 103 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $3.95).

After condemning the consequences of secrecy in the conduct of national security affairs, the authors elaborate a new system in which "whatever is needed for public debate must be made public. The burden must be on those who would keep a secret."

A RUMOR OF WAR. By Philip Caputo. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977, 346 pp. $10.00.

The author, now a foreign correspondent, fought in Vietnam as a Marine

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platoon leader in 1965–66. No one has recounted so well the combination of fear, pain, irrational euphoria, ferocity and boredom which filled the lives of combat soldiers. Any list of essential books on the American experience in Vietnam should include this memoir.

WHITE HOUSE WATCH: THE FORD YEARS: By John Osborne. Washington: New Republic Books, 1977, 314 pp. $11.95.

Osborne's commentaries, appearing originally in *The New Republic*, have lasting value.

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1978 BUDGET. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 443 pp. $11.95 (Paper, $4.95).

The eighth in this annual series contrasts the original Ford proposals for fiscal 1978 with the Carter budget, examines alternative strategies for achieving goals, and analyzes the technique of zero-based budgeting.

HONOR THE PROMISE: AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. By Robert F. Drinan, S. J. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 250 pp. $7.95.

A passionate pro-Zionist essay by the Massachusetts Congressman and Catholic priest. Father Drinan argues that anti-Semitism has been transformed in the Third World and the United Nations into anti-Zionism.

WALTER LIPPMANN. By Larry L. Adams. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977, 229 pp. $8.50.

A succinct and sympathetic introduction to Lippmann's life and thought. Adams emphasizes Lippmann's underlying consistency.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST. By Peggy Dennis. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1977, 300 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95). A FINE OLD CONFLICT. By Jessica Mitford. New York: Knopf, 1977, 352 pp. $10.00.

These books, describing the authors' lives in the American Communist Party, gain in interest when read together. Peggy Dennis, the widow of Party leader Eugene Dennis, is the daughter of Jewish immigrants from Russia; Jessica Mitford is the daughter of an English peer and one of *the* Mitford sisters. Dennis is sincere, passionate and informative about her own life and her husband's. The book concludes with her moving 1976 letter of resignation from the Party because of the narrow prejudices of the leadership. Mitford, never near the leadership, presents a rambunctious, often hilarious account of Party organization and disorganization.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE GOVERNMENT PARTY: ORGANIZING AND FINANCING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, 1930–1958. By Reginald Whitaker. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, 500 pp. $19.95.

Solid description and detailed analysis of the Liberal Party with careful attention to behavior at the provincial level. For the advanced student of Canadian affairs.

G.S.

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA. Edited by Barbara Johnson and Mark W. Zacher. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977, 387 pp.

Papers of superior quality on issues related to the seabed, fisheries, marine pollution, international straits, the Law of the Sea Conference, and enforcement

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policies. The Canadian government was slow to accord high priority to maritime issues in its foreign policy, but in the past decade has become a world leader in this area.

G.S.

ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICA. By Kalman H. Silvert. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977, 240 pp. $14.95.

These 15 essays, arranged by the author before his recent death to show the progression of his thought, may be taken as another memorial to his career. Silvert's principal concerns include the broad themes of nation and class, freedom and democracy, the nature and consequence of dependency, and the role of ideas in social and political behavior.

LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY. Edited by Harold Eugene Davis, John J. Finan and F. Taylor Peck. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977, 301 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

Little has been written in this area and with this broad an overview: the entire panorama of diplomatic relations from the viewpoint of Latin America itself, beginning in colonial times and continuing with the emergence of national policies, World War II, the cold war, alliances and integration.

MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE OIL CONTROVERSY, 1917–1942. By Lorenzo Meyer. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977, 367 pp. $19.95.

Previously untapped Mexican and U.S. archival materials are used in this study of economic and political dependency. In order to establish its authority, the leadership of the Mexican Revolution had to take control of the most dynamic economic sector, the oil industry. But ambiguity remains: after the disputes with U.S. business and the U.S. government were resolved—did dependency decline or increase?

THE NATIONALIZATION OF VENEZUELAN OIL. By James F. Petras, Morris Morley and Steven Smith. New York: Praeger, 1977, 175 pp. $22.50.

The nationalization of oil in Venezuela is analyzed in the context of the interaction of classes within the country, the responses of North American industry, and the policies of the U.S. government.

THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO COSTA RICA. By R. Peter DeWitt, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1977, 197 pp.

Utilizing dependency theory as a conceptual framework, the author examines the influence of U.S. national interests on the Bank, and the Bank's impact on Costa Rican development. An interesting study.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS. Edited by Thomas V. DiBacco. New York: Praeger, 1977, 122 pp.

Presidencies as institutions, the power of presidents, the significance of *caudillismo* and *personalismo*, the effects of U.S. policy, and party systems are the principal subjects of these six essays, four of which deal specifically with Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.

PERU. By Victor Alba. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 245 pp. $15.00.

A Spanish journalist and professor of political science traces in considerable detail the reasons for the emergence of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces in 1968 (including, among other reasons, the desire of younger officers for APRA-like programs but without public participation); the elements that slowly congealed impulses for change; and the revolution's demise in 1975, symbolized by the "coup within a coup."

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THE MILITARY COUP D'ÉTAT AS A POLITICAL PROCESS: ECUADOR, 1948–1966. By John Samuel Fitch. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, 243 pp. $15.00.

This analysis, academic in tone and substance, of the military role in the turbulent days of Velasco Ibarra and Carlos Arosemena, offers a theoretical model of the process of military decision-making in situations of political crisis.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ECUADOR. By R. J. Bromley. London: Latin American Publications Fund, 1977, 116 pp. (London: Grant & Cutler, distributor, £2.80).

A short but interesting volume of social commentary, with emphasis on such topics as internal inequalities, planning, the effect of recent economic changes, and foreign dependence.

CHILE 1970–1973: LECCIONES DE UNA EXPERIENCIA. Edited by Frederico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos and Henry A. Landsberger. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1977, 470 pp.

These essays, generated by a 1975 University of North Carolina conference, are concerned with themes pertaining to the Allende administration, the causes of its failure, the subsequent regime, and the effects of Chilean events on developments elsewhere. Many of the contributors are former Allende officials.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

FRENCH DEMOCRACY. By Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 126 pp. $6.95.

A remarkable *tour d'horizon,* covering past and inadequate ideologies and providing a blueprint for a better future, a modern democratic society in which pluralism and a higher quality of life would prevail. There are bits of Elysée eloquence: "Justice demands ending of poverty and privilege and discrimination." But how? Will the statesman attain some of what the moralist-critic proposes?

LE RENONCEMENT: DE LA FRANCE DÉFENDUE À L'EUROPE PROTÉGÉE. By Pierre Gallois. Paris: Plon, 1977, 279 pp. Fr. 38.

In this second volume of a new series of Gaullist tracts, a French general denounces Giscard's defense policies, which, so the argument runs, abandoned (in part under German influence) de Gaulle's insistence on absolute French independence. A simple polemic on a complex subject.

PHYSIOLOGIE DE LA FRANCE. By Yves Laulan. Paris: Cujas, 1977, 290 pp. Fr. 32.

The premise of this brief, realistic and provocative book is that French society and policy must adapt to the end of economic growth. He has some harsh, never shrill, things to say to his compatriots: the French army would have difficulty countering a Moroccan or Algerian invasion of Provence; France is not the highly cultured country it imagines itself to be; its police have a not unwarranted reputation for brutality. Serious stocktaking and interesting thoughts on reform, by a former official of NATO who is currently an academic.

LES FRANÇAIS AU POUVOIR? By Jean-Denis Bredin. Paris: Grasset, 1977, 234 pp.

A spirited essay on the unpolitical Frenchman, whose only political act is the occasional and indifferent vote. Barbed comments on the foibles of the French, especially of the Right.

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LES MAITRES PENSEURS. By André Glucksmann. Paris: Grasset, 1977, 321 pp.
LA BARBARIE À VISAGE HUMAIN. By Bernard-Henri Lévy. Paris: Grasset, 1977, 240 pp.

The much-discussed philosophers of "après-mai," who teach a new libertarian dispensation and passionately reject Marx, "Marxomanie" (Glucksmann) and the intellectual traditions that led to Marxism of any "face." Significant tracts for our times—but will they wean people from their long-cherished beliefs?

"EUROCOMUNISMO" Y ESTADO. By Santiago Carrillo. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1977, 218 pp.

The Spanish Communist leader's exposition of Eurocommunism as an autonomous strategic concept born of particular experience and concrete reality and still in the process of elaboration. Reading it leaves one in no doubt as to why Moscow felt compelled to denounce Carrillo. But neither are non-Marxists likely to derive much comfort from his analysis and prescriptions.

J.C.C.

THE ITALIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM: AN INTERVIEW WITH GIORGIO NAPOLITANO OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. By Eric Hobsbawm. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1977, 118 pp. $5.95 (Paper, $3.95).

An English Marxist historian sympathetically interviews a leading intellectual of the Italian Communist Party: the discussion ranges broadly and gives an important insight into the thought and policy of the PCI. In part, Napolitano offers variations on Togliatti's statement: "From democracy we want to take nothing; we want to add to it many things." Predictably, a rather sanguine or tame view of the PCI emerges.

PORTUGAL: THE IMPOSSIBLE REVOLUTION? By Phil Mailer. New York: Free Life, 1977, 399 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95).

An evocative, bitterly partisan diary of the Portuguese revolution, written from a radical-utopian perspective. The enemy is any type of organization or presumption of leadership. The book affords a good view of the mood of the time, of the multiplicity of leftist factions, and of the social problems that bedevilled the revolution.

LLOYD GEORGE: THE GOAT IN THE WILDERNESS. By John Campbell. Totowa (N.J.): Rowman and Littlefield, 1977, 383 pp. $19.50.

An eloquent biography of Lloyd George out of power and still at the heart of British politics: his "spectre haunted the Cabinet Room of his successors like Banquo's ghost." The author laments that petty politics prevented his much-admired subject from returning to leadership and realizing his bold vision of needed reforms.

BRITISH LABOUR AND HITLER'S WAR. By T. D. Burridge. Levittown (N.Y.): Transatlantic Arts, 1977, 206 pp. $10.95.

A fine short study, based on private papers and the recently opened records of Churchill's government, of Labour's role in formulating Britain's wartime policies, especially toward Germany—which, the author argues, was far more substantial than Churchill or subsequent historians have acknowledged.

THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN. By Tom Nairn. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1977, 368 pp. $15.00.

A Marxist analysis of British ills ("The elements of fatality in Great Britain's current crisis" include such symptoms as "the cringing Labour conservatism of 1974–6") but also a wide-ranging critique of the contemporary world and contemporary thought. A literate and useful polemic.

SICHERHEITSPOLITIK VOR NEUEN AUFGABEN. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Karl Markus Kreis. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1976, 444 pp.

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Thirteen essays by German experts on various aspects of international security, including studies of the economic aspects, of terrorism, and of the relationship between German foreign policy and European security.

HITLER'S CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THE BAADER-MEINHOF TERRORIST GANG. By Jillian Becker. New York: Lippincott, 1977, 322 pp. $10.00.

An important subject—the history of the radical West German terrorist group—popularly and rather unsatisfactorily treated. The title is misleading, and the book suffers from too much detail and not enough analysis.

THE MAKING OF ADOLF HITLER. By Eugene Davidson. New York: Macmillan, 1977, 408 pp. $17.50.

A minor contribution to our own "Hitler wave." A readable work, and the mixture of biography and historical re-creation has considerable merit.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER. By Robert G. L. Waite. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 482 pp. $13.50.

A major psychohistorical effort to come to grips with the nature of Hitler's psychopathology and its relation to his public career. Hitler's sexual peculiarities receive greater attention than his political skill or the historical circumstances of his rise to power. A corrective to earlier, one-sided approaches, designed "not to replace but to complement several fine biographies."

THE GERMAN WARS 1914–1945. By D. J. Goodspeed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, 561 pp. $17.50.

A partial account of the two wars, seen as one process, and with a heavy emphasis on military narrative. At times idiosyncratically researched and argued: France is held responsible for World War I, and the record of the half-century is summed up by: "What was begun by murder is now being completed by suicide."

GUERNICA! GUERNICA! A STUDY OF JOURNALISM, DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND HISTORY. By Herbert R. Southworth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 563 pp. $19.95.

A perhaps overly elaborate inquiry into the journalistic distortions in France and in some Catholic newspapers elsewhere of the German bombing of this Spanish town in April 1937—one of the greatest atrocities of the Spanish Civil War.

SECRET ALLIANCE: A STUDY OF THE DANISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 1940–45. By Jorgen Haestrup. Odense (Denmark): Odense University Press, 1976 & 1977, 3 vols. Kr. 80 (each).

A somewhat anecdotal account of the Danish resistance, emphasizing its links to the Allies, especially through the Danish section of SOE. A tale of quiet heroism, based largely on hitherto unused recollections, diaries and other papers.

THE SCANDINAVIAN OPTION: OPPORTUNITIES AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS IN POSTWAR SCANDINAVIAN FOREIGN POLICIES. By Barbara G. Haskel. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976, 266 pp. Kr. 68.

A highly specialized analysis of three postwar efforts at greater Scandinavian integration.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE GIANTS: RUSSIA AND AMERICA. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977, 175 pp. $8.95.

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An extended essay on the Soviet-American relationship since World War II. Written with Barnet's usual verve, it is not calculated to win the plaudits of the Establishment either in Washington or in Moscow, but for this author it is surprisingly mild in style and in judgments.

THE TWENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: ASSESSMENT AND CONTEXT. Edited by Alexander Dallin. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977, 121 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Nine American experts analyze the Congress and, more broadly, the state of the Soviet polity and its leadership at that time (February 1976). Much more than quickie Kremlinology, these are thoughtful and penetrating essays.

THE SUPREME SOVIET: POLITICS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM. By Peter Vanneman. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1977, 253 pp. $11.75.

It may be but a rubber-stamp legislature, but it has a number of functions in the political system useful to the Party and the leadership. Vanneman's careful investigation of the Supreme Soviet (and of its Presidium now headed by Brezhnev) confirms his conclusion that they are institutions which are evolving.

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS. By Michael J. Deane. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 270 pp. $17.50.

In analyzing the role of the Main Political Administration (MPA) in the Soviet military, the author uses an "interest group" approach and stresses the continuing problem the Party has had in asserting its control, partly because the MPA has tended to side with the military.

R.G.H.

SOVIET POLITICAL ELITES: THE CASE OF TIRASPOL. By Roland J. Hill. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 226 pp. $16.95.

As the subtitle indicates, this is a case study of local government and politics in a single provincial city. It is of real interest because we have so few studies of this kind, but it has nothing on the nationality question or whether "Moldavians" have any political role at all in this "typical Soviet town" in the Moldavian S.S.R.

THE RUSSIAN MIND. By Ronald Hingley. New York: Scribner's, 1977, 307 pp. $12.50.

An eminent student of Russian literature, language and politics examines the Russian character and psyche, a subject that has fascinated Westerners for centuries. It is a wide-ranging book addressing many aspects of Russian and Soviet society while wisely avoiding a central theme and firm conclusions.

PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: HOW SOVIET PSYCHIATRY IS USED TO SUPPRESS DISSENT. By Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 510 pp. $12.95.

A powerful and documented book by a psychiatrist and a student of Soviet politics on an internal matter which has developed international implications through worldwide publicity and the campaign for human rights.

THE SAMIZDAT REGISTER. Edited by Roy A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1977, 314 pp. $10.95.

A series of articles on Russian history and society translated from Medvedev's clandestine journal put out in Moscow.

POLITIKA SSHA V RAZVIVAIUSHCHIKHSIA STRANAKH: PROBLEMY KONFLIKTNYKH SITUATSII, 1945–1976. By V. A. Kremeniuk. Mosdow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1977, 223 pp. Kop. 76.

A Soviet scholar's view of U.S. policy in the Third World from the era of the cold war into that of détente. Familiar in content and rigid in its ideological

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approach stressing U.S. imperialism and hostility to socialism and to national liberation movements—indeed almost a mirror image of concurrent American descriptions of Soviet policy—it nevertheless contains some interesting attempts at description, comparison and analysis of different crises.

INSIDE EAST GERMANY: THE STATE THAT CAME IN FROM THE COLD. By Jonathan Steele. New York: Urizen, 1977, 256 pp. $12.95.

A British journalist's picture of the GDR based on careful study and first-hand observation. In correcting its Stalinist image in the West he gives the country its due, and perhaps a little more, as a model authoritarian welfare state and as a junior partner, not a satellite, of the U.S.S.R.

AMÈRE RÉVOLUTION. By Pavel Tigrid. Paris: Albin Michel, 1977, 288 pp. Fr. 45.

Essays by a prominent Czech writer on noted "revisionists" (Djilas, Imre Nagy, Pavel Kohout, the Medvedev brothers, and others), supporting the central proposition of the impossibility of changing communist regimes into democratic systems by the path of reform, liberalization and evolution. A bitter book about bitter revolution, meant both as an exposé of reformists of the past and as a warning to those who put their hopes in the Eurocommunists of the present.

LA PETITE ENTENTE ET L'EUROPE. By Nicolae Iordache. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1977, 397 pp.

A Romanian scholar makes a major contribution to the history of interwar diplomacy with this account of the "Little Entente." Using unpublished documents from the archives of Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest, he adds the perspective of the member-states often slighted in earlier studies. But the conclusions are the same: after the rise of Hitler, it was all downhill.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION TWENTY YEARS AFTER. Edited by Nandor F. Dreisziger. Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. III, No. 2. Ottawa: Hungarian Readers' Service, 1976, 210 pp.

A series of papers disappointingly brief but well worth reading for perspective on the events of 1956, which most of the authors personally experienced.

TITO'S MAVERICK MEDIA: THE POLITICS OF MASS COMMUNICATION IN YUGOSLAVIA. By Gertrude Joch Robinson. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977, 263 pp. $12.95.

A serious and largely successful attempt to describe the transformation of the Yugoslav press and broadcasting media over the past 30 years from political to professional management, from centralized to regional organization, and from full censorship to relative freedom. Where the balance between these opposites will be in the future of "socialist self-management" remains an open question.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, CONFLICT AND HOPE. Critical Choices for Americans: Vol. X. Edited by A. L. Udovitch. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1976, 557 pp. $22.95.

In another hefty volume in the "Critical Choices" series, more than a score of experts write on specific regions and problems and give their varying views on what the choices are. The book has no clear message except that things are going to be difficult, especially because of population growth. The two main chapters on the Arab-Israeli conflict are contributed by an Israeli and an Egyptian.

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TRADITION AND POLITICS: THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES OF ISRAEL. By Gary S. Schiff. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977, 267 pp. $14.95.

A detailed treatment of the history and significance of Israel's four religious parties. Though small, they are not minor factors in Israeli public life since their very existence testifies to unresolved questions as to the nature of the society, and their votes have been crucial to the life of successive governments.

A SENTENCE OF EXILE: THE PALESTINE/ISRAEL CONFLICT 1897–1977. By David Waines. Wilmette (Ill.): Medina Press, 1977, 226 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $4.95).

A Canadian scholar makes a brief historical study of the Arab-Israel dispute, which he sees as basically a problem of Zionists versus Palestinians. He does not hide his sympathy for the latter but manages to write not a polemic but an informative book.

EGYPT 1798–1952: HER ADVANCE TOWARDS A MODERN IDENTITY. By J. C. B. Richmond. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 243 pp. $15.00.

Sir John Richmond, who knows the Middle East well from a career as archeologist, intelligence officer, and diplomat, writes a summary history of Egypt from Napoleon's invasion to Nasser's revolution. His main interest is in the relationship of action and reaction between Western and Eastern communities.

CYPRUS: THE UNFINISHED AGONY. By P. N. Vanezis. Levittown (N.Y.): Transatlantic Arts, 1977, 139 pp. $9.75.

A Greek Cypriot official presents a primer on the Cyprus question and especially the conflict since the "Turkish rape" in 1974. He does, however, chide the Greek Cypriots for their singleminded pursuit of *enosis* and concludes that the future of Cyprus must be that of a unitary state.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SYRIA. By E. Kanovsky. Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1977, 177 pp.

An Israeli economist's study of Syria since the 1950s, part of a larger study on the economic implications of peace in the Middle East. The author feels sure enough of his limited data to conclude that the economy would have done much better without the military burden and the bureaucratic controls.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Rodney Wilson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977, 152 pp. $18.00.

A useful work of reference—though the statistical tables are already out of date—especially for those interested in doing business in the world's fastest-growing import market.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES. Edited by L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1977, 382 pp. $16.95.

An experiment in "letting a few new ideas splash over the ossified received wisdom" of Near Eastern studies. The book has many contributors, little unity, and contents ranging from the culture and psychopathology of an Armenian community in Lebanon to the "modal" personality of Saudi college students. But new ideas are here, and this kind of study is not irrelevant to Near Eastern politics.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINESE SHADOWS. By Simon Leys. New York: Viking, 1977, 220 pp. $10.00.

Widely and deservedly praised, this is a special book, full of moral passion,

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amusing, eloquent, exhilarating, beautifully written, all in the Orwellian tradition. Leys, the pseudonym of a Belgian art historian and Sinologist, documents how years of military-bureaucratic repression have caused irreparable damage to the Chinese culture, spirit and society. This book will certainly find a permanent place in the literature of anti-totalitarianism, and it comes at a moment when the need for demystifying China is particularly urgent.

UP TO THE MOUNTAINS AND DOWN TO THE VILLAGES. By Thomas P. Bernstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 432 pp. $17.50.

The most balanced and thoughtful work yet on the massive transfer of 12 million Chinese urban middle-school graduates to the countryside between 1968 and 1975. Provides very good insights into the attitudes of Chinese youth and the dilemmas facing the government in choosing between swollen cities and forced population transfers.

THE BROKEN WAVE: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PEASANT MOVEMENT 1922–1928. By Roy Hofheinz, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 355 pp. $16.50.

The origins in the 1920s of Mao's strategy of rural revolution and a hard-hitting attack on those theories of revolution, emphasizing social structure, economics and demography at the expense of politics. A long-awaited book that will make a lasting contribution to the China field.

CHINA'S FUTURE: FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-MAO ERA. By Allen S. Whiting and Robert F. Dernberger. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1977, 202 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $5.95).

Dernberger, one of America's leading China economists, concludes that China's economic growth over the next 15 years will require significant imports of food grains, producers' goods (and technology), chemical fertilizers and metals from the West. This, says Dernberger, will force China to develop stable commercial trade, and therefore, political relations with the industrialized and farm-surplus nations in the West, including the U.S. Whiting's plea is for the great powers "to influence Chinese visions and policies toward compromise and conversions of the key issues."

CHINA, OIL, AND ASIA: CONFLICT AHEAD? By Selig S. Harrison. Washington and New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1977, 269 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $10.95).

This is the first comprehensive report on Peking's offshore oil and gas program. Harrison shows why a growing Chinese offshore capability could foreshadow significant clashes with neighboring countries and thus affect the future of Taiwan and South Korea, the Sino-Japanese-Soviet triangle, and Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Filipino relations. In projecting long-term production capabilities, the author is more bullish than recent CIA studies, but he continues to stress that Peking is unlikely to have large surpluses for export to other countries, with the notable exception of Japan.

CHINESE PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD. By G. W. Choudhury. Washington: University Press of America, 1977, 105 pp. $5.50 (Paper).

A former Pakistani government official who left Pakistan in 1971 but has since returned to China on several occasions for extended stays provides a useful addition to the literature on recent Chinese foreign policy. His focus is on how the Chinese leaders view the outside world.

WHITHER CHINA: THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN. By Morris Rothenberg. Washington: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1977, 310 pp.

Although in desperate need of a good editor, this book is an extremely

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important contribution to the literature on Sino-Soviet relations. It is not a book about China but about what Soviet leaders think about China and what sort of impact their thinking may have on Soviet global policies. Rothenberg, a former Soviet specialist in the State Department, makes two important points: that the China factor looms much larger in Soviet thinking than is generally realized, and that the Soviet view of China is by no means static. There is a good introduction by Mose Harvey.

CHINA DIARY: CRISIS DIPLOMACY IN DAIREN. By Paul Paddock. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977, 274 pp. $7.50.

A first-hand and often exciting account of the fate of the U. S. consulate in Dairen at the end of World War II, caught between the Soviet and the Communist Chinese machinations in Manchuria and eventually cut off. Scholars, however, will look in vain for any new light on U.S.-Chinese-Soviet relations in Manchuria at the time.

DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN. By Victor H. Li. Washington and New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1977, 41 pp. $1.50 (Paper).

A timely investigation of the legal problems that would result from the withdrawal of U.S. recognition of Taiwan and the formal recognition of the People's Republic instead. Li argues that a legal framework can be constructed for continuing to deal with Taiwan as a de facto government without de jure recognition.

THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. Edited by Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halpern. New York: Praeger, 1977, 193 pp.

A useful collection of essays with a particularly thoughtful introduction and conclusion by Abraham Halpern. On two key questions, how much legitimacy Park's authority enjoys in the eyes of the public and what are the sources of disaffection, Halpern's answers are that no aspiring opposition as yet has as much support as the Park regime and that the ultimate source of disaffection is the profound change in the social structure resulting from economic growth and industrialization.

APPENDICES TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY: VOL. VII. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 186 pp. $4.60 (Paper).

Of particular interest in this portion of the Murphy Commission Report are the analysis and recommendations of Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, two political scientists from the University of Chicago. The analysis is of U.S. policy in South Asia during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations; the recommendations have implications that go far beyond this period. The Rudolphs contend that substantive knowledge of areas and the power to make decisions are too far apart in the U.S. government. They would eliminate all nine of the functional bureaus in the State Department, and create an Assistant Secretary Policy Planning Council, composed of the assistant secretaries of the geographic bureaus, mandated to manage policies in ways that take account of differing regional perspectives. The NSC should be limited to narrowly defined military and intelligence agendas (as was originally intended) and a leaner State Department would then have primacy in formulating and conducting foreign policy. The Rudolphs offer many other useful suggestions for coping with the general pathology associated with presidential secrecy.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MODERN JAPAN. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 445 pp. $21.50 (Paper, $5.45).
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN. Edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1977, 345 pp.

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Both volumes explore in considerable detail the background of the Japanese foreign policymaking process. Of many excellent essays in both volumes, two exceptionally striking contributions in the Scalapino volume are by Masataka Kosaka and by Scalapino himself. Kosaka probes the roots and contradictions of Japan's defensive and nationalistic foreign economic policy, and Scalapino concludes that Japan "may find no sweeping alternatives to its present policies that would offer better opportunities."

MURDER OF A GENTLE LAND. By John Barron and Anthony Paul. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977, 240 pp. (New York: T. Y. Crowell, distributor, $9.95).

Based on interviews with nearly 300 Cambodian refugees, this account describes in chilling detail the murder of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge. It concludes that more than 1,200,000 men, women and children died as a consequence of the actions taken by the Communists after they assumed power in April, 1975. Cambodia today is a land without universities, without cities, commerce, art, music, literature, science or hope. And, as one young refugee said, "There is no love anywhere."

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

ANTI-APARTHEID: TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT AND WESTERN POLICY IN THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA. By George W. Shepherd, Jr. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1977, 246 pp. $15.95.

This highly knowledgeable survey of the evolution of the Western anti-apartheid movement contrasts the activism of non-governmental organizations with the foot-dragging of Western governments—particularly on the U.N. arms embargo. Shepherd, however, overextends the pessimism implicit in his material when he dismisses the possibility—and even the potential significance—of effective Western governmental action against apartheid.

THE BLACK HOMELANDS OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BOPHUTHATSWANA AND KWAZULU. By Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg and John Adams. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 260 pp. $12.50.

Striving visibly for objectivity, this study considers the possible contributions of the homelands to the achievement of evolutionary change in South Africa, while at the same time thoroughly documenting the vast physical and political constraints on homelands development; in the conclusion, the determined balancing becomes a sometimes bewildering dialectic between future possibilities and present realities. An extremely useful source.

THE PITY OF IT ALL: POLARISATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS. By Leo Kuper. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, 302 pp. $17.50.

In this study of ethnic conflict and genocidal violence in Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda and Zanzibar, a noted sociologist seeks the common elements in their varied patterns. Most interesting are the parallels he draws between the struggles of dominant and subordinate racial groups in colonial Algeria and those in contemporary South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC MINERALS: PIECES ON A CONTINENTAL CHESSBOARD. By W. C. J. van Rensburg and D. A. Pretorius. Pretoria: Foreign Affairs Association, 1977, 156 pp. $13.76.

This glossy semi-official review of South Africa's minerals position reiterates its main theme from a number of ingeniously differentiated angles: South

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Africa's mineral resources, though presently a Western asset, are in ominous proximity to the maw of the Russian bear.

GUINEA: THE MOBILIZATION OF A PEOPLE. By Claude Rivière. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1977, 262 pp. $16.50.

The subtitle is misleading; what the author is describing is the progressive immobilization of Guinean political and economic life over two decades in which the increasingly coercive mechanisms of Sekou Touré's socialism collided with the realities of underdevelopment. The author moves authoritatively across an impressive range of data, significantly enriching the rather meager literature on contemporary Guinea.

LA GUINÉE SANS LA FRANCE. By Sylvaine Soriba Camara. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976, 298 pp. Fr. 95.

A Guinean political scientist traces the course of his country's conflict with France (and with the metropole's main West African clients, the Ivory Coast and Senegal) from the rupture in 1958 through the early 1970s; at first French intransigence, and later the exigencies of Sekou Touré's internal development strategies, have kept the fires flaring.

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Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

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Area handbook for Singapore, by Nena Vreeland and others. Washington, G.P.O. (for the Foreign Area Studies of the American University), 1977. 216 pp.

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PRACTICAL guide to the use of the European Communities' scheme of generalized tariff preferences. Luxembourg, The European Communities, 1977. 268 pp. $4.70.

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THE SOVIET IMPACT ON WORLD GRAIN TRADE, by D. Gale Johnson. Washington, British-North American Committee, 1977. 62 pp. $3.00.

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ERRATA

October 1977

1. In William P. Bundy's "Elements of Power":

a. On page 4, lines 32–33, for "fifteenth and sixteenth centuries," read "sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."

b. On page 19, line 31, for "a real sense," read "in a real sense."

2. In *Recent Books on International Relations*:

a. On page 230, second book, the correct listing is PROBLEMY ZAPRESHCHENIIA ISPYTANII I RASPROSTRANENIIA IADERNOGO ORUZHIIA. By A. N. Kaliadin. Moscow: "Nauka," 1976, 348 pp., Rubles 1.37.

b. On page 232, eighth book, the correct listing is SSHA: GOSUDARSTVO I EKONOMIKA; MEKHANIZM GOSUDARSTVENNO-MONOPOLISTICHESKOGO REGULIROVANIIA EKONOMIKI. Edited by Iu. I. Bobrakov and V. A. Fedorovich. Moscow: "Nauka," 1976, 588 pp. Rubles 2.20.

c. On page 232, line 47, for "Nanka," read "Nauka."

d. On page 237, third book the correct listing is VNESHNIAIA POLITIKA PYATOI RESPUBLIKI. By I. A. Koloskov. Moscow: "Nauka," 1976, 303 pp., Rubles. 1.27.

e. On page 239, third book, the correct listing is OBSHCHESTVENNOST' I PROBLEMY VOINY I MIRA. Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia," 1976, 319 pp.

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